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Abstract
This thesis explores Taiwanese privatisation in the context of global neo-liberalisation. 
It is a study of the relationship between the state, capital and trade unions in relation 
to privatisation and the policy-making process in Taiwan and the Taiwan Railway in 
particular. It pays attention to exploring the three dimensions: first, how the state 
plays its role in the privatisation process; second, what private capital does in order to 
extend its financial interests; and third, whether trade unions have capacity to shape 
privatisation policies.
The thesis draws upon extensive fieldwork that took place in Taiwan and the 
Taiwanese railway industry in particular between May 2005 and November 2007. It 
documents how Taiwanese public sector unions, dependent on the party-state system, 
sought to transform themselves into independent unions during the period of 
privatisation. Using qualitative and participant observation methods, including semi­
structured interviews, fieldnote taking, and documentary analysis, this thesis provides, 
for the first time first-hand, rich, deep, holistic and contextual data on issues that had 
previously been hidden from public debate. These are discussed and analysed with 
particular reference to British and former Soviet Union’s experience in the context of 
privatisation.
Although the research was explicitly located in the context of Taiwan and the Taiwan 
Railway, it is hoped that it has more general significance. Taiwan’s experience, until 
now neglected in debates on privatisation, could extend contemporary debates on the 
topic especially in relation to the various roles of the state, capital and trade unions. In 
particular, it raises for discussion the finding that under certain circumstances, instead 
of being marginalised by privatisation, certain trade unions could gain strong 
bargaining capacity, weakening the role of the state and private capital, and 
significantly shaping the policy process.
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Part I
Introduction to the Research
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades or so, Taiwan has undergone an unprecedented 
transformation in politics, society and the economy (Hu, 1994a). Politically, 
Taiwan abandoned the Leninist party-state system and embraced 
democratisation. The development of political pluralism in line with the 
lifting of martial law resulted in a change in the ruling party in 2000. The 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), which had governed Taiwan 
since the late 1940s, was replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
in 2000. In line with this political development, civil society has been 
encouraged and has flourished. When referring to the Taiwanese economy, 
commentators often speak of an economic miracle between the 1960s and 
1980s (e.g. Hu, 1994b). The term, the “Taiwan experience”, has frequently 
been used to describe its experience in politically “quiet revolutions” and 
successful economic development and strategy (Hu, 1994a; see also Cheng, 
1994; Koo, 1994). After 1989, Taiwan embraced neo-liberal economic 
strategies, adopted, and implemented privatisation.
Privatisation, first initiated by the advanced and liberal democratic countries 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has become a global policy focus. Based 
on the privatisation experience in advanced countries, this neo-liberal trend 
was introduced mainly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank through structural adjustment programmes to developing and Third 
World countries in the 1980s (Tickell and Peck, 2003; see also Komer et al., 
1987). This trend continued and was used, primarily by the West, as a 
“stabilisation programme” to help post-socialist (transition) economies to 
transform from a centrally planned to a market economy (Borisov and Clarke, 
1996; see also Clarke, 1993a; Nellis, 2002). The privatisation trend is
1
globally ubiquitous, though different countries have diverse considerations 
and the outcomes of privatisation have varied. However, in Taiwan, t he 
origins and motives for privatisation were neither to implement structural 
adjustment programmes nor to stabilise political and macroeconomic chaos. 
On the contrary, when the KMT government deliberately implemented 
privatisation in the early 1990s, Taiwan’s economy was strong and the KMT 
was still in power. In addition, trade unions, which were often viewed as 
victims of privatisation policies in liberal democratic countries (Beynon, 
2003; Thomas, 1986; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) or demobilised in transition 
economies (Clarke, 1993b; see also Borisov et al., 1994), experienced the 
process differently in Taiwan. Thus, these aspects seem to imply that the 
Taiwanese privatisation experience was distinctive and should be studied in 
its own right.
Taiwan’s privatisation experience has been largely overlooked by much of 
the literature. One possible explanation is that in the face of geo-political 
confrontation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan has been 
excluded from membership of almost all important international 
organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the IMF and the World Bank 
(Lien, 1994). Nevertheless, after decades of “pragmatic diplomacy”, Taiwan 
joined the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Hu, 1994b). However, as 
a result of its political isolation, Taiwan’s privatisation experience has been 
outside the mainstream discussion of global neo-liberalisation. 
Notwithstanding, Taiwan still plays a part in the global neo-liberalisation 
community, and the state has adopted and implemented privatisation policies.
To understand why the Taiwanese privatisation experience is unusual, it is 
necessary to look back and examine how the Taiwanese state adopted both 
the Leninist party-state ruling system and “state capitalism”. At the same 
time, in order to understand the dynamics of Taiwanese trade unionism, we 
have to look at the forces that have shaped working-class struggle and the 
way in which they developed capacity to organise against the background of
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the party-state structure. Such exploration reveals a complex and, at times, 
contradictory history.
This chapter’s aim therefore is to introduce Taiwan with reference to the 
political and economic environment as well as the trade union movement and 
the role played by trade unions. The Leninist party-state system, which 
defined Taiwanese politics with respect to the economy, society and labour 
movement, is the focus of this chapter. This serves as an important platform 
from which to launch the study and to understand modem day Taiwan. Based 
on this, I will show how the state, capital, and trade unions played different 
roles in state policy development with reference to privatisation. Such 
demonstration will also explain why the Taiwanese experience is so 
interesting and how it contributes to the debate about privatisation and trade 
unions.
1.2 Privatisation -  a global phenomenon
Neo-liberalism involves government sell-offs, fiscal policies, financial and 
labour market deregulation, trade liberalisation, welfare cutbacks, and so on. 
It is the most significant and influential worldwide political, economic and 
social phenomenon during the past three decades or so. As part of this 
approach, privatisation has become a globally ubiquitous policy, since it was 
first initiated by the British Conservative government led by Mrs Thatcher in 
1979. Before the Thatcher government officially adopted privatisation as a 
major economic reform policy, a limited number of privatisations had taken 
place in countries such as Taiwan, Chile, France, Ireland, Italy, and West 
German between the 1950s and 1970s (Chang, 2002; Chen et al., 1991; 
Feigenbaum and Henig, 1997; Miller, 1997). However, during the 1980s and 
1990s it became a key plank of many governmental policies.
The background to such development centres on the shift from Keynesian 
economic policies to monetarism (and neo-liberalism). One notable
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development was in 1976 when the then British Labour government was 
forced to seek emergency financial aid from the IMF, conditional upon 
implementing neo-liberal initiatives, in order to tackle a balance of payments 
crisis, a collapse in the value of sterling, and seemingly ineffective 
intervention in financial markets (Tickell and Peck, 2003: 172; see also 
Harmon, 1997). It has been argued that the 1976 British experience in part 
heralded the demise of Keynesian economics and also paved the way for the 
neo-liberal approach of the Thatcher government.
Privatisation as a major neo-liberal, or New Right, state policy, is far from 
being a monolithic and undifferentiated project throughout the world 
(Famham and Horton, 1996; Tickell and Peck, 2003). In the trend towards 
global neo-liberalisation, even though privatisation is clearly associated with 
the realisation of the downsizing of nation-states, individual liberties and 
market forces, it has been adopted and implemented by countries of 
dissimilar backgrounds at different periods for diverse considerations and 
interests. The privatisation trend led by Mrs Thatcher subsequently extended 
into the rest of the world. Although privatisation in advanced liberal 
democratic countries (e.g. Britain, America and Australia) has led this global 
phenomenon, experience of it in them represents at most one dimension of 
the global privatisation trend.
More generally, such development has also laid the foundation for the 
promotion of neo-liberal policies by the IMF and the World Bank in 
developing countries, as a necessary precursor to economic reform (Tickell 
and Peck, 2003). The wide impacts of these policies have been clearly 
illustrated by Tickell and Peck’s research on global neo-liberalisation. In 
their view, privatisation was initiated as a policy programme reflecting “the 
geo-economic interests of the global North, it has been forged, adapted and 
reshaped in a wide variety of global contexts” -  from structural adjustment 
programmes of Third World countries in the 1980s to shock therapy in 
former communist countries and others whose politics and economy 
underwent transition in the 1990s (Tickell and Peck, 2003: 164-165).
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However, in contrast to the experience of developing and transition countries, 
the way in which Taiwan promoted privatisation was distinctive. First, 
Taiwan introduced privatisation type policies in the 1950s, as part of the 
development of a capitalist economy. For instance, four publicly-owned 
enterprises1 were privatised in accordance with The Act of Privatisation of 
Government-Owned Enterprises of 1953, by the Taiwanese government in 
the early 1950s in order to complete the government’s land reform policy 
and strengthen and develop the financial market (detailed below). Later, the 
Taiwanese government adopted and implemented comprehensive 
privatisation when its economy was growing strongly in the 1980s, as part of 
its policy to reposition the economy internationally. Taiwanese Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was 8.23% in 1989, in comparison 
with 3.54% in the USA, 2.17% in the UK, and 6.08% in South Korea 
(Department of Investment Services, 2008). As regards the unemployment 
rate, Taiwan’s was 1.57% in 1989, in contrast to that of 5.27% in the USA, 
5.99% in the UK, and 2.60% in South Korea (Department of Investment 
Services, 2008). Both percentage figures (relatively high economic growth 
rate and low unemployment rate) suggested that the Taiwanese economy was 
strong and there were no major macroeconomic problems.
Moreover, unlike the transition economies, the Taiwanese political transition 
from a Leninist authoritarian party-state regime to democratisation was 
surprisingly peaceful and smooth and did not result in a significant political 
setback and the collapse of the KMT regime. Although the KMT faced 
unprecedented challenges, its political environment was relatively stable 
during the transition period (Hu, 1994a). From this perspective, the adoption 
of privatisation was certainly not to secure political stability.
Second, despite more than a decade of planning, the Taiwanese government 
found it difficult to privatise some state-owned enterprises, for instance, 
railway, petroleum and electricity. Of these cases, the railway case represents
1 These four government-owned enterprises were the Taiwan Cement Corporation, Taiwan 
Pulp and Paper Corporation, Taiwan Industrial and Mine Corporation and Taiwan 
Agricultural and Forestry Development Corporation.
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the most unusual example of delay and even withdrawal from the 
privatisation list. Trade union opposition played an important part in this 
story. This study reveals the pronounced role of railway workers and their 
organisation, the Taiwan Railway Labour Union (TRLU), in delaying and 
shaping policies towards the privatisation of the Railway. This finding is 
significant and extends the existing debates about privatisation and trade 
unions.
Third, as I indicated above, Taiwan’s privatisation experience has been 
largely ignored in the mainstream literature. Taiwan, as a developing country 
as well as a transition economy, was not a member of the IMF or of the 
World Bank, and thus little data on Taiwan in relation to privatisation 
statistics and figures can be found in research reports written by these 
supranational financial agencies. This neglect means that Taiwan’s 
privatisation experience is omitted from the discussion of global neo­
liberalism.
To summarise, in many aspects, the Taiwanese experience in privatisation is 
extraordinary. This experience is highly associated with the administrative 
structures of the state in Taiwan adopted and implemented by the KMT. 
Therefore, to understand this experience, it is appropriate to introduce the 
political context of Taiwan.
1.3 Taiwan
Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese government in 1895, after the government 
of China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese war. After the Second World 
War, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945 as part of 
the war settlement. However, following the outbreak of the Chinese civil war, 
Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT, was defeated by Mao Ze-dong, the 
leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and retreated to Taiwan in 
1949. Although the KMT was anti-communist, upon defeat, Chiang vowed to
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“turn defeat into victory” by adopting many of the CCP’s organisational 
characteristics and methods. As a result, the KMT became a Leninist type 
party (Dickson, 1993: 56; Eastman, 1981: 658). The decision to embrace 
Leninism and reorganise the KMT as a Leninist party in the early 1950s was 
perhaps the most crucial moment in the political and economic development 
in Taiwan. It also had major implications for the position of Taiwanese trade 
unions.
1.3.1 Consolidation of the KMT regime
Although its intention was not supported by the US government, the KMT 
government sought every opportunity to retake the mainland by force, as it 
continued to claim sovereignty over the mainland China (Amsden, 1985: 78; 
Dickson, 1993; Harper, 1987: 394; Wilkinson, 1994: 115). However, at the 
beginning of its administration in Taiwan, the KMT regime faced political 
and military challenges and was on the brink of collapse. Apart from the 
challenges from domestic and overseas native Taiwanese elites and the 
intelligentsia in political affairs (Chou and Nathan, 1987; Myers, 1994), the 
defeated KMT remained a focus of the CCP’s military activity, even though 
the KMT had retreated to Taiwan. Notwithstanding, the KMT regime 
survived.
A number of crucial factors contributed to the effective consolidation of the 
KMT’s political power in Taiwan. First, a large number of native Taiwanese 
elites, regarded as political dissidents by the KMT regime, were persecuted 
and even murdered in the wake of an island-wide revolt on 28th February 
1947 (Lee, 2004). This historical event was known as the 2/28 Incident. In 
the wake of these political incidents, martial law was promulgated, by which 
the KMT and state apparatus and the police could effectively administer, 
supervise and control society at all levels. For this reason, indigenous 
opposition forces were controlled, repressed and on some occasions forced 
into exile.
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The second reason for the KMT regime’s consolidation in Taiwan was 
support from the United States in the name of anti-communism. During the 
Korean War in the early 1950s, the US government deployed the Seventh 
Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent the invasion of Taiwan by the PRC 
(Dickson, 1993). In addition, in the 1950s, the Americans provided 
substantial financial as well as military aid to help the KMT government 
stabilise itself in Taiwan (Dickson, 1993). As a result, military confrontation 
between the KMT and the CCP, as well as internal tension between the KMT 
and local Taiwanese, were temporarily eased. The implications of the support 
from America were twofold. On the one hand, the KMT polity became 
solidly entrenched in removing the political and economic chaos inherited 
from the Second World War. On the other, American aid together with 
increasing trade dependency drew Taiwan into the US capitalist orbit. Some 
have argued that this economic dependency and the success of export- 
oriented economic development strategies since the 1960s, both contributed 
to the flourishing Taiwanese economy (Chang, 2002; Cheng, 1994; Tsai, 
2001). The introduction of neo-liberalism, deregulation and an open market 
strategy, as well as the idea of privatisation, were in part the outcome of 
Taiwanese trade dependency on the US (Chang, 2002; Tsai, 2001).
Third, it has been argued that the land reform policy introduced by the KMT 
between the late 1940s and early 1950s played an important role not only in 
increasing agricultural production and improving people’s living conditions 
and social status, but also in stabilising and easing the tension between the 
KMT and the local Taiwanese (Chen, 1961; Dickson, 1993; Ho, 1987). The 
motivations for the land reform policy were partly to alleviate this tension 
and to strengthen the KMT’s administrative authority (Kaohsiung Museum 
of Labour, 2006). The principal characteristics of the land reform programme 
were the reduction of land rents, the distribution and sale of public land, the 
purchase of land from landlords and its resale to peasants, and the land-to- 
the-tiller programme (Chen, 1961; Taiwan Year book, 2005). While 
Taiwanese peasants gained cheap land to engage in agricultural production 
and generate an income, landlords were financially compensated and
8
encouraged to develop private businesses (Chen, 1961). It has been argued 
that because an aim of the land reform policy was to redistribute wealth 
between rich and poor, this led to fairer income distribution (Ho, 1987; 
Johnson, 1987; Myers, 1984). Besides, land reform also substantially 
improved agricultural productivity, provided food for the growing urban 
populations, as well as increasing funds for industrial development (Chen, 
1961; Dickson, 1993; Ouyang, 1994; Sun, 1994). The success of the land 
reform policy not only reduced conflicts and tensions between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie, and hence politically strengthened the KMT’s 
jurisdiction in Taiwan, it also economically contributed to the Taiwanese 
industrial reconstruction and economic development.
Finally, in the wake of the political as well as military defeat by the CCP, 
Chiang Kai-shek learnt lessons and, between 1950 and 1952, reorganised the 
KMT as a Leninist party in Taiwan. The reorganisation of the KMT guided 
by Chiang served as a decisive step since it provided the KMT with long­
term advantages. There were several reasons why Chiang viewed Leninism 
as the appropriate model for party reform. In part, it was because Leninism 
was the legacy of Sun Yat-sen’s (the founder of the KMT) ideology, as 
revealed in the Three Principles o f the People (san-min zhu-yi). It was also 
partly because the success of the CCP on the Chinese mainland caused him 
to re-examine the organisational base of the KMT (Chou and Nathan, 1987). 
However, the most obvious explanation as to why Chiang was particularly in 
favour of Leninism actually was the advantages offered by this form of party 
(Dickson, 1993). Reorganising the KMT as a Leninist party together with 
American assistance successfully prevented the KMT from collapsing. 11 
became entrenched in and then dominated Taiwanese politics, the economy 
and society for nearly 50 years. Although Chiang was known for his anti­
communism stance, he extracted and adopted some important features of 
Leninist parties, including a centralised decision-making procedure, policy­
making and policy-implementing structure, propaganda departments, control 
of the military, a cadre system and school (Chou and Nathan, 1987). There 
were six broad goals to this reorganisation:
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(1) make the KMT a revolutionary-democratic party;
(2) broaden the social base of the Party by including peasants, 
workers, youths, intellectuals and producers;
(3) adopt democratic-centralism as the organising principle;
(4) emphasise Party cells as the basic units of the Party;
(5) have all decisions made by Party committees, and personnel and 
other policy matters handled by formal procedures; and
(6) insist that Party members obey the Party, uphold its policies, and 
have a proper work style (Hsu, 1986, cited in Dickson, 1993: 65).
In fact, these goals actually became the main features of the KMT, with far- 
reaching consequences and impacts, including those on the development of 
trade unionism.
1.3.2 Features of the KMT Leninist party-state system
Chiang established an ad hoc party reform committee between 1950 and 
1952. He also embarked on a series of party reforms whereby the Leninist 
party-state ideology, state corporatism and democratic centralism were 
entrenched and continued in effect until the 1990s. This important political 
reform, together with legal restrictions, such as martial law, ensured the 
continuation of an authoritarian regime (Cheng, 1989; Lin, 2002). The 
Central Standing Committee was the highest decision-making body of the 
KMT, with the task of directing the state policy-making process through 
which the guidelines for implementing the policy of Party leadership in terms 
of politics and the military were developed {United Daily News, 08/01/1952: 
01; see also Dickson, 1993).
Democratic centralism was the main principle and approach adopted and 
implemented to complete the Party’s decision-making process (Cheng, 1989; 
Dickson, 1993). Under this principle, “... the individual complies with the 
organisation; the minority yields to the majority; the lower level yields to the
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higher level ...” (Chang, n.d., cited in Dickson, 1993: 69). This guiding 
principle was also applied to administer and supervise workers and union 
organisations at the industrial level, and union confederations at the regional 
and national level. The principle of top-down decision-making and policy- 
implementation strictly defined and limited the function and role of the trade 
unions. They could only represent members’ interests, in accordance with the 
Party’s definition, within the limits of the Leninist party-state system (c.f. 
Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993a). In addition, under the principle of democratic 
centralism, trade union organisations were developed and incorporated into 
the strictly hierarchical monolithic governing structure of the party-state (c.f. 
Ashwin and Clarke, 2003). In addition, like other Leninist parties, the KMT 
also restricted horizontal contacts between unions at the local level. Unions 
could only affiliate upward with the upper union confederations and the 
union centre, the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL). Both national and 
local levels of organisation were under the control of the party-state (c.f. 
Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993a).
By means of a commissar system, party organs were developed and able to 
control and penetrate administrative units at various levels of government 
and the army (Cheng, 1989). In addition, party cells were deeply embedded 
in the military so that the Party was able to conduct close supervision, 
maintain repression and control and mobilise the army. Moreover, selective 
Party members received moral training by way of a cadre system and a cadre 
school (Dickson, 1993). The creation and maintenance of a cadre force 
proved essential to the success of the Party’s hegemony (Dickson, 1993: 76). 
For instance, mass movement cadres, normally the heads of social and labour 
organisations, were appointed to work with members of those organisations 
on behalf of the Party. Understandably, the cadres’ main function was to 
closely supervise and provide direct consultation and assistance to the 
organisations in which they worked in order to secure smooth policy- 
implementation and prevent unexpected labour movement activity, including 
the emergence of an independent organised labour. Under this organisational 
structure, the KMT effectively and closely linked together the state apparatus, 
government departments, the society and labour unions. The KMT’s Leninist
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party-state system provided an essential platform for the KMT to exert and
expand its hegemonic power in Taiwan.
By means of the above, the KMT transformed itself into a Leninist party. 
Further, as I argued earlier, the KMT regime benefited from such state and 
legal systems since it was able to successfully consolidate and gain dominant 
power over politics, the economy and social movement. Such state and legal 
systems effectively excluded people from participating in political affairs and 
major economic activities and from organising any form of social 
movements. Moreover, such exclusion had far-reaching consequences for the 
subsequent development of politics, the economy, society and trade union 
movement. In terms of politics, the Taiwanese state had genuinely become a 
party-state authoritarian dictatorship. Within the party-state apparatus, the 
state and the Party were linked, interchangeable and inseparable. Moreover, 
membership of the KMT was the main criterion to serve in government, the 
army and educational organisations. In other words, the state and the Party 
had become integrated in aims and in practice.
However, the KMT model of the party-state had at least one structural 
difference from that of other Leninist party-states, that is, the adoption of 
capitalist economic principles and practice. The historic origins of this aspect 
lay, first, with Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles o f the People — namely, 
nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood. Of the three ruling 
principles, the people’s livelihood was basically a form of “state capitalism” 
in that it was under the state’s planning and regulation (Cheng, 1989; see also 
Clarke, 1993c). The rationale for state-regulated capitalism was that the state 
had obligations to secure fair and equal distribution of wealth among the 
people through the development of private business and industry and to avoid 
monopoly and over-concentration of private capital (United Daily News, 
07/08/1952: 2). The nature of state-regulated capitalism in Taiwan was still a 
form of capitalism (c.f. Burawoy and Krotov, 1993). Nevertheless, the party- 
state in Taiwan did not abandon the idea of public ownership, which had 
been emphasised by Leninism. The state effectively controlled and operated 
some major public sector industries, mainly transport, petroleum, electricity
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and telecom, and other strategic industries. Therefore, the KMT, in nature, 
was regarded as a Leninist type party rooted in capitalism that rested on the 
state’s approach to planning and regulation.
Second, the relationship between the KMT and private capital had developed 
at a time when the KMT regime was in mainland China and when tension 
with the CCP was beginning to build up (Coble, 1979). The power of the 
CCP developed with the support of the proletariat, mainly labourers, farmers 
and students. Urban capitalists and the bourgeoisie, for example in Shanghai, 
were driven to form an alliance with a more conservative wing of the KMT 
to protect their wealth (Coble, 1979). In the wake of the success of the CCP’s 
proletarian revolution in the Chinese mainland, capitalists followed the 
defeated KMT and retreated to Taiwan. Here, the KMT allowed native 
bourgeoisie (ex-landlords) to invest in commercial and industrial 
developments. They were given land bonds in kind and shares in the four 
privatised government enterprises as compensation (Chen, 1961; United 
Daily News, 26/07/1952: 1; United Daily News, 02/02/1953: 3). 
Encouragement of these economic activities was important for entrenchment 
of the KMT in Taiwan. The adoption of capitalism distinguished the 
Taiwanese party-state from other Leninist parties. Capitalism under state 
regulation could be regarded as a “political safety valve” for the KMT 
regime in Taiwan, since it dissuaded the bourgeoisie from involvement in 
political affairs and thus challenging the KMT’s hegemony.
However, this type of state capitalism was forced to transform when the 
KMT regime was incorporated into a US-dominated domain. F irst, such 
development centred on an anti-communist military alliance and, later, on 
international trade relationships. Taiwan’s increasing economic dependency 
on America made it difficult for the KMT government to resist the US 
government’s demand for economic openness and liberalisation. 
Paradoxically, this gradually induced the transformation of the party-state 
system to political pluralism and democratisation, which included the 
development of an independent labour movement.
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1.3.3 The party-state’s economic power in Taiwan
The KMT government played a dominant and interventionist role in the 
economy (Deyo, 1989). Such a state-dominated economy and “guided 
capitalist market” were evident in three respects (White and Wage, 1988: 3). 
The first was public ownership through nationalisation of various industries, 
most of which were in the form of monopoly, oligopoly, or franchise (Chen 
et al., 1991: 64-69). The second was private ownership via regulating and 
guiding native private capital to invest in state-selective major industries, for 
instance, car and high-tech industries (Tsai, 2001). In this category, major 
industries, though privately owned, were highly protected from foreign 
competition by the state through tariffs and import regulations (Huang, 2002). 
Some view this industrial development policy as a neo-mercantilist policy 
(Huang, 2000). The third and remaining economic activities were located in 
private small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which, as mentioned 
earlier, had been created by the native bourgeoisie under the encouragement 
of the KMT. These SMEs, which tended to be family-owned businesses and 
less unionised1, had relatively more economic freedom and were independent 
of the party-state, in comparison with the other two categories (Cheng, 1989).
The majority of public sector industries, such as public utilities, 
transportation, banking, raw materials and manufacturing, were inherited 
from the Japanese colonisation period. This part of production accounted for 
half of the national industrial production by the 1950s (Cheng, 1989). A 
number of public sector enterprises, set up on the mainland, retreated and 
were re-established along with the KMT to Taiwan. Others were newly 
established, including manufacturing, steel, shipyard and petrochemicals, 
during the period of the “Ten Major Construction Projects” (1972-76) and
1 The Labour Union Law regulates that “An industrial union or a craft union shall be 
organised [in an organisation where] workers ... exceed the number of thirty” (Article 6). 
However, the Industry, Commerce and Service Census in Taiwan in 2001 showed that 
907,698 companies, equivalent to 97 per cent of the total number of companies in Taiwan at 
that time, had recruited less than 30 employees in the company (DGBAS, 2001). This 
suggests that to organise a trade union within these SMEs would have been almost 
impossible.
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the “Six-Year Plan” (1976-81) (Chang, 2002: 50; Tsai, 2001). Officially, 
there were hundreds of public sector enterprises, whose total turnover in 
1989 was 15 per cent of GDP (Chen et al., 1991: 89 and Table 1-1). This 
figure falls between that of public sector enterprises in advanced capitalist 
economies (e.g. their total turnover in Britain of 10 per cent of GDP prior to 
1979), and that of such enterprises in a selection of sub-Saharan developing 
countries (their total turnover of 17 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s) 
(Nellis and Kikeri, 1989: 659). This could in part illustrate the KMT’s two- 
way developmental strategy in which, economically, the state allowed and 
encouraged private ownership but at the same time the state also dominated 
major industries for political purposes. However, if the economic activities 
controlled by the state were calculated with those controlled by the KMT, the 
actual turnover of public enterprises was believed to be more than 30 per cent 
of GDP (Chen et al., 1991: 89-90). Nevertheless, whatever the correct figure, 
the Taiwanese party-state derived a huge financial advantage from this 
economic structure.
The party-state’s economic power was extended by the incorporation of key 
social, political and economic actors in ways described below that prevented 
them from challenging the Party’s authority, thereby strengthening the 
Party’s power (Lin, 2002: 2-3). Implementation of state corporatism has been 
widely recognised as the most prominent control technique, not only over 
political affairs but also over labour relations (Hsu, 1987: 189-204 and 1989: 
107-110; Wang and Fang, 1992: 9-14). One of the major consequences of the 
party-state corporatism was the emergence of relatively peaceful labour- 
management relations within industries. Some further argue that in addition 
to state corporatism, Taiwan’s neo-mercantilist policy provided workers, 
particularly those who worked in public and the protected enterprises, with 
secure employment and better working conditions (Huang, 2000). Therefore, 
orderly industrial relations in this category of enterprises became the norm. 
Clearly, under these circumstances, peaceful industrial relations became one 
of the main drivers securing high economic growth in Taiwan between the 
1960s and 1980s (Deyo, 1989: 87-105).
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In a study of newly developed Asian states, Deyo contends that disciplined 
and low-cost labour were two important prerequisites for sustaining high 
economic growth (Deyo, 1987: 182-202 and 1989: 87-105). In Taiwan, 
repression and incorporation of labour were by: (1) legal regulations brought 
in from the mainland by the KMT; (2) trade unions fostered and controlled 
by the KMT; (3) political exclusion at the national level strengthened by 
martial law; and (4) secure employment and better terms and conditions in 
the public and protected private sector. These mechanisms served as the 
foundation to secure a disciplined labour force (Deyo, 1989: 107-109; Huang, 
2000: 15). Trade unions, regarded as a Party’s administrative organ within 
industry, played a crucial role in ensuring trouble-free employee- 
management relations. The state incorporated trade unions and union elites 
into the party-state structure, creating a form of unionism that was politically 
subordinate to and dependent on the Party. It has been widely acknowledged 
that such strategies were the main forms of control of labour (Hsu, 1987; 
Koo, 1987; Pan, 2006; Wang, 1996; Wang and Fang, 1992). The result was 
the development of dependent trade unionism.
In short, under the KMT, a Leninist party-state system in association with 
state controlled capitalism was effectively developed. Taiwan thus became a 
particular state form combining state control and a capitalist form of 
economic expansion. The KMT regime represented the interests of the 
bourgeoisie; this newly evolved middle class supported the KMT regime. At 
the same time, the majority of workers who benefited from state capitalism 
and a neo-mercantilist policy we re unwilling to oppose the authoritarian 
party-state; or, perhaps more accurately, were unable to organise independent 
of the state. This distinctive corporatist approach together with the principle 
of democratic centralism had profound implications for the development of 
trade unionism.
In one sense, Taiwanese dependent trade unionism had similarities with the 
Soviet Union. However, in the wake of implementing privatisation as a state 
reform policy and the collapse of the party-state regime, the transformation 
path and experience of trade unionism in the two countries appears to be very
16
different. While trade unions in Taiwan developed and transformed in 
independent ways, official unions in the Soviet system merely shifted from 
the Party to rely on enterprise management (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993a). 
Although independent unions had emerged in competition with official 
unions in the wake of the transition to a market economy in Russia, their 
functions, roles and representativeness were largely limited and restricted 
and tended to be ignored by management (Clarke et al., 1993; Borisov et al., 
1994). In contrast however, labour in Taiwan sought to transform the official 
unions from within. The way in which Taiwanese independent workers 
challenged the union leadership (which had been controlled by the party-state) 
is impressive and has far-reaching consequences for the permanent 
entrenchment of independent trade unionism in Taiwan. This thesis 
documents this undocumented Taiwanese experience.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
Central to this thesis is the research on the Taiwan Railway as a case study, 
with particular reference to the British experience of privatisation and 
Russian trade unionism in the context of privatisation. The aim of this 
research is to explore the issue of privatisation in Taiwan and the relationship 
between privatisation and the main actors of the privatisation process, 
particularly trade unions. For these reasons, this thesis is divided into four 
parts. The first part sets out to present the background for this research. 
Chapter 2 reviews two sets of literature. The first focuses on privatisation as 
a global phenomenon, which Tickell and Peck (2003) describe as a key 
feature of global neo-liberalisation. Three categories of privatisation, namely, 
in developed countries, developing countries and transition economies, are 
discussed. These discussions will consider the role of the state and capital in 
the process of privatisation. The second set of literature comprises an 
examination of trade unions in both liberal democratic countries, particularly 
the UK and Australia, and in post-communist countries, mainly Russia, with
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reference to privatisation. In the end of Chapter 2, general research questions 
will be identified.
Chapter 3 provides a history of Taiwanese trade unionism. It starts by 
exploring the features of Taiwanese trade unions in the Leninist type party- 
state system. Taiwan adopted a particular type of state development strategy 
in which Leninist party-state political control and capitalist economic 
expansion were both embedded. Against the backdrop of this particular 
development background, dependent trade unionism and ‘cosy’ industrial 
relations were the norm. However, when the party-state regime was 
challenged and Taiwan gradually embraced democratic practices, an 
organised labour and independent labour movement emerged to represent 
workers’ interests and challenge the union leadership through union election. 
The trend towards an independent labour movement mainly appeared in 
public enterprises and then became a national phenomenon. In this chapter, I 
argue that since the late 1980s privatisation has played an important part in 
providing the opportunity for trade unions to become independent from the 
state and the party. In the end of this chapter, I formulate four Research 
Questions pertaining to Taiwan based on the discussions.
Chapter 4 first explains how this research was carried out. The data on which 
this thesis is based was obtained from extensive fieldwork which commenced 
since 2005. It was collected primarily from semi-structured interviews 
conducted with trade unions officials, government officials, legislators, 
railway managers and employees. Moreover, on-site observation and 
participation were also utilised. In addition, detailed documentary analysis of 
reports and related material on pertinent issues was also undertaken. In this 
chapter, I consider the issue of gaining access to study participants and the 
question of involvement as an insider and detachment as an outsider during 
the fieldwork.
In Part II, the research begins to consider privatisation and Taiwanese trade 
unions. Chapter 5 studies the relationship between policy choices of public 
sector trade unions and bargaining capacity in the context of privatisation. I
18
first investigate the origins of and motives for privatisation in Taiwan. I then 
examine how Taiwanese public sector trade unions responded to privatisation 
proposals. The research reveals that public sector trade unions’ attitudes 
towards privatisation varied. Some unions chose to oppose it, while others 
did not. In order to analyse this phenomenon, I present an analytical 
framework, based on the Taiwanese government’s rationale for privatisation, 
and illustrate the relationship between choice of union policy and changes in 
bargaining capacity in the privatisation context. The research suggests that 
the different economic contexts of these firms in which trade unions operated 
were not only linked to the way in which public sector trade unions chose to 
respond to privatisation but also associated with the changes in union 
bargaining capacity. Of significance, this last point draws attention to the 
history of the way unions organise and operate. Thus, although structural 
analysis is applied, this research does not ignore other explanatory aspects, 
particularly union leadership, organisational capacity, and its impact on 
union bargaining capacity.
This leads to Part III of the thesis which addresses privatisation of the 
Taiwan Railway and the railway union. Chapter 6 documents the history of 
the Taiwan Railway and the proposal for privatising this public sector. I 
analyse the reasons why the government attempted to privatise the Taiwan 
Railway. Modelled on Britain and influenced by private capital, the 
government proposed “separation” of railway infrastructure and train 
operations. However, the “separation” scheme was withdrawn and replaced 
by that of the “integration”, mainly due to opposition from the railway union.
In the following chapters, I discuss the sources of railway union power and 
activism. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 explain why the railway union was able to 
successfully challenge and influence the privatisation policy. Chapter 7 
examines how the Taiwan Railway Labour Union (TRLU) was established 
and what forces propelled moves towards an independent form of unionism. 
This chapter focuses on the issue of the emergence of the TRLU (as a party- 
state political instrument) and its transformation. A workers’ group, the 
Taiwan Railway Workers’ Fellowship (TRWF), was established outside the
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official TRLU by autonomous railway workers for the purpose of 
challenging the union leadership and transforming the official union into a 
worker-led one. The way in which railway workers rebelled had crucial 
sociological implications for the union and its activity within the industry.
Chapter 8 introduces another independent railway workers’ group, the Train 
Drivers’ Fellowship (TDF), and shows how this fellowship played on 
sectional interests in the railway industry. Further, this chapter documents 
how train drivers made best use of their distinctive role between the railway 
management and the TRLU in order to secure train drivers’ sectional 
interests. Although sectionalism has had negative impacts on the 
contemporary TRLU’s practices and actions, the two groups in fact need 
assistance from each other in order to sustain their bargaining capacity. For 
this reason, the TRLU still maintains a good relationship with the TDF and 
retains a critical role in terms of negotiation with the government on many 
issues.
Chapter 9 discloses a distinctive relationship between railway managers and 
the TRLU in the context of privatisation. Railway managers and the TRLU 
formed a tacit alliance in order to oppose privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. 
Railway managers, as the “state management”, could not express their 
opinions and concerns against the government’s privatisation policy for the 
Taiwan Railway. While railway managers had provided the TRLU with some 
necessary support when confronting the government, the TRLU began to 
speak on behalf of managers and negotiate with the government on the 
privatisation issue. This cross-class collaboration is sociologically important 
for the future development of the industry.
Finally, in Part IV, the analysis is drawn together. In Chapter 10,1 assess the 
issues and arguments discussed in the empirical chapters. In particular, the 
role of the state, capital and trade unions in the privatisation process of the 
Taiwan Railway is assessed and evaluated in detail. I further consider the 
implications of findings derived from this study and suggest further research 
directions.
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Chapter 2 
Privatisation and 
the State, Capital and Trade Unions
2.1 Introduction
In the wake of the pervasive global economic crisis, unprecedented since the 
Second World War, Keynesian economics, once predominant, came under 
severe criticism. During the 1970s, neo-liberalism with its emphasis on 
monetarist programmes, liberalisation of prices, free market competition and 
the minimal role and functions of the state, was gradually proposed by many 
governments. Privatisation is one of the most important dimensions of neo­
liberalism approaches to governance. Strongly associated with Mrs Thatcher, 
privatisation focuses on the sale of government assets, fiscal policies and the 
deregulation of financial and labour markets. The aim is to address the 
negative impacts that supposedly result from Keynesian policies.
The origins of privatisation policies are complex. One strand of argument 
points to the difficulties faced by the British Labour Government during the 
macroeconomic crisis of the mid-1970s, including IMF financial aid. With 
the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 and the Regan 
administration in 1980, Keynesian economics was rejected. These beginnings 
of neo-liberal policies encouraged the IMF and other international financial 
agencies to promote privatisation and related measures elsewhere, where 
economies were on the brink of collapse and hence required different 
economic policies (Tickell and Peck, 2003). Generally speaking, apart from 
privatisation in developed countries, there has been a much wider impact of 
these policies, illustrated clearly by Tickell and Peck’s research on global 
neo-liberalisation (Tickell and Peck, 2003). In their research, Tickell and 
Peck identify a policy programme advancing the capitalist power of the
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global North. Privatisation has been part of a raft of policies that have 
reshaped and reconstructed economies to fit the policy into a wider global 
context, ranging from structural adjustment programmes of developing 
countries in the 1980s to shock therapy in former communist countries in the 
1990s (Tickell and Peck, 2003: 164-165).
The role of the state, capital and trade unions is seen to be significant in the 
global neo-liberalisation context (see Fairbrother and Rainnie, 2006). States 
throughout the world have been extensively restructured and reorganised 
(Fairbrother et a l , 2002). States have pursued policies of redrawing 
boundaries and disengaging from the organisation and ownership of 
government businesses. This has taken the form of deliberate restructuring in 
the developed Anglo-American state (e.g. Britain, America, Australia and 
New Zealand) (Fairbrother et al., 2002; Kelsey, 1995; Veljanovski, 1987), or 
externally encouraged privatisation as those in developing countries and 
transition economies (Fischer, 1992; Nellis, 2002). In contrast with 
developed and capitalist countries, privatisation in both developing countries 
and transition economies has been a policy imposed mainly by international 
forces, in the form of financial aid. The provision of aid was conditioned 
upon the implementation of economic restructuring, mainly in the form of 
deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. Under the influence and 
intervention of supranational financial agencies, these countries have had 
little option but to adapt to this force and implement privatisation and related 
policies.
These developments in relation to privatisation and the role of the state and 
capital draw attention to the role of labour and trade unions which is also 
significant in the global neo-liberalisation context. In liberal democratic 
countries, and transition economies, the role and functions of trade unions 
differ (Ashwin, 2004; Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Barton and Fairbrother, 
2007; Clarke et al., 1993; Fairbrother, 2000; Fairbrother et al., 2002). In 
liberal democratic countries, trade unionism indeed has been shaped by 
privatisation. Some trade unions have certainly been victimised as they 
experienced a significant decline in union density. Further, some have argued
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that privatisation stimulated the decentralisation of bargaining (Fairbrother, 
1994a and 1994b; Fairbrother and Testi, 2002; Foster and Scott, 1998). Such 
developments led trade unions to renew themselves during the aftermath of 
privatisation, for example, railway unions in the British privatised railway 
industry, and Australian unions in the privatised transport and electricity 
sectors (Arrowsmith, 2003; Barton and Fairbrother, 2007; see also 
Fairbrother and Yates, 2002).
In contrast however, in transition economies, like Russia, trade unions 
adopted a rather different path. Instead of confronting privatisation, Soviet 
trade unions chose to accept and adapt to privatisation. Such a response was 
part of embracing democratisation and seeking the disintegration of the 
power of the party-state, breaking the administrative-command system and 
thereby becoming “proper” trade unions (Clarke et al., 1993; Clarke and 
Fairbrother, 1994). To form a “social partnership” with enterprise 
management is the way in which Soviet trade unions sought to survive and 
maintain their limited role and distributive functions in the post-privatisation 
era (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Clarke et al., 1993).
In order to discuss the role of the state, capital and trade unions in the neo­
liberalisation context, this chapter first reviews the literature in relation to 
privatisation in developed countries, developing countries, and transition 
economies. Based on this review, the role of the state and capital in the 
context of privatisation will be examined. This chapter will then consider the 
role of trade unions in liberal democratic countries, particularly in Britain 
and Australia, and in transition economies, particularly in Russia. Based on 
the literature review and discussions, the general research questions will be 
identified.
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2.2 The state and capital in the privatisation process
Privatisation as a global phenomenon has not only been implemented in 
developed countries but also in developing countries and transition 
economies. However, different forms of states have diverse considerations 
and goals. While some states have implemented it as the way in which states 
relocate their roles in their economies, others have had little option but to 
adopt it as a requirement for securing the involvement of capital and the 
support of supranational financial agencies for economic reconstruction and 
development. Accordingly, the state and capital seem to play different but 
interrelated roles in the privatisation process.
2.2.1 Privatisation in developed countries
It is widely believed that privatisation in Britain was “a policy which was 
adopted almost by accident, but has become politically central; a policy 
which has no clear-cut objectives, but has become almost an end in itself’ 
(Bishop and Kay, 1988: 1). When Mrs Thatcher came to office in 1979, the 
idea of, not the term “privatisation”, was proposed to tackle British economic 
malaise. As stated in the 1979 Conservative Party’s election manifesto:
To master inflation, proper monetary discipline is essential, with 
publicly stated targets for the rate of growth of the money supply. At 
the same time, a gradual reduction in the size of the Government’s 
borrowing requirement is also vital... All the controls [done by the 
Labour Government] have achieved is a loss of jobs and a reduction 
in consumer choice... The State takes too much of the nation’s 
income; its share must be steadily reduced... We will scrap 
expensive Socialist programmes... [and] reduce government 
intervention in industry... The reduction of waste, bureaucracy and 
over-government will also yield substantial savings. We shall cut 
income tax at all levels to reward hard work, responsibility and 
success; tackle the poverty trap; encourage saving and the wider 
ownership of property (Conservative Party, 1979).
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In the face of economic hardships and market failures attributed to the failure 
of the Keynesian demand management approach, Mrs Thatcher committed 
herself to two sets of policies. On the one hand, Thatcher proposed 
monetarist approaches, including controlling the money supply, reducing 
public expenditure and cutting income tax, as an economic panacea to tackle 
the British economic problems. On the other hand, she pursued public sector 
reform through liberalisation and free-market competition as a solution for 
dealing with the supposed inefficiencies of the public sector. Initially, 
privatisation was mainly implemented in some small public sector enterprises, 
which already operated in competitive markets, and in the sale of publicly 
owned council houses (Bishop and Kay, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
However, these monetarist approaches were limited and further slowed down 
British economic development (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1997). Large-scale 
privatisation programmes were then placed at the policy forefront 
(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1997; Wolfe, 1989).
From her second term of office from 1983 onwards, privatisation became a 
major driver inspiring the Thatcher government in many aspects. The 
unexpected popularity of the sale of the shares in British Telecom in 1984 
raised a total of nearly £4 billion , six times larger than any previous issue on 
the UK stock market (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 647). The prospect of 
immediate financial gain through privatisation largely fulfilled the Thatcher 
government’s intention to reduce public expenditure and the public sector 
borrowing requirement (Beaumont, 1992; Heald, 1984; Heald and Steel, 
1986; Marsh, 1991; Ramanadham, 1988; Stevens, 2004; in contrast, see 
Brittan, 1984: 113). The success of the sale of the shares in British Telecom 
was followed by the sale of shares in British Gas in December 1986, British 
Airways in February 1987, Rolls Royce in May 1987, and the British 
Airports Authority in July 1987, generating proceeds of nearly £9 billion in 
total (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 647-648). Parallel to conversion of state 
enterprises through the sale of shares was privatisation through the sale of 
state assets. Compared with the former privatisation scheme, the latter tended 
to be small in terms of proceeds, such as British Steel, British Shipbuilders 
and British Rail (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 647-648). In one sense, gaining
25
income through the sale of public assets or shares could be politically more 
acceptable to the electorate than reducing public expenditure (Abromeit, 
1988; Brittan, 1984). This economic achievement later drove Mrs Thatcher 
to re-orient privatisation as an electoral policy (Stevens, 2004: 56).
The second crucial inspiration for the Thatcher government was to achieve 
increasing efficiency through a change in ownership from public to private. 
This brought to the forefront the importance of the privatisation programme. 
The shift, from the rhetoric of liberalisation and competition to ownership, 
clearly indicated that privatisation programmes had become ideologically 
driven political strategies (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1997; Jackson and Price, 
1994).
In developing the privatisation policy, it has been argued that the Thatcher 
government had tactical as well as systemic considerations, of which there 
were two major aspects. First, it has been argued by economists and others 
that market competition is the key to the success of increasing efficiency, 
rather than a change in ownership (Abromeit, 1988; Bishop and Kay, 1989; 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Yarrow, 1986). However, during the second term 
of the Thatcher government, the emphasis on increasing efficiency through 
open-market competition shifted to that of a change in ownership. Pursuing 
open market competition was played down as a means of increasing 
efficiency (Bishop and Kay, 1989). The Thatcher government repeatedly 
advised that an increase in market competition might generate negative 
impacts on raising more money from privatisation. The sale of the whole 
would yield more than the sum of the sale of the parts, though the latter 
might not always be true (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 651). In addition, during 
the process of large-scale privatisation, senior managers of public sector 
monopolies, such as British Gas, the Central Electricity Generating Board 
and British Airways and others, argued for privatisation of their businesses as 
intact entities (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 651). This further justified the 
government’s ideology in terms of pursuing efficiency through a change in 
ownership.
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Second, the pursuit of large-scale privatisation through either the sale of 
shares or the disposal of assets provided the government with opportunities 
to transfer public resources to favoured interest groups and to win over votes 
from those who were in traditional Labour constituencies. In other words, 
privatisation was translated into electoral gains for the Conservative Party 
(Stevens, 2004). The political popularity of privatisation emerged following 
the success of privatising British Telecom and others. As John Moore stated 
in July 1984:
As we dispose of state-owned assets, so more and more people have 
the opportunity to become owners... So these policies also increase 
personal independence and freedom, and by establishing a new breed 
of owners, have an important effect on attitudes. They tend to break 
down the divisions between owners and earners... (cited in Abromeit, 
1988: 71).
The idea of broadening share ownership later lay at the heart of the 
Conservative Party election manifesto in 1987. The idea was the pursuit of 
“popular capitalism” and “wider share ownership” (Conservative Party, 
1987). Research on constituencies’ voting attitudes and behaviour showed 
that privatisation had had a positive effect on those voters who had benefited 
from the programme of popular capitalism and wider share ownership 
(Marsh, 1991). For instance, a MORI opinion poll, conducted in Britain in 
March 1986 among those whose purchase of British Telecom shares was 
their first share purchase, showed that 53 per cent had voted Conservative, 
while only 14 per cent had voted Labour (Veljanovski, 1987: 68-69). In 
addition, the British Election Study data between 1979 and 1987 suggested 
that there had been a major swing to the Conservative Party between 1979 
and 1983 among those who had bought their council houses and a smaller 
swing to the Conservatives between 1983 and 1987 among those who had 
bought shares (Crewe, 1989, Table 13). The evidence that privatisation could 
lead to electoral benefits was therefore significant.
However, it has been argued that the way in which the Conservative 
government achieved the goal of broadening share ownership was through 
underpricing the selling objects (Abromeit, 1988; Stevens, 2004). Bishop and
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Kay commented that “in pricing issues the government had been ready to 
sacrifice revenue to secure wider share ownership” (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 
650). For example, people who purchased the shares of Amersham, and then 
sold them on, immediately gained 35 per cent higher proceeds than the price 
paid (Stevens, 2004: 57). The same scenario was observed in other 
privatisations, including British Telecom, council houses and British Rail 
(Bishop and Kay, 1989: 647).
It can be argued that underpricing of the selling objects might have had two 
significant political implications. First, it could have drawn more people, 
attracted by an immediate financial gain, into privatisation. In this way, 
underpricing almost guaranteed the success of privatisation, and created a 
situation where the beneficiaries of privatisation would be more likely to vote 
Conservative. Second, privatisation by its very nature is a policy that rests on 
the involvement of private capital. Therefore, in order to fulfil its political 
goal of wider share ownership, the Conservative government was more likely 
to set the price of shares or assets below their market value to draw in private 
capital and resources. This phenomenon seems to suggest that private capital 
plays a role that governments consider when privatisation is in process. 
Specifically, it could be contended that, based on the British experience, the 
success of privatisation seems to depend on whether the government could 
formulate and design a favourable policy and prices that would attract private 
capital. The account that the government and private capital play an 
interrelated role in the process of privatisation has been demonstrated in my 
earlier study on the privatisation of British Rail. The political purpose of 
Thatcher’s privatisation programmes was so significant and influential that 
Nigel Lawson commented: “between 1984 and 1987 privatisation as a 
valuable electoral policy became the Thatcherite ‘jewel in the crown’” (cited 
in Stevens, 2004: 58).
It has also been asserted that the political objective of popular capitalism and 
wider share ownership is also to reduce public sector trade union power 
(Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990: 13). The intention of implementing 
privatisation to weaken trade union power could be on the one hand, tactical
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and, on the other, systemic. Privatisation has been viewed as a long-term 
political strategy to minimise the power of organised labour, particularly that 
in state-owned enterprises (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1997). The sources and 
use of public sector trade union power in the context of Keynesian policies in 
Britain has been widely addressed and examined by various authors 
(Beaumont, 1992; Clegg, 1976; Femer, 1988; Freeman, 1986; Hanson, 1991; 
Longstreth, 1988; Pendleton, 1993). In line with the implementation of 
privatisation, the Thatcher government had the intention to weaken public 
sector trade union power (believed to be the main cause leading to wage and 
labour market rigidities and the rise in public expenditure) by introducing 
market competition mechanisms and revitalising managerial prerogatives 
(Marsh, 1991; Moore, 1986). The political intention of implementing 
privatisation to restrict trade union power was another political milestone for 
the Thatcher government (Miller, 1997; Foster and Scott, 1998; Flynn, 2001).
From the above, it is apparent that privatisation as a state policy was pursued 
for political as well as economic reasons. Economically, the British 
government initiated privatisation programmes to increase efficiency and 
competition, and to cut the public sector borrowing requirement by 
disengaging the state from public enterprises. Politically, the Conservative 
government not only intended to enlarge its electoral base by pursuing wider 
share ownership and popular capitalism. Capital was involved in the 
privatisation process to realise the goals of these policies and also to diminish 
trade union power.
2.2.2 Privatisation in developing countries
The rest of the world, particularly developing countries, began to implement 
privatisation policies at the behest of the supranational financial agencies. 
The World Bank reported in 2005: “120 developing countries carried out 
7,860 transactions between 1990 and 2003, generating close to [US]$410 
billion in privatisation proceeds, or 0.5 percent of total developing country
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GDP during that period” (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005: 3-4). According to this 
report, this trend is distinct and pervasive.
Privatisation has not only been put into practice in developed countries but 
also adopted and implemented in developing countries. Developing countries 
constitute the second category of this global privatisation trend from the 
1980s onwards. Privatisation has been introduced in developing countries 
primarily as part of structural adjustment programmes aimed at dealing with 
domestic fiscal and financial crises, mainly generated by the supposed 
failures of public sector management (Van de Walle, 1989). Such countries 
were primarily composed of developing and post-colonial countries, 
including sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and parts of 
Asia (World Bank Annual Report, 1996). Although these countries may have 
different considerations and problems, it is widely believed that a pervasive 
dissatisfaction with the failure of the state and the financial and managerial 
performance of the public sector as well as the consideration of economic 
stabilisation were at the heart of the promotion of privatisation to policy 
makers in these settings by powerful supranational financial agencies (Van 
de Walle, 1989: 602).
Supranational financial agencies and donor institutions, particularly the IMF 
and World Bank, have been driven by the view that the privatisation policy 
should be introduced in developing countries (Nellis, 2002). As part of 
structural adjustment programmes, these supranational financial institutions 
agreed to provide loans, investments, aid, consultations and other technical 
supports conditioned upon the design and implementation of a certain set of 
reforms to help these countries out of fiscal crises (Bienen and Waterbury, 
1989). Privatisation in developing countries, such as Egypt, Tanzania, 
Mexico and others, has been imposed and driven by these supranational 
financial creditors. In some countries, such as Peru, Turkey, India, Algeria 
and others, structural adjustment programmes have been partly propelled by 
internal recognitions of the failures of public sector enterprises (Bienen and 
Waterbury, 1989: 619 and 623; Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990: 5).
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It is contended that, of all structural adjustment programmes, privatisation is 
broadly regarded as a policy of last resort by states where deficits and debts 
have grown beyond their control (Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990: 5). 
Additionally, problems of government intervention and market failure were 
regarded as more serious in developing countries than in developed countries 
(Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Specifically, the adoption of privatisation in 
developing countries has been promoted by the supranational capitalist 
agencies essentially for pragmatic purposes to reform the public sector, to 
reduce deficits generated by state enterprises, to respond to the need for fiscal 
austerity, and to reduce government intervention in the economy (Bienen and 
Waterbury, 1989; Kelsey, 1995; Miller, 1997). Although in one sense, deficit 
and inflation reduction has been a major economic goal pursued by both 
developed and developing countries through privatisation, the latter typically 
have higher and more serious problems of debts and deficits than the former 
(Bienen and Waterbury, 1989: 619).
In contrast to privatisation in their developed counterparts however, the 
intention of increasing competition and efficiency has not been a policy 
priority. Developing countries have been far more troubled by financial 
losses and fiscal considerations (Van de Walle, 1989; Nellis and Kikeri, 
1989). However, that is not to say that increasing efficiency and competition 
have not been goals pursued by developing countries. The World Bank in 
fact recognised that the need and scope for improved efficiency in 
developing countries was much greater than that in leading OECD countries 
(Nellis, 2002: 3). In view of endemic problems in developing countries, Bank 
staff became convinced that privatisation was the solution (Nellis, 2002). The 
major impetus for the divestiture of public enterprises was to cut government 
expenditures and to help restore budgetary balance. In other words, fiscal and 
public finance considerations were used to justify the adoption and 
implementation of privatisation in developing countries.
To summarise, in contrast to developed countries, privatisation policies in 
developing countries tended to be more concerned about the immediate 
economic malaise, namely, fiscal and financial crises. States of this kind
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found themselves trapped in economic hardship which they couldn’t escape. 
They sought external help, mainly from supranational financial agencies, and 
this help was contingent upon the introduction of structural adjustment 
programmes. This provided the impetus driving developing countries to 
embark on the rapid divesture of state enterprises. In other words, states in 
developing countries in many instances lacked the capacity to deal with 
economic problems they faced. They were forced to accept the intervention 
of supranational capital in the form of financial aid, linked to the 
implementation of neo-liberal programmes. Central to this was privatisation.
2.2.3 Privatisation in transition economies
Along with this global trend, privatisation has also been introduced in former 
communist countries. In the wake of the collapse of communist regimes, the 
political and economic structures of post-communist countries, including the 
former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe1, underwent transition. 
They have begun to implement reform strategies as part of a move towards 
democratisation. The aim has been to re-stabilise economies and politics 
disrupted by the collapse and disintegration of the administrative-command 
system of the party-state (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Clarke et al., 1993; 
Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Privatisation was also imposed and propelled, 
mainly by Western governments and other supranational financial agencies 
(Fischer, 1992; Nellis, 2002). For instance, in the face of economic and 
political crises, Russian “new democrats” led by Boris Yeltsin sought to 
align the Russian economy and political arrangement rapidly with the world 
economy. Democratisation by means of privatisation together with price 
liberalisation and fiscal and financial stabilisation helped create a favourable 
environment for attracting domestic as well as foreign investment to revive
1 China was also seeking to transform its market structure, from a central planning to a 
market economy. I will not discuss the Chinese case here because unlike its Eastern 
European counterparts its communist regime remains in power (c.f. Fischer, 1993; Clarke, 
2005).
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the Russian economy and restore the political system (Ashwin and Clarke, 
2003).
Typically, transition economies suffered from both growth crises and 
macroeconomic disequilibrium in which a large budget deficit, high inflation 
and balance of payments difficulties were pervasive and serious (Fischer and 
Frenkel, 1992: 37). In the face of these problems, the IMF, the World Bank 
and Western governments in particular, intervened in these transition 
economies. This was done via the provision of loans and humanitarian aid, 
conditioned upon reform strategies: macroeconomic stabilisation;
liberalisation on trade and prices; convertibility of the currency; the creation 
of a social safety net; and privatisation (Fischer, 1992 and 1993; Fischer and 
Frenkel, 1992).
In contrast to developing countries, the West, mainly represented by the US 
and Western European countries, promoted strategic political and economic 
interests in relation to the transition economies, particularly those of the 
former Soviet bloc (Kim and Yelkina, 2003). Maintaining the pace and 
direction of political and economic reforms in these transition economies was 
certainly in the interests of the West (Fischer, 1992: 107). There were two 
aspects to their interests. First, in the face of the collapse of communist 
regimes, Western governments worried that nuclear weapons, held by some 
of these transition economies, particularly those in the former Soviet bloc, 
could end up in the wrong hands, with catastrophic consequences (Morz,
1992). The assumption was that privatisation policies would help these 
transition economies settle and stabilise their politics and economy and 
introduce democracy as quickly as possible. Privatisation, promoted by the 
West as part of the condition for the provision of financial aid, was seen by 
some as having a positive effect in helping the post-communist countries to 
consolidate in democratic directions, as well as in laying the foundation for 
liberal capitalist economies (Cui, 1997).
Second, Western governments also had a geo-strategic interest in these 
transition economies (Morz, 1992). Preventing the collapse of the economy
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in them could avoid the possibility of civil war or large-scale westward 
emigration that would quickly overwhelm the Western economies (Morz, 
1992: 45). Therefore, the adoption and implementation of privatisation in 
transition economies was not only promoted by the IMF and World Bank, 
but also by Western governments to meet their particular regional and 
defence interests.
The scale and pace of privatisation in transition economies was globally as 
well as historically unprecedented when compared with that in developed 
and developing countries. During the first half of the 1990s, more than 
50,000 medium- and large-scale state enterprises were privatised in transition 
economies. Hundreds of thousands of small-scale public sector enterprises 
were also transferred into private hands during the same period, for instance, 
over 75,000 in Russia, 35,000 in Ukraine and 22,000 in the Czech Republic, 
(Nellis, 1996, cited in Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997: 419). Big-bang or 
shock therapy is the term used interchangeably to describe this mass 
privatisation approach in these transition economies (Clarke et al., 1993; 
Fischer, 1992; Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2003). The reason why the scale and 
pace of privatisation in transition economies was so extensive was mainly 
because both enterprise management and trade unions welcomed this reform 
strategy, although for different reasons. While Soviet management regarded 
privatisation as a way in which they could profit from the disintegration of 
the administrative-command system and regain their managerial autonomy, 
trade unions viewed privatisation as a lifeline towards true workers’ 
collective organisation independent of the state (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; 
Clarke et al., 1993). Although privatisation in some transition economies, 
particularly Russia, was not successful, partly because of corruption 
(Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Nellis, 1999), it has been argued that 
without privatisation, these transition economies would not have been able to 
survive bankruptcy and social chaos (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997: 421; 
see also Nellis, 1999).
To summarise, post-communist countries in political, economic and social 
transition represented the third wave of the global privatisation trend. A
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sudden collapse of communist regimes forced these countries to implement 
quick reform strategies to stabilise their economies and to restore the social 
and political orders. In furtherance of their interests, the West, therefore, 
desperately provided all sorts of immediate assistance to these transition 
economies through loans and humanitarian aid conditioned upon adopting 
economic reform strategies and political democracy. Against this 
international background, the scale and pace of privatisation in transition 
countries was extensive and unprecedented.
2.3 Privatisation and trade unions
When assessing the impacts of privatisation in relation to the changing 
patterns of work and employment under the pressure of shifting ownership 
from the public to private sector, it is important to consider the role of trade 
unions. In general, one feature of the liberal democratic state is the state’s 
imposition of rules, regulations and restrictions upon social relations and 
trade unionism in the name of the “national interest” (Hyman, 1975: 145). 
The power of individual workers is not sufficiently strong to influence work 
and employment relations, or to resist the supremacy of the state and capital. 
For this reason, workers look to trade unions to enlarge their bargaining 
powers to acquire better working conditions and pay. However, due to 
conflicting interests between trade unions and the state and capital, the 
structure and institutions of industrial relations are often contested and 
unstable (Hyman, 1975).
The role and functions of trade union are in many senses polarised between 
liberal democratic countries and the communist world. As a result, the 
impacts and implications that privatisation has had on and for trade unions 
are also different. In liberal democratic societies, trade unions have tended to 
be more or less regarded as victims in the process of privatisation 
(Fairbrother and Testi 2002; Tickell and Peck, 2003). As a consequence, 
many trade unions in liberal democratic countries have sought to renew
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themselves during the post-privatisation period (Fairbrother, 2000). In 
contrast however, trade unions in transition economies have shown different 
attitudes towards privatisation. After decades of repression and incorporation, 
trade unions in transition economies, particularly those in Russia, tended to 
be in favour of privatisation as the way in which they could restore their role 
and functions (Clarke et al., 1993). These two sides to the debate will be 
discussed by looking at trade unions in liberal democratic countries, mainly 
Britain, and transition economies, primarily Russia, in the following two 
sections.
2.3.1 Liberal democratic countries
As we have argued above, one of the fundamental political concerns of the 
British Conservative government was to curb the public sector union power 
(Beynon, 2003; Bishop and Kay, 1988; Domberger and Piggott, 1994; Femer, 
1988; Foster and Scott, 1998; Hurl, 1992; Jackson and Price, 1994; Marsh, 
1991; Moore, 1986). In order to understand this, I will briefly review the 
literature in relation to the relationship between trade unions and government 
policy-making.
When talking about labour markets and industrial relations in the context of 
privatisation, the literature tends to focus on the following three topics: (1) 
privatisation as an approach to deal with labour market rigidity in the public 
sector resulting from the excessive power of the trade unions (e.g. Bishop 
and Kay, 1988; Femer, 1988; Marsh, 1991; Moore, 1986; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988); (2) comparative research on industrial relations before and 
after privatisation (Arrowsmith, 2003; Pendleton, 1991a, 1991b, 1994 and 
1999; Pendleton and Winterton, 1993); and (3) trade unions’ renewal after 
privatisation (e.g. Fairbrother, 2000 and 2002; Barton and Fairbrother, 2007).
The role of the state is to provide and structure the framework of the national 
economy, particularly in areas where the private sector is less likely to offer
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assistance due to profitability considerations (Femer, 1988). During the post­
war era, it is clear that the state was expected to intervene in economic 
activities to ensure the provision of adequate and basic social requirements. 
The Keynesian idea of the social welfare state largely prevailed at that time. 
The consequence of this approach was that a number of basic and strategic 
industries were nationalised (Allington, 1995; Femer, 1988).
Public sector objectives are numerous, intangible and contradictory in part 
because they are subject to direct guidance and control by governments. In 
addition, public sector managements and operations are defined and highly 
restricted by formal rules, regulations, reporting requirements and more rigid 
hierarchical arrangements, and their performance is monitored (Beaumont, 
1992: 8-11; Femer, 1988: 29). The corollary is that market information and 
commercial incentives are often absent in the public sector. These factors had 
far-reaching consequences for the development of the labour movement and 
trade unionism which is now the focus of attention.
Public sector trade unions had long enjoyed a high membership density. 
Broadly speaking, the higher the union density the stronger is union 
bargaining capacity in the sector (Fairbrother, 2002, Chapter 3; Foster and 
Scott, 1998). Clegg (1976: 23-27) identifies four reasons for high union 
density in the public sector. First, public sector employment is concentrated 
in a relatively small number of individual large-sized undertakings. Second, 
the bureaucratic operations and decision-making processes are generally 
found in public sector organisations and trade unions are thus recognised as 
part of this process. Third, the bureaucratic operations and employment 
conditions in the public sector are less likely to be altered because of the 
individual occasion. Public sector bureaucrats therefore favour the formal 
collective bargaining mechanism with trade unions. Fourth, public sector 
senior managers, responsible to elected local authorities and their committees, 
may feel a need to join trade unions in order to seek collective protection 
against bureaucratisation of the public sector.
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One further crucial reason which may have contributed to high union density 
and power is that the British government historically adopted a position, as 
an employer of labour, of actively encouraging its employees to become 
union members (Beaumont, 1992: 47). This was mainly driven by 
government legislation, which required public sector management to 
recognise and consult the trade union (Moore, 1986; Thomas, 1986; 
Pendleton and Winterton, 1993). According to Femer (1988), the reason why 
the government legally granted public sector trade unions political 
recognition was because of considerations of short-term political interests. 
Since products and services provided by the public sector are of vital 
necessity to the national economy and public requirement, interruption of 
such activities may result in industrial disputes, a politically sensitive issue. 
Therefore, for short-term political interests, the government would intervene 
in industrial relations “to avoid the politically damaging disruption of vital 
public services” (Femer, 1988: 42-43).
The political and economic features of the public sector are often associated 
with trade unions’ exclusive and powerful representative status and legal 
protection. Under these circumstances, Freeman (1986: 44) argues that it 
would be very tempting for unions to influence work and employment 
decision-making, as well as wage negotiation through the collective 
bargaining system. As a consequence, trade unions could force up wages 
unrelated to organisational performance, and be in a position to thwart 
changes designed to raise labour productivity (Pendleton and Winterton, 
1993; Marsh, 1991). In British Rail, for instance, the “cosy” relationship 
between railway unions and railway management was widely viewed as 
“restrictive practices” since it impeded operational efficiency (Pendleton, 
1993: 46). Since the government, represented by public sector management, 
officially recognised trade unions and intervened to avoid industrial disputes, 
the close relationship between trade unions and management became a 
characteristic of the post-war arrangement. Nevertheless, this post-war 
arrangement came to an end when the British economy deteriorated and 
when the government began to restrict union practices and power (Femer, 
1988; Howell, 2005).
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Thatcher was elected with a commitment to restrict the excessive power of 
public sector trade unions. Privatisation was a very powerful anti-union 
weapon (Wiltshire, 1988). As argued above, one of the Thatcher 
government’s main political strategies was to systemically relocate the 
conventional bargaining arrangement between trade unions and management. 
As a result, managerial prerogative was backed by the government, while the 
role of trade unions was restricted. Liberalisation and open-market 
competition were believed to be the main ingredients to fulfil these goals. In 
view of their negative effect on the terms and conditions of union members, 
trade unions attempted to attack privatisation policies (Lord McCarthy of 
Headington, 1988). However, throughout British privatisation history, no 
union has successfully countered the privatisation trend (Thomas, 1986: 299). 
As a consequence, in many aspects, privatisation successfully weakened 
trade union power by transforming centralised (national) into decentralised 
(local) bargaining arrangements and implementing new managerial practices, 
such as human resource management and performance related pay (Foster 
and Scott, 1998; Flynn, 2001).
Nevertheless, it has been argued that paradoxically, for some unions, 
privatisation seemed to have laid the foundation for them to open up space to 
renew and rebuild (Fairbrother, 2000 and 2002; Barton and Fairbrother, 
2007). Indeed, some trade unions were successful in renewing themselves 
during the aftermath of privatisation. For instance, research shows that many 
trade unions remained well organised with the capacity to disrupt the 
production of the privatised enterprises (e.g. Arrowsmith, 2003). This 
situation was not only seen in Britain but also in other liberal democratic 
countries. For example, in their research on the privatisation of the energy 
and transport sectors in Australia, Barton and Fairbrother (2007) indicate that 
trade unions in these two sectors took crucial steps to meet the challenges of 
privatisation. They attempted to renew and rebuild their structures and even 
strengthen their capacity to challenge the new private oligopolies. 
Accordingly, it could be contended that trade unions in liberal democratic 
countries attempted to challenge privatisation for their future. However,
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when they were defeated in the battle against privatisation, they then shifted 
their focus and sought to preserve and sustain their roles and capacity within 
the changing social relations of production in the privatised enterprises.
2.3.2 The Soviet system
In contrast to liberal democratic countries, Russian trade unions demonstrated 
a rather different developing and survival strategy in the face of privatisation 
(Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Borisov et al., 1994; Clarke et al., 1993). Soviet 
trade unions gave support, whatever active or passive, to privatisation in the 
wake of the collapse of the party-state and the disintegration of the 
administrative-command system (Clarke et al., 1993). In view of this unusual 
union strategy, at least two questions arise: why did the Soviet trade unions 
choose not to oppose privatisation? What did privatisation mean to the Soviet 
trade unions, management and the state? In order to answer these questions, 
we need first to consider the relationship between the Soviet trade unions, 
enterprise management and the state.
The objective of traditional Soviet trade unionism was to act as an organ of 
the party and the state, a school of communism and a transmission belt 
between the Communist Party and the masses (Clarke et al., 1993). The 
growing “statisation” of the official trade unions unavoidably required the 
leadership of trade unions to be subordinated to the Party and incorporated 
into the state apparatus (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003). Besides, under the 
principle of democratic centralism, official trade unions were established 
along hierarchical lines and were subordinated to the Communist Party 
(Clarke et al., 1993). The official trade unions were required to play a role in 
imposing labour discipline, to mobilise workers in support of the party and 
state apparatus, and to dissuade workers from challenging the party-state 
authority (Clarke et al., 1993). The incorporation of trade unions into the 
state apparatus inevitably made the unions hierarchically as well as 
functionally dependent on the state.
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Moreover, under the leadership of Stalin, Soviet official trade unions at the 
enterprise level acquired the important roles of not only imposing a rigorous 
labour discipline but also stimulating productivity growth through the 
provision of material and moral incentives (Ashwin, 2004; Clarke et al., 
1993). Within enterprises, the official trade unions were commonly identified 
with the Communist Party and enterprise management, performing their 
welfare and distributive functions to provide a “paternalist reinforcement of 
their authority” (Borisov et al., 1994: 17). Their distributive role and 
functions were so prominent that even the Deputy Director of an official 
Russian trade union federation (the Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
of Russia, FNPR) claimed that “the unions were not trade unions at all, but 
the social and welfare department of the central committee of the 
[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]” (cited in Borisov et al., 1994: 17).
Under the Soviet system, social and welfare resources were in the hands of 
enterprise management. For this reason, after the collapse of communism, 
while the official trade unions declared their independence of the state, they 
actually developed more intimate links with management at the enterprise 
level (Ashwin, 2004; Clarke et al., 1993). Therefore, while it was a major 
claim in the West that the “dual functions” of the Soviet trade unions were to 
represent their members and the party-state (Ruble, 1981), based on their 
research, Clarke and others (1993) suggest that this duality of function was 
not a feature of the Soviet trade unions. Rather, they were actually supportive 
of the enterprise administration, on the one hand, and the functions for the 
party-state on the other. From this perspective, Clarke and others (1993: 93) 
explain why the Soviet official trade unions did not collapse in line with the 
disintegration of the party-state system. As “an arm of the enterprise 
administration”, the Soviet official trade unions were actually strengthened 
during the transition process (see also Borisov et al., 1994).
This cross-class alliance between trade unions and enterprise management is 
ideologically identified as the programme of “social partnership” (Clarke and 
Fairbrother, 1993b: 192). It is argued that the formation of a social
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partnership with management was more for the consideration of the 
sustainability of the Soviet trade unions than for defending members’ 
interests during transition and maintaining social peace during the post- 
communist era (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Ashwin, 2004). The research by 
Clarke and others (1993) also provides an account of why privatisation did 
not face significant opposition from the Soviet trade unions and labour 
collectives. As previously mentioned, the decision to move from a centrally 
planned to a market economy was externally imposed by supranational 
financial agencies as well as the West. Internally, however, there were more 
complex elements. When Gorbachev’s Perestroika was underway, the 
political pendulum began to swing to the right. More people, particularly the 
new democrats and liberal intelligentsia under the leadership of Yeltsin, had a 
strong belief that the future of Russia rests on the connection of its economy 
with the world economy. By implementing neo-liberal policies, including the 
rapid privatisation programme, they facilitated the disintegration of the 
conservative forces and the old guard which had been trying to hold on to the 
levers of the bureaucrat power and to revive the traditional means of control, 
i.e. the administrative-command system (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003). As a 
result of intrinsic support from both the unions and enterprise management 
and extrinsic agreement with the supranational financial agencies and the 
West, Yeltsin came to power with his commitment to introduce a programme 
to accelerate the transition to capitalism (Clarke et al., 1993).
Since the labour collective and the Soviet trade unions had long been 
incorporated within and repressed by the administrative-command system, 
they tactically chose to support Yeltsin’s neo-liberal policies and, in 
particular, the mass privatisation programme. Enterprise managements 
declared their independence and showed their “spontaneous” support for 
Yeltsin’s reform programme of transition to a market economy (Clarke et al.,
1993). Spontaneous privatisation with the support of enterprise management 
could therefore be regarded as the main reason why the pace and scale of the 
Russian privatisation were extensive and massive.
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However, the Soviet official trade unions and the alternative trade unions had 
different reasons for their shared support of privatisation policies. Despite 
their occasionally confrontational rhetoric, the official unions actually 
showed more support than opposition to the Yeltsin government and his 
reform programme of the transition to a market economy. Clarke and 
Fairbrother (1993b: 185) argue that this was mainly because the official 
unions sought to retain governmental patronage on which their legal and 
property rights had been dependent. Within enterprises, in order to keep 
traditional welfare and distributive functions in house, the official trade 
unions chose to collude with management as they believed this would serve 
the best interests of their members as well as maintain their own institutional 
position (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993a). The development of an intimate 
relationship between the official trade unions and management unavoidably 
resulted in a situation in which the official trade unions showed no opposition 
to the privatisation programme of the Yeltsin government (Clarke and 
Fairbrother, 1993b).
In contrast with the official unions, the alternative trade unions were small in 
terms of membership, which unavoidably became a barrier when they came 
to confront and compete with the official unions. Generally, the official 
unions enjoyed extensive management support, commanded a pervasive 
patronage network, and provided a wide range of social and welfare benefits 
(Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993c: 158). Thus, the alternative trade unions 
supported the privatisation programme because they were aware that they had 
little option but to attach to political forces in play within the struggles within 
the ruling stratum (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993d: 143). The Yeltsin regime 
and neo-liberals were the major and perhaps the only political forces on 
which the alternative trade unions could focus their ambitions. The 
alternative trade unions gave their support to Yeltsin, who in return offered 
them, at least in the beginning, political recognition. Although their 
expectations were never realised, the alternative unions attempted to exploit 
privatisation as the way in which they could become “proper” trade unions, 
by drawing a clear boundary between owners as managers and wage- 
labourers (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993b: 196).
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In short, the Soviet trade unions chose distinct paths and developing 
strategies in the face of the privatisation programme. The collapse of the 
party-state did not fundamentally change the social relations of production, 
and the Soviet trade unions came to depend more on management which 
controlled resources. This had a decisive impact on the way in which the 
Soviet official trade unions chose to respond to privatisation. The Soviet 
trade unions supported privatisation as the way in which they could revive 
their role and functions as unions to represent and defend the majority of 
workers’ interests. Although they survived in the wake of the collapse of the 
party-state and the mass privatisation programme, it was at the cost of many 
who, mainly female and auxiliary workers, experienced redundancies and 
cuts in benefits and wages (Clarke et al., 1993). Nevertheless, in the face of 
the transition to a market economy, the Soviet trade unions still endeavoured 
to hold on to their traditional welfare and distributive role and functions for 
fear of losing power and authority as workers’ representatives within 
enterprises.
Although an aim of the alternative trade unions was developed with a strong 
intention in part of breaking through this web of traditional defects and 
weaknesses, they had little capacity to achieve their goals. The fact is that the 
alternative trade unions gradually lost out to the official trade unions. These 
official unions had significant competitive advantages in terms of 
membership, organisation and resources. Commenting on trade unions in 
general, Ashwin and Clarke (2003) argue that whether official or alternative, 
trade unions established a “social partnership” with enterprise management in 
order to survive and to maintain their power, authority, institution and 
organisation intact within enterprises (see also Ashwin, 2004).
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the three actors -  the state, capital and trade 
unions -  played their roles in the privatisation process. Privatisation is a 
global phenomenon in which the state and capital play interrelated but 
decisive roles. In this context, trade unions have been important points of 
reference in the development of policies and have experienced a range of 
outcomes. These themes have been drawn together in a consideration of trade 
unionism in liberal democratic countries, mainly in Britain, and in transition 
economies, primarily in Russia.
First, in the context of the global privatisation trend, the state, particularly in 
developing countries and transition economies, was encouraged to adopt and 
implement privatisation policies as a result of external pressure, for example, 
from supranational financial agencies. The state in these types of countries 
often faced a deep fiscal crisis. The main reason why privatisation was 
introduced into these countries was via structural adjustment programmes of 
the IMF and World Bank. Western governments, also played a key role in 
promoting these policies to protect their own interests. Therefore, developing 
countries and transition economies adopted and implemented privatisation as 
a condition for receiving loans, investments and aid to stabilise political and 
economic chaos and to encourage a move towards the democratisation of 
political structures and stabilisation as capitalist economies.
Second, capital played different roles in various types of countries. A great 
deal of the literature in the UK has criticised the technique of underpricing 
(e.g. Bishop and Kay, 1989). The British Rail experience revealed that 
underpricing was used to draw the attention of private capital and promote its 
involvement in privatisation. This phenomenon clearly illustrated that, in 
essence, privatisation is a policy that requires the involvement and 
participation of private capital. Based on the British experience, the success 
of privatisation seems to depend on whether the government can formulate 
and design a favourable policy and prices that could attract private capital
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into the privatisation process. That the government and private capital play an 
interrelated role in the privatisation process is clearly demonstrated in the 
British Rail privatisation experience.
However, experience in developing countries and transition economies 
suggests that supranational financial agencies providing financial aid to 
stabilise economic and political chaos, played a role in pressurising these 
countries to embrace neo-liberal policies and privatisation. Given their poor 
endemic conditions, these countries had little option but to adopt and 
implement privatisation.
The last actor in the privatisation process is the trade unions. However, in the 
global neo-liberal context, the discussions of trade unions have usually been 
limited. Yet, trade unionism and the way in which trade unions chose to 
respond to privatisation is diverse depending on the type of political 
economies in question. The British experience showed that one of the main 
political reasons for implementing privatisation was to restrict trade union 
power. Privatisation policies were so successful in this regard that the 
mainstream literature in relation to privatisation and trade unions largely 
focuses on discussing how privatisation weakened trade union power and 
how trade unions adopted particular strategies to revive themselves in the 
post-privatisation era.
However, trade unions in post-communist Russia took a rather different 
approach. Soviet trade unions, whether official or alternative, generally 
showed little opposition to the government’s privatisation programme. Since 
the collapse of the party-state system did not fundamentally change the social 
relations of production, the Soviet trade unions hence developed a social 
partnership with enterprise management primarily to secure their future 
within enterprises. Adoption of privatisation therefore became a means to 
help the Soviet trade unions to survive the challenges resulting from the 
transition to a market economy.
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The above considerations suggest three broad research questions. First, the 
consideration of the state in promoting privatisation policies prompts the 
question: What happens to privatisation programmes when states in 
developing/transition economies are not impelled by economic uncertainty? 
Second, is capital always a major player in the development of privatisation 
programmes? Third, what are the conditions for trade union opposition or 
support for privatisation?
These questions are general and require further refinement in relation to the 
specific circumstances of Taiwan. In the next chapter, a history of the state 
and trade unions in Taiwan is presented, as the first step in considering the 
development of privatisation policies and their implications for trade unions.
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Chapter 3 
Trade Unionism and the State in Taiwan
3.1 Introduction
Having reviewed the literature in relation to the role of the state, capital and 
trade unions in the global privatisation context, the next task is to focus on 
Taiwan. The aim is to explore how privatisation policies have impacted on 
trade unionism in the country. There are two reasons for focusing on Taiwan. 
The first reason is because the debates about privatisation which began in the 
late 1980s are still ongoing. Second, Taiwan, as a developing economy with 
a distinctive political history, provides an appropriate case to explore the 
themes raised by the debates about global privatisation.
The literature on Taiwan between the 1960s and 1980s usually focuses on 
how political repression and corporatist type industrial relations directly 
resulted in its remarkable economic achievement (e.g. Amsden, 1985; Deyo, 
1989; Koo, 1987). The focus of the literature then shifts to how the party- 
state system restricted labour movements and the impacts the collapse of the 
party-state system has had on political and economic development as well as 
independent labour movements since the 1980s (e.g. Kleingartner and Peng, 
1991: 431; see also Hsu, 1989; Lin, 2002; Pan, 2006; Wang, 1993 and 1996). 
This chapter applies a political-economic approach to examine the role of the 
Taiwanese model of the party-state system in the context of trade unionism 
development. The Taiwanese state, like other countries which adopted the 
Leninist party-state philosophy, exerted political power through the control 
of the military to exclude people from political participation and to repress 
those who attempted to challenge the party-state’s hegemony. However, the 
Taiwanese party-state, under the leadership of the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(the Kuomintang, KMT), developed a distinct party-state system and adopted 
a capitalist type of economic expansion. This capitalism was encouraged
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under the Taiwanese party-state system. This had significant implications for 
the development of dependent trade unionism in Taiwan and its 
transformation.
As in other Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and South Korea), Taiwanese trade unions spent a long period 
under state political surveillance and repression in the name of national 
stability and economic development (Gall, 1998: 359-376). Whereas in the 
public sector, trade unions developed under the party-state’s direct 
supervision, in the private sector, where they existed, trade unions were 
dependent upon the sponsorship of employers. In both cases, trade unions did 
not exist as agencies to defend members’ interests against exploitation by 
capitalists or to confront the state as employer. Rather, they existed 
politically to serve the party-state and to act as “an arm of the administration” 
(Harper, 1969: 92; Lin, 2002: 4; Koo, 1987: 174; Lee, 1988: 194). They were 
in effect a “transmission belt” between the Party and the masses (c.f. Clarke, 
2005: 2-18; Lenin, 1977). Ashwin and Clarke (2003) even comment that the 
organisational structure, functions and authority of Leninist trade unionism 
were highly associated with and depended on the party-state. Within 
industries, they were there to economically help employers improve labour 
productivity and to take on the responsibility of providing social and welfare 
programmes. In other words, trade unions developed at the discretion of the 
party-state as well as capitalists in order to ensure peaceful industrial 
relations and to avoid the emergence of organised labour. No independent 
union movement or collective labour activity was observed in Taiwan until 
the late 1980s (Huang, 2002; in contrast to Soviet trade unions, see Clarke 
and Fairbrother, 1993a). Unlike independent and free trade unionism in 
liberal democratic countries, dependent trade unionism was much more 
common in countries, like Taiwan, where the party-state system prevailed.
From the 1980s onwards, however, the dominant role of the Taiwanese 
party-state declined. Under external pressure (mainly from America) and 
internal pressure (from political dissidents and organised elite), the 
Taiwanese party-state was forced to transform. Its traditional interventionist
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role was gradually replaced by neo-liberal practices. This political 
transformation process opened up an opportunity for dependent trade unions 
to transform into independent ones and such unions gradually took on an 
agency role to represent workers’ interests and to resist capitalist exploitation. 
Although much of the literature about Taiwanese trade unionism tends to 
argue that independent trade unions in Taiwan still have their limitations in 
relation to organisational strength and capacity to mobilise, a legacy of party- 
state control (Huang, 1997 and 2002). The problem with this line of analysis 
is that it largely focuses on the confederation and not the affiliate unions. In 
contrast, I argue that some trade unions have been successful in developing 
their capacity to resist public policies at the enterprise and industrial level. 
The key point to note is that many of these unions are located in the public 
sector. The methodological implication is that it is necessary to study the 
history and place of individual unions as well as the confederation.
The Taiwanese party-state system has been described in Chapter 1. This 
chapter therefore aims to illustrate the development of trade unionism in 
Taiwan. Taiwanese trade unionism was established under state sponsorship 
through which trade unions developed a dependent and subordinate role. 
They were not there to defend members’ interests but to serve the party-state 
for political purposes. However, their subservient role was transformed in 
line with the emergence of a number of decisive developments in the 1980s. 
Of these elements, privatisation policies were crucial to the transformation of 
trade unionism from dependent to independent. For this reason, the chapter 
begins with a brief analysis of the origin and development of privatisation 
policies in Taiwan. This is then followed by a history of trade unionism 
showing how trade unions were initially promoted by the party-state. 
Subsequently, they then developed into independent unions, at least in the 
public sector.
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3.2 An overview of privatisation policies in Taiwan
In 1989, the KMT government announced its intention to privatise sections 
of the public sector. The shift to a neo-liberal ideology appeared to be 
incompatible with the KMT’s philosophy that the state should play a 
dominant role in the economy. However, the KMT was beginning to look to 
a future where its dominant role in the economy could no longer rely on state 
ownership.
This policy initiative was partly a response to US pressure to liberalise the 
economy. The US government’s influence on Taiwanese economic 
liberalisation may be regarded as one of the most powerful and direct 
external drivers. As previously indicated, the KMT government benefited 
from American financial and military aid between the 1950s and 1960s. 
From the 1960s onwards, the US government became the KMT’s most 
important trade partner (Directorate General of Customs, 2007). Given this 
intimate economic relationship, the US took the opportunity to push 
Taiwanese economic policies towards more liberalisation and less regulation. 
For example, the Nineteen-Point Economic Reform Programme announced 
in the early 1960s, and the National Economic Reform and Development 
Commission in 1985 were responses to pressure from the US in relation to 
liberalisation of price and the lifting of protectionist measures. Such 
transition signalled the upcoming privatisation policy. Moreover, apart from 
the pressure from the US, the KMT government also intended to position the 
economy in an international context in the 1980s. However, to become a 
signatory to GATT (The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, later 
placed under the World Trade Organisation, WTO), the Taiwanese 
government had to adjust its economic policies by reducing tariff barriers and 
subsidies and making its domestic markets more open. Such economic 
reforms indirectly reduced the state’s dominant role in the economy. It has 
also been argued that granting more economic freedom enabled industries to 
compete effectively with international counterparts (BOFT, 2002). The 
requirements imposed on Taiwan to become a member of the WTO served as
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another external force to move the KMT government into the privatisation 
scenario.
Inside Taiwan, some internal and more direct forces served as drivers for the 
government to consider privatisation. The operational performance of the 
public sector had long been criticised by economists (Chen et al., 1991). At a 
meeting of the National Economic Reform and Development Commission 
held at the national level in 1985, proponents strongly criticised state-owned 
enterprises’ performance and expressed the view that privatisation would 
resolve this problem (Chang, 2002: 61). In the meantime, the emergence of 
labour movements in the late 1980s, mainly for economic considerations 
both in the public and private sector, had begun to alarm the ruling party. 
However, as will be shown, it is reasonable to assume that the problem of 
labour disputes was not the main reason for privatisation implementation in 
Taiwan.
Political elements played a more significant role in the implementation of 
privatisation. As one Taiwanese researcher comments as follows:
[in terms of motives for implementing privatisation], the striking 
difference between Taiwan and Britain or the post-socialist countries 
was that the introduction of the privatisation policy was neither 
driven by the change of the ruling party nor chosen by the KMT as an 
election manifesto to attract votes. The actual reason was to use the 
privatisation policy to pass its decreasing supreme power over to 
capitalists who supported the KMT regime (Chang, 2002: 71)
The opposition party, the DPP, strongly supported privatisation as a means of 
breaking the economic and political linkages between the public sector and 
the party-state. This linkage had been gradually weakening with the 
emergence of the labour movement since the 1980s. Inside the KMT, the 
mainstream faction, under the leadership of the first native Taiwanese 
President, Teng-hui Lee, secretly formed an alliance with the DPP. This was 
an attempt to marginalise the old guard and conservative forces in the 
country. The privatisation policy, core to the agreement between Mr. Lee and 
the DPP, became a means to achieve this political goal (Chang, 2002: 72-73).
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Since the motives for implementation of privatisation were deeply rooted in 
short-term political considerations, labour issues, at least in the beginning, 
were largely ignored by policy-makers (Chang, 2002: 107-109). In the wake 
of the emergence of independent public sector unions from the late 1980s 
onwards, the majority seemed not to have been alarmed by the privatisation 
policy, though some unions’ firms were already on the privatisation list 
(Chang, 2002: 139). As a result, workers’ rights and benefits were largely 
ignored in the early stage of privatisation1. In fact, it was argued that the 
privatisation policy resulted in job losses and poorer working conditions in 
Taiwan, but profited capitalists involved in this process (Taiwan Labour 
Front, 1999). Alarmed by a number of privatisation cases that caused poorer 
working conditions and even redundancies, some public sector unions due to 
pressure from their members began opposing government policy through 
coalition and consolidation with each other. Although most of the union 
coalitions were short-lived because of no formal recognition from the state, 
the importance of such union activities should not be overlooked, since they 
were important contributory elements in the developing trajectory towards 
independent trade unionism.
This brief history suggests that while the pattern of trade unionism was not 
one of the key concerns of the Taiwanese government in developing 
privatisation policies, for unions it was an important and worrying 
development. To appreciate the importance of these policies for the 
development of trade unionism in Taiwan, it is necessary to review the 
history of trade unionism, with particular reference to the public sector.
1 In 1994, privatisations of China Petrochemical Development Co. and BES Engineering Co. 
were the most significant cases in this regard (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999: 44-82).
3.3 State-sponsored trade unionism
Taiwanese trade unions are divided into two major categories: 
industrial/enterprise unions and craft unions. The only role of craft unions in 
Taiwan has been to operate as an agency of labour health insurance for its 
members, which has little to do with defending and representing members’ 
interests (Ho, 2006; Huang, 2002). Further, trade unions in the public sector 
have been more vibrant than those in the private sector, mainly because 
public sector workers have had better employment security than those in the 
private sector. Accordingly, the discussion of trade unionism in this thesis 
focuses only on public sector industrial/enterprise unions.
The “Taiwan experience” of economic development was seen as a model to 
be copied by other developing countries (Evans, 1987: 203-26; Hu, 1994b). 
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Taiwan’s outstanding economic development, 
which annually averaged 9.21 per cent growth rate together with low 
unemployment, mild inflation and income equality, earned it the title 
“economic miracle” (Amsden, 1979 and 1985: 79). Nevertheless, as argued 
above, the KMT’s national development strategy was not at first initiated for 
economic development but for its own political purposes. The shift of 
attention to economic development came because of further considerations. 
First, the KMT in the 1960s was aware that American aid could be 
withdrawn at any time and that would cause a political as well as economic 
setback to the KMT’s authority.
Second, its stated mission of retaking mainland China had diminished with 
the entrenchment of the CCP regime. The KMT decided to redirect its 
political attention in part to economic development as a long-term strategy 
for sustaining its power. The most crucial aspect of its economic 
development strategy was the introduction of export-oriented 
industrialisation as a replacement for the agrarian industry and import- 
substitution strategy (Hu, 1994a and 1994b). This alteration of Taiwanese 
economic strategy in the late 1960s was so successful that the country from
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that time onwards gradually became a capital and labour intensive and 
export-oriented industrialised country attracting large amounts of foreign 
direct investment which, in turn, became one of the drivers for economic 
growth. The development of export-oriented industrialisation was in part 
based on a sufficient supply of disciplined and low-cost labour.
Sustaining competitive advantage based on labour conditions became crucial 
for securing continuous economic growth. A range of political, social and 
cultural factors contributed to the KMT’s success in organising and 
maintaining a peaceful and compliant labour force. A great deal of the 
literature has documented this experience and attributed the success to the 
effectiveness of the authoritarian party-state and its corporatist technique in 
maintaining a stable supply of disciplined and low-cost labour, as a main 
source for market competitiveness (Amsden, 1985; Deyo, 1989; Koo, 1987), 
although some provide alternative viewpoints (e.g. Huang, 2000). Repression 
and incorporation became the stick and carrot for labour. The party-state 
intervened to control labour conditions and the labour market in the name of 
economic development and national as well as social stability. This form of 
labour control was mainly achieved through trade unions, dependent on the 
state and employers.
At the social level, the KMT required employers to establish trade unions 
within firms and requested those unions to focus on providing and managing 
members’ social and welfare programmes (Deyo, 1989; Wilkinson, 1994). 
Some have described this mechanism as “state-mandated enterprise 
paternalism” by which the state attempted to pre-empt any form of labour 
conflict at the enterprise level and, most importantly, to restrict trade union 
functions, ruling out collective bargaining (Deyo, 1989: 134). In addition, the 
KMT-state also shared economic growth with workers by improving working 
conditions and standards of living. Throughout this period, Taiwan had a low 
unemployment rate, which was combined with an increase in real income 
and a fairer income distribution, one aim being to limit the possibility of 
labour unrest (Harper, 1987).
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At the cultural level, Taiwan, like its Asian counterparts, has also been 
influenced by Confucian philosophy which emphasises adherence to 
hierarchy, cooperation, patriarchy, and individual subordination to the state 
and society. The effect of Confucianism appears to have counter-acted 
possible rebellion by workers and encouraged industrial, social and national 
stability, progress and development. Although some have argued that 
Confucian philosophy should be viewed as playing only a minor role in this 
respect (e.g. Deyo, 1989: 88-89), much of the literature still stresses the 
importance of this cultural heritage, superimposed on labour relations (e.g. 
Lin, 1997: 56-67; Wilkinson, 1994: 141). As a consequence of the 
aforementioned factors, no significant strike or labour conflict was recorded 
until the enactment of the Labour Standards Law and the lifting of martial 
law in the 1980s (Deyo, 1989: 3; Harper, 1987: 395; Huang, 2000).
As well as the decision to move towards a Leninist party-state system, made 
at an ad hoc party reform committee in the early 1950s, the KMT established 
a number of principles in relation to labour control. First, under the guideline 
of democratic centralism, all party branches had to adhere to policy made by 
the Central Standing Committee of the KMT; second, the party would lead 
labour and its organisations through party members and party branches; and 
third, trade unions had to adhere to the party’s leadership (KMT, 1951, cited 
in Lin, 2002: 27). The KMT implemented its labour control approach 
through trade union organisations following several important labour 
relations principles. First, the Party encouraged trade unions within industries 
(to which membership was compulsory); second, trade unions were 
established under the leadership of party members and branches; third, the 
Party provided clear and direct guidance for trade union affairs (KMT, 1951, 
cited in Lin, 2002: 33). Only under the Party’s tutelage did the KMT support 
the development of trade union organisations (Hsu, 1989).
The idea behind this surveillance structure was to pre-empt any union 
activity that might be unacceptable to the party-state (Wang and Fang, 1992: 
9-14). While the KMT, on the one hand, recognised labour rights based on 
the Labour Union Law, on the other hand, those rights were withdrawn under
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martial law. Further, by widely deploying party cells and a large number of 
loyal party core members within industries, the KMT had the capacity to 
control and repress any labour collective movement (Wang and Fang, 1992: 
9-14). Moreover, under the principle of democratic centralism, trade unions 
did not have horizontal linkage with their union counterparts but were 
required to affiliate upward with the upper union confederations and the only 
union centre, the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL). However, this is not 
to say that the party-state exerted its control of labour through the state- 
sponsored union confederations. In fact, these organisations, including the 
CFL, lacked capability and power to articulate working class interests and 
discipline their affiliate unions (Huang, 2002: 312). Control of labour and 
trade unions actually rested in the hands of the party-state.
In short, before lifting martial law in 1987, the Party effectively initiated 
labour policies which constructed a highly regulated control structure and 
environment for labour and its organisations. This was again achieved 
through direct guidance, intervention, and leadership and based on Sun Yat- 
sen’s Three Principles o f the People. According to Sun, the state should play 
a role of supporting the formation of trade unions and of providing social and 
welfare programmes for workers through labour union institutions 
(Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: 430; Pan, 2006: 2-3). Hence, the KMT 
integrated labour unions into the state apparatus and made trade unions a part 
of Party organs to help promote government policy.
As a result of the functional, structural and legal confinement of trade unions 
by the KMT, union leaders in Taiwan looked less to members for financial 
support and policy suggestion than to government and employers 
(Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: 434). In addition, being a KMT member was a 
precondition for nomination as an official union candidate in union elections. 
Being a KMT nominee, by that time, almost guaranteed election. Further, 
upward mobility to higher union posts or granting political interests were the 
most common means to incorporate and win over unionists to the KMT’s 
leadership (Lin, 2002; see also Hsu, 1987 and 1989). One researcher who 
long observed Taiwanese trade unionism, noted:
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... the union movement was politically oriented [towards the] party 
because union leaders were attracted by the KMT’s incentives that 
union leaders could become political figures someday as long as they 
collaborated with the KMT ... (Pan, 2006: 4).
It was due to the highly regulated and interventionist relationship between 
the KMT and union officials that Taiwanese trade unions became dependent 
on and subordinate to the party-state. Under this dependency relationship, the 
unions became an arm of government administration and the transmission 
belt between the Party and their members. As a consequence, although the 
KMT did not adopt a hostile attitude towards the trade unions, and even 
openly supported them, the role and agency of the unions were largely 
limited. Their role was neither to defend members’ interests nor to represent 
members’ grievances in confrontation with employers, but to mobilise 
members to serve the party-state (Pan, 2006). Economically, trade unions 
existed to provide social, welfare, health and educational programmes for 
workers within firms (Harper, 1987: 395; Lin, 1997: 56-60; Wilkinson, 1994: 
144-148). The aim was to promote economic and industrial development, 
and to help employers improve productivity.
This union dependency situation may be demonstrated by considering a 
number of union cases. The Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL), established 
by the KMT in 1948 in Nanjing, mainland China, was the only legally 
approved national union confederation authorised by the Labour Union Law. 
It functioned at the national, regional and local level and included diverse 
groupings of industrial, company and craft unions (Lin, 1997: 56). All trade 
unions, including public sector unions -  ports, post, mining, railway, 
petroleum, electricity and steel -  were required by the Law to affiliate to the 
CFL (Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: 432-434). In 1990, the year following the 
announcement of the first privatisation list, the CFL’s total number of union 
affiliates was 3,629, of which 1,373 were industrial and enterprise unions 
(CLA, 2006). As shown in Table 3.1, in 1990, membership of the CFL was 
more than two million, of which nearly 700 thousand or 8.45 per cent of total 
workers (8.28 million) belonged to industrial or enterprise unions. Before the
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change of the ruling party in 2000, the CFL was highly controlled by the 
KMT, not only in terms of its activities but also in the union presidential 
elections1. Its role and function were regulated to provide social, welfare, 
health and educational programmes for its affiliates (Lin, 1997: 56-60; 
Harper, 1987: 395; Wilkinson, 1994: 144-148), and to promote economic and 
industrial development as well as to mobilise member unions in support of 
KMT policy (Pan, 2006: 3).
Table 3.1 Unions affiliated to the CFL in 1990
Affiliated Unions Membership
Taiwan Provincial Federation of Labour 1,505,435
Taipei Municipal Federation of Labour 205,000
Kaohsiung Municipal Federation of Labour 138,975
Chinese Federation of Railway Workers’ Unions 21,829
Chinese Federation of Miners’ Unions 2,315
Chinese Federation of Postal Workers’ Unions 23,862
National Chinese Seamen’s Union 27,923
Taiwan Highway Workers’ Union 5,874
Taiwan Telecommunication Workers’ Union 34,550
Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ Union 22,851
Taiwan Electricity Power Workers’ Union 27,817
Taiwan Federation of Industrial Workers 
(Unions of Processing Zones) 59,272
China Airlines Industrial Workers’ Union 6,000
Total 2,084,703
Source: Department of Organisations, CFL 1990, cited in Kleingartner and Peng, 1991, 
Table 2.
Extensive intervention was also imposed by the KMT on CFL affiliates. 
Moreover, the Federations listed in Table 3.1 also comprised affiliated 
unions. One of the CFL’s important affiliates was the Chinese Federation of 
Railway Workers’ Unions, which until the mid-1990s comprised the Taiwan 
Railway Labour Union2 (TRLU). The Taiwan Railway Labour Union, set up
1 Before the 1990s, CFL presidential elections were not held at regular intervals (Ho, 2006).
2 The TRLU had been the only member of the Chinese Federation of Railway Workers’ 
Union until the establishment of the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation Union in the mid- 
1990s, which later became the second member of the federation.
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with the full support of the party-state in 1947, was one of the earliest, largest 
and most important public sector unions in Taiwan. Its development was 
mainly driven by the KMT’s labour relations principles mentioned above. 
The KMT not only provided unambiguous and direct guidance and 
leadership during the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the 
TRLU, but also full financial support (Lin, 2002: 39-46). Against this 
background, the TRLU’s development was not based on labour 
consciousness but on the Party’s political intention in relation to labour 
control. The TRLU would not concentrate on representing members but on 
serving the party-state. It could be argued that the support and intervention 
from the Party during the preparatory period were aimed to control the union 
and to incorporate it as an arm of administration on the one hand, and to 
show that the party-state cared about labour rights and status by 
incorporating union leaders into the decision-making structure, on the other.
The close association between the TRLU and the party-state can also be seen 
when scrutinising the composition of the TRLU’s officials. From 1956 
onwards, the percentage of KMT members working on the railway network 
was more than 50 per cent of total railway workers. The percentage reached 
67 per cent in 1982 (Lin, 2002: 62-63). In addition, since the first union 
election in 1947, the TRLU’s chairmen and union officials had been 
dominated by KMT members1 (Lin, 2002). The proportion of KMT members 
working on the Taiwan Railway and belonging to the TRLU seemed to 
enhance the capability of the KMT to influence and provide guidance on 
union policy on the one hand, and to more easily control the union on the 
other. Moreover, the TRLU’s leaders and core union staff were usually 
granted political benefits in return for their loyalty to the Party (Lin, 2002). It 
is clear that since the union’s establishment was not based on labour 
consciousness but on the Party’s will in relation to labour control, the role of 
the TRLU did not concentrate on representing its members’ interests but on
1 The incumbent union chairman (since 2003) is an exception. He was expelled from the 
KMT in 1990 because he organised collective action against the party. Further, after the 
TRLU became independent in 1991, Chairmen Lin (1991-1997) and Chang (1997-2003), 
although officially KMT members had more discretion and began to make autonomous 
decisions.
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serving the party-state. Its dependency role can best be understood by 
looking at the TRLU’s founding statement announced at the TRLU’s 
inaugural meeting on 14 August 1947:
Our Mission:
We will never hesitate to sacrifice ourselves in support of the 
government to eliminate rebellion in order to preserve our 
national independence and territory intact. We will fight against 
those who attempt to ruin our nation’s unity and to obstruct 
social progress to the end.
Our Goal:
From now on, we will endeavour to improve railway workers’ 
knowledge and to organise education on self-discipline ....
Our Pledge:
... We will endeavour to follow the government’s instruction and 
support orders to construct san-min zhu-yi (Three Principles o f 
the People) in Taiwan (Railway Workers, 1987: 18-19, cited in 
Lin, 2002: 41).
These strong expressions in the TRLU’s founding documents explicitly 
illustrate that the TRLU’s establishment was part of the party-state’s political 
ambition to consolidate its power in Taiwan, as an independent territory. 
Obviously, therefore, the establishment of the TRLU had little to do with 
improving railway workers’ interests and working conditions.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that industrial relations were 
relatively passive and no major labour disputes occurred in the railway 
industry, primarily because of the dependent role of the TRLU. The TRLU 
was also required to play a mediatory role between workers and the employer 
and the state. It is therefore not surprising that union organisations, including 
the CFL, union confederations and their member unions, in the context of 
KMT control were dependent on and subordinate to the party-state. However, 
by the 1980s, the dependency scenario was beginning to show signs of 
change.
In short, the KMT strategically regarded the unions as an instrument to 
control labour and thus incorporated trade unions into its state system, as 
other Leninist parties did, in the interests of the nation, the economy and
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society. At the national level, the party-state created dependent trade unions 
subordinate to the Party. At the industrial level, employers, though not 
substantial, supported the development of union organisations in the interests 
of peaceful industrial relations and better productivity. They were not 
established to promote workers’ interests and seek redress for their 
grievances, as the railway case showed. Nevertheless, as the KMT’s 
dominant role disintegrated with political reform and economic emancipation, 
so trade unions also reformed.
3.4 The emergence of independent trade unionism
The authoritarian party-state gradually became unsustainable as external and 
internal pressures built up from the late 1970s onwards and accelerated in the 
late 1980s. The political dissidents, who were outside the Party, began to 
organise a wave of political reform movements for democracy and challenge 
the power of the KMT through a number of political incidents1 (Lin, 2002: 
20). This wave of political reform was at first triggered by the severing of 
diplomatic ties with Western countries and Taiwan’s withdrawal from the 
United Nations in 1971 when Communist China took over its permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council (Cheng, 1989). The KMT government also 
carried out a number of policy changes, mainly to promote political openness 
as a response to the deteriorating diplomatic situation and to quell the 
demands of the emerging intelligentsia. From that time on, the dominant role 
of the party-state gradually declined. Political and economic emancipation 
opened up opportunities for a prosperous civil society by which the KMT’s 
hegemony was further challenged and weakened. In line with the party- 
state’s disintegration, a more activist working-class consciousness began to 
develop, indicated by the independent labour movement that emerged to take 
on the role and functions of the official unions. This independent labour 
movement organised outside the official unions and served as a foundation
1 For instance, political dissidents won Taoyuan county’s governorship election in 1977 
(Cheng, 1989; United Daily News, 20/11/1977: 3).
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for rebellion against state sponsorship. In one sense, this labour movement 
was not only an economic struggle but also a struggle for freedom and 
democracy.
There were four events in the 1980s that widely inspired the development of 
a more active expression of working-class consciousness and which led to an 
increase in labour disputes. These were: (1) the enactment of the Labour 
Standards Law on 30th July 1984; (2) the lifting of martial law on 15th July 
1987; (3) the establishment of the Council of Labour Affairs at Cabinet-level 
on 1st August 1987; and (4) the privatisation policy announcement in July 
1989. I will illustrate how these events played key roles in transforming 
dependent trade unionism.
Ratification of the Labour Standards Law (LSL) in a sense fulfilled the 
KMT’s inherited ideology that the state has an obligation to take care of 
workers’ interests and welfare. The LSL clearly regulates every aspect of a 
worker’s rights, benefits and working conditions, from first entering a 
company to the retirement pension. It also details the health and safety issues 
and minimum as well as maximum working standards. Since the function of 
the LSL and collective bargaining largely overlapped, the role of trade 
unions in negotiating with employers on working conditions was further 
marginalised (Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: 429-430; see also Deyo, 1989; 
Lin, 2002). As a result of the LSL’s introduction, workers became aware of 
minimum working standards and conditions which were constantly being 
ignored by employers in the name of industrial prosperity. Accordingly, 
when the law was only partially implemented by employers, workers became 
impatient and prepared to rebel to uphold their interests (Kleingartner and 
Peng, 1991: 430; Moore, 1988: 116). The number of labour disputes as well 
as the number of workers involved increased considerably after the 1970s 
and accelerated in the 1990s when the government began to implement 
privatisation as shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Number of labour disputes and number of workers involved
Selected
Years
No. of 
disputes
No. of 
workers 
involved
Selected
Years
No. of 
disputes
No. of 
workers 
involved
1965 15 259 1995 2,271 27,342
1970 92 920 1996 2,659 21,654
1975 458 16,809* 1997 2,600 81,004
1980 626 6,305 1998 4,138 103,568
1985 1,443 15,486 1999 5,860 30,440
1987 1,609 15,654 2000 8,026 56,543
1988 1,314 24,237 2001 10,955 58,643
1989 1,943 62,391 2002 14,017 105,714
1990 1,860 34,089 2003 12,204 28,821
1991 1,810 12,696 2004 10,838 32,478
1992 1,803 12,394 2005 14,256 85,544
1993 1,878 37,949 2006 15,464 81,639
1994 2,061 30,890 2007 19,729 121,563
Source: Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: TABLE 3.
Labour Statistics, Council of Labour Affairs, 2008
Both figures increased substantially when martial law was lifted in 1987. 
However, between 1991 and 1992, the number of workers involved in strikes 
halved, mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, the KMT government, 
under pressure from indigenous capitalists and foreign investors, began to 
forcefully carry through legal restrictions to persecute a number of organisers 
of unlawful strikes (Lin, 2002). On the other hand, the party-state did not 
give up attempting to intervene in union affairs (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999). 
However, the downward trend did not last long, because union activism in 
the public sector was stirred up by the state-driven privatisation policy in the 
late 1990s and significantly increased from the 2000s onwards.
By the end of the 1980s, strikes and stoppages were mainly organised 
through independent workers’ organisations for economic considerations. 
This wave of labour activism was centrally aimed at obtaining a more 
thorough enforcement of the LSL and better pay and conditions (Moore, 
1988). Labour activists first emerged from public utilities and govemment-
1 1975 saw a setback in economic growth due to the oil crises. This partly contributed to the 
increased labour unrest. These disputes were small in scale and soon settled down when the 
government intervened.
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sanctioned monopolies, such as transport companies, the railway, petroleum 
and electricity, and so on (Moore, 1988: 117). These public sector workers, 
whose jobs were secured, had more bargaining leverage than those in the 
private sector. However, it must be noted that the majority of firms in Taiwan 
were SMEs in private and family hands, and they were not significantly 
affected by labour problems (Moore, 1988: 117). Workers in private and 
family-owned companies were more likely to be made redundant if they 
attempted to confront employers. In addition, the legacy of Confucian 
philosophy appeared to guide labour-management relationships in a more 
subtle way in these enterprises. As a result, the wave of independent labour 
movements in the late 1980s, with the assistance of political dissidents, 
became much more pervasive in the public sector than in the private sector in 
Taiwan (Cheng, 1989).
Public sector trade unions found themselves trapped in the middle of these 
developments. On the one hand, unions could not play a mediatory role to 
pacify workers and persuade them not to go on strike, on the other hand, 
unions were discredited by workers on account of their inability to stand up 
to employers’ exploitation. On 1st May 1988, for instance, Taiwan Railway 
train drivers called for a one-day stoppage to draw attention to their demand 
for better working conditions and pay and enforcement of the LSL. Initially, 
train drivers had attempted to petition management through the TRLU. 
However, the TRLU lacked capacity to confront management. Train drivers 
therefore organised independently. The success of this industrial action led 
railway workers to think further ahead to winning union leadership through 
election as a long-term strategy to secure their independence. Those events 
which paved the way for railway workers (and other Taiwanese workers) to 
move further into autonomous grounds will be discussed in Part III of the 
thesis.
In the face of an increase in labour disputes and the decreasing influence of 
the Party, the Taiwanese government established the Council of Labour 
Affairs (CLA) at the Cabinet level. The CLA was to be at the forefront of the 
KMT’s labour policy-making and management of labour related issues. The
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establishment of the CLA on 1st August 1987 so soon after the lifting of 
martial law on 15th July 1987 could be regarded as the beginning of the end 
of the dominant role of the KMT in labour issues, as well as a response to 
American criticism of unsatisfactory labour working conditions and 
standards (Hsu, 1989). Some have argued that the CLA’s establishment was 
also an attempt by the government to demonstrate the importance of workers’ 
grievances by assigning their redress to Cabinet level (Kleingartner and Peng, 
1991: 431). Others, however, regard it as nothing more than another form of 
incorporation -  an intermediary role and substitute for direct labour control 
(Lin, 2002: 85). Notwithstanding, what is clear is that the party-state was 
losing its power of control over labour. This also stimulated the 
determination of rebellion from below.
In 1988, the first non-KMT member was successfully elected as union 
chairman at the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (renamed the CPC Co. 
Taiwan in 2007). This was a historic moment, since it was the first time that 
a non-KMT member had chaired a major public sector union. It was seen as a 
crucial step towards independent unionism (Kleingartner and Peng, 1991: 
435). However, it is important to note that because dependent unionism was 
so deeply rooted in the party-state, the transformation of trade unionism 
would be a prolonged and complex process of struggle. For instance, two of 
the public sector unions, the TRLU and the Telecom Workers’ Union, did 
not become independent until autonomous workers (directly involved in local 
struggles) won union leadership through election in 1991 and 1995, 
respectively1.
Before the mid-1990s, public sector unions which became independent 
remained loosely linked. This was mainly because the Labour Union Law 
only allowed Taiwanese unions to be vertically affiliated with union 
confederations and the CFL and not horizontally connected with other unions. 
Moreover, the only union centre, the CFL, did not serve as a platform for its 
affiliates to work together and establish cooperative relations. Not until
1 Public sector unions had already attempted to become more member-oriented in the face of 
activists’ challenges as the TRLU’s case shows (Lin, 2002: 103).
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working conditions visibly deteriorated with the vigorous implementation of 
privatisation policies did these public sector unions begin to get together.
3.4.1 Independent unions and union confederations
After the emergence of independent unions in the late 1980s, the Taiwanese 
labour movement became increasingly active, progressive and dynamic. 
However, the collective labour movement, which would considerably 
strengthen the development of independent unionism, did not emerge until 
the mid-1990s. The formation of union coalitions seeking to collectively 
oppose privatisation gathered pace from this time onwards. The Public Sector 
Unions Coalition, the Preparatory Committee of the Taiwan Confederation of 
Trade Unions, and the Public Sector Unions Confederation were created in 
1995, 1997 and 1999, respectively, to oppose privatisation and other 
purposes. Their establishment was phenomenal and had at least three 
important implications in relation to independent unionism. First, although 
the coalition of industrial unions was still illegal under the Labour Union 
Law, these unions attempted to organise union coalitions to safeguard the 
interests of their members as well as the unions themselves1, highlighting 
how useless the CFL was to them. The establishment of these union 
coalitions suggested to activists that they could go beyond the boundaries set 
up by the state through legal regulations. The emergence of a new union 
centre, the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) , appe ared to 
confirm this situation. Second, these unions seemed to have won the support 
and confidence of their members whose labour consciousness in relation to 
working rights and conditions had been growing. Further, the formation of 
these coalitions demonstrated that, having been deprived of their 
fundamental functions for decades, unions were beginning to develop the 
capacity to organise and represent their members to confront employers and 
the state. Third, the establishment of such coalitions explicitly indicated that
1 However, the state and the CLA inclined to refuse to negotiate with these unlawful union 
coalitions as a strategy to divide unions. When a number of public sector enterprises were 
privatised, union coalitions were disbanded.
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unions were in the process of developing a more cooperative and collective 
labour movement, extending bargaining power in relation to employers as 
well as the state. These three far-reaching implications emerged in the 
context of the state’s privatisation policy in the 1990s, further heralding the 
rolling back of the party-state and the entrenchment of free, autonomous and 
independent unionism.
By the 1990s, the CFL lacked credibility in the eyes of its member unions 
due to its direct linkage with the party-state, and continued to maintain 
political dependency until the change of the ruling party in 2000. As a result 
of the successful formation of union coalitions in the face of privatisation, the 
establishment of a new and independent union centre became the major 
ambition of union activists (TCTU, 2007). On May Day 2000, eighteen trade 
unions, seven of which were in the public sector, collectively withdrew from 
the CFL and established a new union centre, the Taiwan Confederation of 
Trade Unions (TCTU), as a declaration of their independence, breaking their 
connections with the party and the state (see Table 3.3). In 2000, the TCTU’s 
membership was nearly 260 thousand, 44 per cent of total industrial and 
enterprise unions’ membership (around 590 thousand).
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Table 3.3 TCTU founding unions and membership, 2000
Unions_____________________[ Membership
Public Sector Unions
Chunghwa Telecommunication Workers’ Union 36,000
Taiwan Power Labour Unions 27,433
Taiwan Railway Labour Union 17,189
Taiwan Bus Workers’ Union 3,137
Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor Corporation Federation Union 8,925
Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ Union 17,594
Bank of Taiwan Workers’ Union 3,803
Local Trade Union Confederations:  r
1
Kaohsiung City Confederation of Trade Unions 34,771
Kaohsiung County Confederation of Trade Unions 12,330
Tainan Hsien Federation of Trade Union 10,000
Hsin-chu Confederation of Trade Unions 4,000
Miao-li County Confederation of Trade Unions 3,000
Confederation of Taipei Trade Unions 41,000
Taipei County Confederation of Trade Unions 10,000
Yi-lan County Confederation of Trade Unions 3,000
Taichung City Amalgamated Industrial Union 10,500
!
Privatised Company
First Bank Labour Union 4,220
Private Sector
Ta-ton Industrial Union 7,068
Total 259,170
Source: data provided by the TCTU, 2007
The TCTU’s long-term objectives stated in its founding statement were “to 
change the unequal relationship between capital and labour and create a fair 
and just society in cooperation with other movements for social change” 
(TCTU, 2000). Its short-term goals aimed at revising the Labour Union Law 
to give workers the freedom of assembly; to protect workers’ right to work 
and raise labour standards; to temporarily put a halt on privatisation; to allow 
employees to participate in company management; to establish a 
redistributive social welfare system; to join forces with other social
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movements; and to consolidate workers’ political power. This founding 
statement unambiguously acknowledged that, in order to defend the interests 
of the working class and to bring democracy to the workplace permanently, 
the autonomous union movement would be independent of political parties 
(TCTU, 2007). This declaration sharply contrasts with the dependent role of 
the CFL and highlights the commitment to independent unionism of the 
TCTU as well as its member unions.
However, since the establishment of the TCTU was still illegal under the 
Labour Union Law, it decided to make a strategic alliance with the 
opposition party, the DPP, which was later elected as the new ruling party in 
2000, in the hope of being granted legally approved status. This was 
subsequently achieved through an administrative decree issued by the DPP 
government. The new government wanted to show its commitment to labour 
rights and it also needed a union centre linked to it to promote its labour 
policy. The alliance between the DPP and the TCTU had two profound 
consequences. First, since the TCTU and another two union centres (the 
National Labour Alliance and National Trade Union Congress) had been 
granted legal status in 2000, the Taiwanese labour movement genuinely 
developed multi-unionism, with many Taiwanese trade unions becoming 
more dynamic and thus more member-oriented1. However, the TCTU’s 
strategic linkage with the DPP has led many to question whether the TCTU is 
really independent. Some union activists feel that the TCTU has lost its 
ambition to protect an autonomous and independent labour movement (Yan 
et al., 2003). For instance, when the CFL and other labour organisations 
formed an alliance to lobby the DPP government to initiate a policy to 
shorten weekly working hours from 48 hours a week to 84 hours every two 
weeks in 2001, the TCTU chose to support the DPP government’s proposal 
to reduce working hours to 44 hours a week. The TCTU’s support of the DPP 
government was regarded as a symbol of its linkage with the ruling party 
(Chen, 2001).
1 Up to 2007, eight national union centres had been approved by the DPP government. 
However, the CFL and TCTU were still dominant in the Taiwanese labour movement.
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However, others point out that the working class in Taiwan has been 
struggling for independence for more than a decade, and will therefore not 
easily give up this struggle and surrender to another newly established 
political force (Ma, 2003). In Ma’s view:
The establishment of the TCTU heralds to the world that the 
Taiwanese labour movement has eventually, for the first time in 
history, become autonomous and independent, and is ready to make 
its presence felt on the international labour movement stage. ... At 
the same time, it is recognised that the DPP has some influence over 
the TCTU. This is because the DPP along with labour movements 
has endeavoured to and succeeded in challenging the party-state’s 
hegemony. ... The history of class struggle in which the DPP stood 
together with independent unions cannot be ignored. ... It is unlikely 
that the DPP will successfully repress this newly flourishing 
autonomous labour movement because having experienced many 
pains to achieve its autonomy, this independent unionism will not 
surrender easily (Ma, 2003).
Although the debate as to whether the TCTU was independent or not was 
still ongoing, one of its founding member unions, the TRLU, chose to 
withdraw in November 2001 in protest against the TCTU’s increasing 
support of the DPP. Its withdrawal highlighted its strong intention of 
remaining a union independent from political intervention. This placed the 
TRLU in the leading role in the struggle for independent unionism. Although 
the TCTU’s ambiguous practice is still debated, what is explicit is that trade 
unionism has been moving towards independence, and the role of the state in 
this matter has been marginalised.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the KMT model of the party-state and its role in 
labour relations in Taiwan. The KMT regime incorporated the Leninist type 
of political control and the capitalist model of economic expansion in its 
development strategy. This particular state form led to political as well as 
economic success. On the one hand, the KMT regime dominated political 
affairs by means of military and state corporatism, by which incorporation
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and repression were imposed upon society at every level. On the other hand, 
the Taiwanese party-state allowed the development of private capital. 
Capitalism under the party-state’s regulation became the feature most 
distinguishing it from Leninist parties elsewhere. This chapter has argued 
that the adoption of state capitalism under the KMT regime could be 
regarded as another form of state corporatist practice, since both the native 
bourgeoisie and the working-class became less likely to challenge the 
authoritarian party-state system. Under this two-way practice, an independent 
labour movement was repressed and controlled. Existing trade unions were 
simply there to serve the party-state and employers and not to engage either 
in class struggle or economic struggle, as the CFL and TRLU have shown. 
The literature, when focusing on Taiwan’s economic experience, emphasises 
the contribution of disciplined and low-cost labour. However, this chapter 
goes beyond this to further contend that rather than confronting employers, 
the official trade unions played a role in mobilising members to support 
economic development as their priority. The role of trade unions, I argue, 
also contributed to the success of the KMT regime.
However, the situation where official trade unions were dependent on the 
KMT gradually transformed with the declining power of the party-state. This 
transformation process first emerged through autonomous workers 
organising themselves outside the existing system with the assistance of 
political elites and dissidents. In line with the changing role of the party-state, 
four events were identified as crucial drivers for the emergence of an 
independent labour movement. In the context, the occasion of the 
privatisation policy, instead of marginalising trade unions, became a force 
driving unions towards independence. This union activism proved important 
and effective in the development of independent Taiwanese trade unionism. 
Individual labour conflicts not only helped develop a broadening working- 
class consciousness, but also created an atmosphere for more active and 
independent workers seeking to win union leadership through union election. 
As a result, independent unionism emerged in the late 1980s.
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This independent trend was strengthened in the wake of the privatisation 
policy in the 1990s, when public sector unions began to realise that, unless 
they got together, they would not win the battle against the government. 
Cross-union solidarity enlarged bargaining power against employers as well 
as the state. Against this background, the first independent national union 
centre, the TCTU, was established and formed a strategic alliance with the 
new ruling party in 2000 to represent and defend autonomous unions’ 
interests. However, the TRLU, one of the leading unions in Taiwan in 2001, 
withdrew from the TCTU, indicating its rejection of any form of political 
intervention in the labour movement. This action seems suggest that the 
TRLU, once dependent on state sponsorship, is now independent.
The issue of the independence of Taiwanese trade unionism raises a number 
of questions. To what extent does independent trade unionism strengthen 
unions’ bargaining capacity when the privatisation policy is applied? And 
does the railway union which showed its independence by way of 
withdrawing from the TCTU have stronger bargaining capacity against 
privatisation than its union counterparts? General Research Questions 
formulated in Chapter 2 will help to answer these questions in detail.
3.6 Research Questions relating to the Taiwanese 
context
This thesis aims to explore the relationship between privatisation and the role 
of the state, capital and trade unions in Taiwan in the context of global neo­
liberalisation. On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, the four 
overarching Research Questions are as below:
Research question 1: The state
RQ1: Given that Taiwan was a Leninist party-statey was the process and 
issue of privatisation in Taiwan similar to that in post-socialist
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countries (such as Russia), developing countries (such as sub- 
Saharan Africa) or advanced capitalist countries (such as the UK)?
Research question 2: Capital
RQ2: What role did private capital play in Taiwan in the privatisation 
process?
Research question 3: Trade unions
RQ3: How did Taiwanese public sector trade unions play their roles in the 
privatisation process?
RQ4: Do Taiwanese public sector trade unions have the capacity to shape 
public policy?
In answering these questions, consideration is given to the public sector as a 
whole. However, specific attention is paid to the Taiwan Railway and the 
railway union. There are a number of reasons for this focus. First, the 
proposal to privatise the Taiwan Railway is long standing. However, this 
sector has still not been privatised. This proposal has been subject to 
extensive debate. Second, in view of privatisation policies and practice 
elsewhere, it is unclear what the role and place of capital is in the process of 
privatising the Taiwan Railway. Third, privatisation became a critical point 
of reference for public sector unions. As noted, the TRLU was at the 
forefront of the campaign for independent trade unionism and subsequently 
became a leading independent trade union.
The subject of the next chapter is the research design and methodology 
chosen to elicit the data necessary to answer the above questions.
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Chapter 4 
Research Design and Methodology
4.1 Summary of Chapters Two and Three
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggested that the state, capital and 
trade unions played different roles in the privatisation process in the global 
context. Generally speaking, developed countries played a leading role in this 
global neo-liberalisation trend. The involvement of capital in privatisation in 
developed countries seemed to be driven by a state which created a 
favourable financial climate. In contrast, both developing countries and 
transition economies adopted and implemented privatisation as part of 
structural adjustment programmes or stabilisation schemes, under pressure 
from supranational financial agencies and Western governments. In the post­
privatisation era, trade unions in liberal democratic countries appeared to 
play a limited role in the process, often experiencing difficulties in 
questioning the process. Nevertheless, there is evidence that unions began to 
revive in the aftermath of privatisation. T rade unions in post-communist 
Russia sought to benefit from the privatisation process.
When considering Taiwan however, things seem to be different and more 
complex. The government pursued its privatisation programme as a way of 
securing power rather than to position the Taiwanese economy in a global 
context. Of note, Taiwanese public sector trade unions responded variously 
to these proposals, some supported them while others were against them. To 
explore the differences and complexities, I approached the research as below.
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4.2 Overview
I became aware of the extent to which the topic of privatisation and labour 
was neglected when I began my first year of doctoral research. Further, it 
became obvious that there was a major “gap” in relation to privatisation in 
Taiwan. Accordingly, it became clear to me that in this thesis, fieldwork 
would be of paramount importance in order to understand and examine the 
Taiwanese experience in detail. This doctoral thesis therefore attempts to 
pursue the research goals through utilising qualitative research methods to 
gain first-hand, rich, deep, holistic and contextual understandings of the 
research topic.
As indicated in Chapter 3, I decided to study Taiwan and the Taiwan 
Railway in particular. There were four reasons for this choice. First, the 
Taiwan Railway, which celebrated its 120-year anniversary in 2007, is one of 
the oldest and most important strategic industries in Taiwan. Second, in view 
of its financial plight, the government had attempted to introduce a number 
of reform approaches but failed. In line with the global neo-liberalisation 
trend, the government then decided to adopt privatisation policies in general 
and privatisation of the railway in particular, as a way of solving its financial 
problems. From the early 1990s onwards, the government therefore began 
studying an appropriate approach to privatise the Taiwan Railway. However, 
to-date, privatisation of the Taiwan Railway is far from complete. The 
reasons for this delay have been overlooked by the mainstream literature. 
Therefore, a study of the railway case can provide an alternative analysis of 
arguments about neglected aspects of privatisation. Third, railway workers 
and the railway union have led the way for workers and trade unions of 
different trades throughout the history of the Taiwanese labour movement. 
The way in which railway workers and the railway union have rebelled 
against the government is unprecedented and extraordinary in Taiwan. I 
therefore wondered why the railway labour movement could be so significant 
in Taiwanese labour history. Fourth, before I was accepted as a doctoral 
student at Cardiff School of Social Sciences in 2004,1 was in the process of
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completing a MSc. study on a particular aspect of the privatisation of the 
Taiwan Railway (the privatisation policy and the way in which the policy 
had shaped industrial relations in the railway industry) at Cardiff Business 
School between 2003 and 2004. When my Master’s research project was 
about to finish, I had been curious about why labour movements in the 
railway industry were more distinctive than other unions in Taiwan. I 
therefore assumed that there would have some unknown correlations between 
the past and present of the railway union in relation to its struggle against the 
party-state apparatus and privatisation. This became the centre of my PhD 
study.
During my Master’s Study, of significance, a core event, a day of 
“intentional” stoppage by the TRLU took place on 11th September 2003, 
known as the 9/11 event. It had major implications for Taiwanese union 
history. The 9/11 event was so successful that not only was the privatisation 
of Taiwan Railway temporarily withdrawn but also the event became a 
benchmark for other unions in Taiwan to follow in resisting either 
management or the government.
Upon reviewing the emergence of this event together with the British 
privatisation experience, I was curious to know the nature and character of 
the Taiwanese privatisation policy, and what impacts it had had on industrial 
relations in the railway industry. In other words, my MSc. research project 
was a study of the privatisation policy and the changes in industrial relations 
in the Taiwan Railway before and after the 9/11 event in 2003. In contrast 
with the MSc. project, the significance of this doctoral project is that it aims 
to study the development and transformation of public sector trade unionism 
in Taiwan. This second study not only involves the railway industry but also 
considers other public sector trade unions in Taiwan. Privatisation is a 
particular event used to illustrate and demonstrate the place of Taiwanese 
trade unions in relation to state policy and practice.
The MSc. research project thus provided me with two advantages for my 
subsequent doctoral research project. The first was that I established a fair
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understanding of Taiwanese privatisation issues and the attitude of the 
government, management and the railway union to privatisation. Second, and 
perhaps the most crucial benefit, was that I had established and maintained a 
strong connection and contact with the head of the Research Group of the 
railway union who later became my main informant and was very supportive 
of my doctoral research project.
4.2.1 Data collection
Data for this research project was obtained during three fieldwork trips 
between May 2005 and November 2007. In order to explore the Research 
Questions in relation to Taiwan in detail, three principal methods of data 
collection were utilised. The first and most dominant data collection method 
was the semi-structured interview. Data collection was of decisive 
importance in relation to the success of this research project. If not done well, 
the whole research might be put in danger and the entire research work might 
be in vain (Yin, 2003). In view of the research settings, interviews as the 
main data collection method in the field were important for this research 
project.
The advantages and features of the semi-structured interview have been 
widely identified. First, the interview involves face-to-face dialogue. This 
technique helped to develop mutual trust between me and interviewees and 
thus strengthen data credibility. Second, the interview, particularly the semi­
structured one, is particularly suitable for explaining changes in organisations 
and society, operational processes and employee behaviour (Mason, 2002). 
The semi-structured interview can be conducted like a chat or a conversation 
and carried out in a pressure-free atmosphere to generate and discover useful 
data.
An open-ended conversation, the main feature of the semi-structured 
interview, not only allowed me to follow up interviewees’ remarks for
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further exploration and clarification, but also allowed respondents to freely 
give their experiences and opinions towards some events which they thought 
appropriate and necessary while being interviewed. This feature helped me to 
generate new and important themes. An informal and flexible conversation 
also allowed me to induce interviewees to speak and elaborate on some 
informal and untold stories in which I was particularly interested. 
Accordingly, based on such informal interactions between me and 
interviewees, I explored and gained first-hand, rich, deep, holistic and 
contextual data that had been hidden (Mason, 2002: 63).
I conducted 41 interviews in total, which included 38 semi-structured 
interviews and three telephone interviews (Appendix A). I attempted to 
interview people from a wide range of positions within and beyond the 
railway industry. In addition to railway union officials, interviewees included 
government officials, legislators1, railway commentators, the executive 
manager of the Consumers’ Foundation, academics, railway director-generals 
and managers, railway workers, union officials in other industries, and other 
experts.
In addition to data collected through interviews, during the fieldwork period, 
I was granted special permission, to become a Union Researcher (December 
2005 -  December 2006), by the railway union chairman. As a result, I was 
able and free to participate in union activities, formal union meetings, and 
informal and occasional discussion groups. This also gave me the 
opportunity to collect a large amount of observational data in relation to 
people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happened, 
listening to what was said, and asking questions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
1995). I wrote fieldnotes on my observations. Observation and participation 
provided me with substantial data and understandings of the union policy­
making process and the way in which those observed responded. Data 
collected through observation and participation was of paramount importance 
for this research project because the study area had not been previously
1 In British terms, members of Parliament.
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properly studied, and thus much of what has happened in the world of work 
had remained unexplored. Furthermore, as complementary data collection 
methods, observation and participation proved crucial because my fieldnotes 
helped me to explain and analyse other data I had collected through 
interviews.
Moreover, detailed documentary analysis of reports and related material on 
pertinent issues published by government agencies and the Taiwan Railway 
were also utilised and cross-referenced with qualitative data to strengthen 
data credibility. Such materials were mainly published by government 
departments or agencies. The main government agency for planning, guiding 
and controlling privatisation progress is the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD). Four major government departments in charge of 
implementing privatisation in individual public enterprises are the Ministry 
of Transportation and Communications (MOTC), the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Veterans Affairs 
Commission. Both the planning and executive bodies periodically publish 
and update important and relevant information on the privatisation process 
on the official websites. These online documents were collected and analysed 
to understand the government’s perspective towards privatisation. Apart from 
that, other useful sources of data included Taiwan Railway internal 
publications, privatisation forum papers, and articles in the press dating from 
the 1950s to the present day.
All interviews were conducted in Taiwanese and/or Mandarin, and the 
fieldnotes and the majority of documentary materials were written in 
Mandarin. Under these circumstances, the data analysis involved not only 
analysing data but also translating data into English and writing it up. In 
order to translate words, which might have particular social and cultural 
implications, as precisely as possible, and to reduce the influence due to 
cultural differences for English readers, I consulted native English speakers 
in the School of Social Sciences for advice and assistance.
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In the following sections, I will first explain the history of this research 
project. This initial section is followed by a detailed description of the three 
fieldwork trips. And then, I will reflect on my role during the fieldwork 
period and on the issues of involvement and detachment.
4.3 History of the doctoral project
I did my MSc. in Cardiff Business School between 2003 and 2004. My 
dissertation was entitled Privatisation and Industrial Relations -  a case study 
in the Taiwan Railway. I then came to Cardiff School of Social Sciences in 
2004 with a fair understanding of the privatisation issues in Taiwan and the 
way in which the policy shaped industrial relations in the railway industry. 
During the course of my MSc. research project, I came to realise that the 
Taiwanese government had particularly referred to the privatisation 
experience of British Rail and the Japanese Railways. The Taiwanese 
government first looked at the British experience of the privatisation of 
British Rail but, then, having encountered a number of barriers to 
privatisation, shifted their attention to the Japanese model of privatisation of 
the Japanese Railway. Therefore, when I began my doctoral research project 
in October 2004, I decided to maintain my particular focus on privatisation 
and the railway industry but, driven by an ambitious research intention, I 
decided to broaden its scale to an international comparative study looking at 
the role of the state, capital and trade unions with reference to the 
privatisation of railways in Britain, Japan and Taiwan.
During the first year of my doctoral research, my supervisors, Peter 
Fairbrother and Huw Beynon, and I spent a long time trying to decide on the 
focus of the project. We drew a structure of the focus of this project on a 
flipchart for this purpose. We had been debating as to whether this research 
would be a comparative study of the three countries or a study on Taiwan 
with particular reference to Britain and Japan, as two exemplars. We decided 
that, structurally, the Taiwanese privatisation experience had to be the first
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case of the three in my thesis. However, since the literature and documents in 
relation to Taiwan and this topic are not abundant, I began this research by 
first looking at the British experience in the privatisation of British Rail as a 
theoretical foundation for the following research on Taiwan and Japan. I 
therefore wrote four working papers, entitled Railway History in Britain, 
Privatisation and the State, Privatisation and Capital, and Privatisation and 
Labour, respectively. These working papers attempted to study the issues and 
arguments on the basis of the British experience. We spent time debating and 
discussing the issues and arguments, raised in the four working papers during 
supervision periods in the first year. We also attempted to extend the issues 
and debates to international comparative perspectives.
However, as I worked through the three years, the focus of this doctoral 
research project shifted from an international comparative ground to a study 
of privatisation in Taiwan. The main reason why I shifted the focus of this 
doctoral research project was that I came to realise that the history and 
background of the Taiwanese privatisation experience and that of the railway 
industry and the railway union in particular were far more complex than I 
had initially expected and imagined. Not until the beginning of my first 
fieldwork trip in May 2005 to Taiwan did I realise the extent of the neglect of 
study on privatisation and trade unions in Taiwan. I had overlooked and 
underestimated the phenomenal implications that the Taiwanese privatisation 
experience would have.
During the first fieldwork trip in Taiwan, I met my main informant and 
others whom I had got to know when I was doing my Master’s research 
project. On this fieldwork trip, I became aware that the significance of the 
railway union was not only with reference to its success in opposing 
privatisation, but also in the way in which railway workers rebelled against 
the administrative-command system and the structure of the party-state to 
which they had been subservient for decades. There were stories upon stories 
in relation to the history of the development of the independent railway union 
which were not publicly known. Upon becoming aware of this research 
potential, I began to refocus my research project. The most important
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consequence of this fieldwork trip was that I planned a second eight-month 
fieldwork trip in Taiwan (between February and September 2006) in order to 
find out more about these stories. Accordingly, the focus of my doctoral 
research project continued to shift.
When I came back from the second fieldwork trip (September 2006), I 
attempted to find out what was happening within the Taiwanese trade unions 
by giving a paper, Public Sector Unions and Privatisation in Taiwan, at a 
Labour Research Seminar in the School of Social Sciences in November 
2006. The advantage of this presentation was that I realised that my doctoral 
project could focus on the Taiwanese experience alone, with the British 
experience as a point of reference and as a background study. I also came to 
understand that I could not research the railway union without dealing with 
other public sector trade unions in Taiwan. Thus, I shifted the focus and 
structure of this doctoral research project again. In addition to this seminar, I 
also gave papers on different occasions, including three at important 
international conferences:
Mind the Gap: Development o f trade unionism in Taiwan and its 
transformation. Paper presented at Graduate Research Presentations 
Day. Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Cardiff, UK. 8th May 2007.
Union Activism in the Taiwanese Railway Industry: Its source and 
impact. Paper presented at British Universities Industrial Relations 
Association New Researcher Workshop: IIRA Conference,
Manchester, UK. 3rd—6th September, 2007.
Union Policy and the Bargaining Capacity o f Taiwanese Trade 
Unions in the context o f globalisation. Paper presented at Work, 
Employment and Society Conference, Aberdeen, UK. 12th—14th 
September 2007.
The Rise and Fall o f the Taiwanese Party-State: implications and 
impacts on the development o f trade unionism. Paper presented at 
22nd Employment Research Unit Annual Conference, Cardiff 
Business School, Cardiff, UK. 17th—18th September 2007.
The basic intention of giving these presentations was not only to gain 
feedback from the professional audience but also to broaden the scope of my
83
research area and to enlarge my social network. The experiences provided 
me with considerable benefit when I was writing up my thesis.
4.4 Data collection for the PhD study
As indicated, I undertook three fieldwork trips to Taiwan as part of my 
doctoral research.
4.4.1 The first fieldwork trip —  May 2005
My first fieldwork trip took place in May 2005. It was organised with two 
basic aims in mind. First, I wanted to do some preliminary studies in order to 
determine how this doctoral research project should be constructed and could 
be conducted. I needed to understand to what extent this research topic and 
area were appropriate. As I indicated earlier, based on the knowledge I 
developed during the MSc. project, this doctoral project added the 
examination of the role of the state, capital and trade unions in the 
privatisation process of the Taiwan Railway which had not been 
systematically studied before. During this fieldwork trip, I did my best to 
look into materials from all possible sources, including postgraduate 
dissertations, journal articles, to ascertain the issues that my research might 
address. Surprisingly, there was very little information and research available. 
For me, this had two implications. First, in view of the situation, it was clear 
that no one had conducted a research project similar to mine. Second, it also 
meant that, as preliminary research, I would have to collect more first-hand 
data both by conducting more in-depth interviews with a wide range of 
interviewees and through collecting documentary data.
In addition to documentary resources, I also talked to people who might help 
me. I not only consulted union officials but also visited one Taiwanese 
academic who specialised in the privatisation of the Japanese Railway and
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Taiwan Railway. I did not deliberately prepare interview schedules for this 
trip since I was endeavouring to ascertain whether the issues I intended to 
focus on my research project were feasible. It was on this fieldwork trip that I 
noticed the research potential in Taiwan and the Taiwan Railway in relation 
to the history of class struggle in the country. People with whom I consulted 
about the issues in which I was interested unintentionally and commonly 
mentioned that the railway industry had had a long history of rebellion since 
the 1970s. In addition, in their view, the reason why the railway union could 
successfully oppose the privatisation of the railway was linked to this history. 
This aroused my interests because I have never seen any report or heard any 
news about the connection between the past and present events.
Second, the aim of this fieldwork trip was also to negotiate with the head of 
the Research Group for access not only for interviews but also for 
participation and observation on site. I also discussed with him the timetable 
for the following fieldwork. When he heard that my research project required 
more in-depth interviews with key figures, he promised to help me to arrange 
these. On the way back from Taichung (where the academic lived) to Taipei 
(where the railway union was based), I asked him (he had accompanied me 
on my visit to the academic in Taichung) whether or not the railway union 
could “hire” me as a non-paid union researcher for this research project. My 
abrupt request to “work” as a union researcher (which had not been a planned 
intention for this fieldwork trip) caused a lull in our conversation for a little 
while. Somewhat embarrassed, I further explained that I was not seeking 
payment for this work, rather I hoped that I might benefit from this identity 
and gain access within and outside the railway industry. Shortly after my 
explanation, he said he could promise me nothing but would present this idea 
to the union chair and let me know the outcome as soon as possible. To be 
honest, I was not sure whether my request was proper and polite, since he 
and the union had no responsibility to support my research in this way.
However, to my surprise, in November 2005, I received an email from the 
head of the Research Group, who said, he had put forward my idea at the 
union directors’ meeting and it had been officially approved. There had been
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no objection. Therefore, from December 2005 until the end of 2006, I was 
not only a PhD student but also a railway union researcher. My benefit as a 
union researcher included a desk with an Internet access point in a shared 
union office, and unlimited and free train tickets to travel wherever I needed 
to go for fieldwork purposes. I derived immeasurable benefits from this dual 
identity on my second fieldwork trip.
4.4.2 The second fieldwork trip —  February to September 
2006
The period of the second fieldwork trip was the longest and most crucial to 
the success of my doctoral research project. It lasted from February to 
September 2006. In February 2006, I went to the railway union for the 
second time. But this time, I had a new identity and a business card on which 
my name and title — “Union Researcher” — was printed. During the second 
fieldwork trip, data was collected not only through in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, but also through observing union activities, participating in union 
meetings, taking fieldnotes, receiving feedback from others and collecting 
documents.
Semi-structured interviews still formed the most important part of data 
collection on this fieldwork trip. According to my interview schedules 
(Appendix B and C) prepared before the trip, I intended to interview former 
and incumbent director-generals of the Taiwan Railway, railway managers, 
railway union officials, railway workers, government officials, legislators, 
representatives of consumer groups, other chairs of different unions, railway 
correspondents and other experts. Benefiting from the identity of “Union 
Researcher”, I was freely able to contact as many union officials as I thought 
necessary for conducting interviews.
During interviews with railway union officials and senior workers, I 
successfully gained and explored several “insider” stories in relation to the
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connection between the history of the railway workers and their union and 
the contemporary railway union situation. This connection had puzzled me 
for a while. On this fieldwork trip, I had more time to solve this puzzle by 
contacting several key figures who had been directly involved in the 
rebellion process in the 1970s that had resulted in the formation of the 
Taiwan Railway Workers’ Fellowship (TRWF) in the late 1980s. On 
exploring this issue, one particular group of railway workers, the train drivers 
and the Train Drivers’ Fellowship (TDF), were frequently mentioned by 
union interviewees. In addition, these interviewees tended to use 
conservative (some used negative) expressions to describe the sectional 
interests of their train driver colleagues. This caught my attention. More 
importantly, according to interviewees, the significance of the TDF in the 
development of the independent railway union was no less than that of the 
TRWF. I was deeply convinced that this story as well as the relationship 
between the TDF and the TRWF was worth further exploration.
I therefore re-designed my interview schedules (Appendix D), particularly 
for interviewing train drivers and core members of the TDF and others who 
might know something about this history. The exploration of these stories 
and history in relation to the relationship between the two railway workers’ 
groups helped me to identify two important and previously unknown themes, 
namely, (1) sectionalism of the TDF within the railway industry, and (2) 
cross-class collaboration between railway workers and the railway 
management in the context of privatisation. Many stories behind these events 
were recalled and related by union interviewees. In order to prove the 
authenticity of the data provided, I cross-referenced it not only with other 
interviewees’ responses but also with the news reports and documents from 
that time. Overall, the sources of information and data proved to be highly 
credible.
In addition to interviews with unionists, I also endeavoured to interview 
people outside the railway industry and the union in order to broaden my 
research scope and improve the richness of my data. First, I asked my 
interviewees whether they could approach a number of key figures whom I
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wanted to interview on my behalf. Second, I always asked my interviewees 
one final question: whom would they recommend I interview to explore 
some of the issues I wanted to investigate further? Interviewees were not 
only happy to recommend others to me but also (some of them) to directly 
contact key figures for me. Both these means were important because they 
not only saved me time in negotiating access but also engendered trust for 
those who were invited. This technique helped me to solve successfully the 
problem of negotiating access to some important figures, such as retired 
Taiwan Railway director-generals, retired Provincial Government officials, 
legislators and Chairmen of another two important unions.
For the purposes of this research project, I also sent invitation letters to 
people whom I believed to be worth interviewing, including ALSTOM’s1 
senior manager in Taiwan, the executive manager of the Consumers’ 
Foundation , two railway correspondents from two national newspapers, the 
executive secretary of the Taiwan Labour Front, the incumbent (at the time I 
was interviewing) Taiwan Railway director-general and former Labour 
Attache to America. In some cases, I did not reveal my union researcher 
status, only my PhD student status, when I felt my interviewees might be 
anti-union. All those interviews during this fieldwork trip are listed in 
Appendix A. Due to time constraints and work pressures of some 
interviewees, I conducted three telephone interviewees with one railway 
correspondent, the chief secretary of the telecom union, and one MOTC 
official.
Almost all interviews were carried out at the offices of interviewees, except 
those with one retired railway director-general and the retired union 
chairman of the Taiwan Motor Transport Company. Interviews were also 
voice-recorded, except the telephone interviews. The duration of interviews 
varied from around 45 minutes to 2 hours, except the three telephone
1 ALSTOM is a French based multi-national transport company, which ever provided 
locomotives to the Taiwan Railway.
2 The Consumers’ Foundation severely criticised the way in which the railway union had 
protested against the government’s privatisation policy. Such protest, in its view, ignored 
passengers’ interests.
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interviews which were completed in ten minutes. After interviews, I went 
through my fieldnotes and listened to voice recordings and transcribed some 
of the more important ideas from interviews for the purpose of refining 
interview schedules for subsequent interviews.
Apart from interviews, I also collected data through participation and 
observation. During the second fieldwork trip, I was invited to participate in 
different union meetings, including informal brain-storming and discussion, 
weekly meetings, monthly standing director meetings, quarterly director 
meetings, six-monthly member representatives’ general meetings and 
irregular ad hoc group meetings. Although the agenda of each meeting might 
not necessarily be related to my research project, I benefited from being 
present at these meetings. I carefully observed participants at meetings, the 
way in which they spoke and reacted with each other. I endeavoured to better 
inform myself of how the railway union operated and how decisions were 
made. In other words, by attending these meetings, I came to understand and 
explore the politics, culture, power structure, relationship and interactions 
within the union. Everyday, I took fieldnotes to record what I had observed. 
Although the majority of this data seemed to have little direct relationship 
with this research project, I believe the observational data increased my 
capacity to understand the setting and this helped me to analyse interview 
data more accurately. The setting also provides a context within which to 
understand attitudes towards privatisation.
Such observation became particularly important when I tried to understand 
some terms frequently used by interviewees and sought to translate them 
more precisely into English. For instance, union interviewees always used 
the term gan-bu (cadres) to describe “the most core members of the group” 
and the “people” who directly organised and planned particular events. This 
was particularly the case when they referred back to the history of rebellion 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The term gan-bu tended to have “political” 
connotations and implications. Thus, if I simply translated the term as “the 
core members of the group”, the political overtones of the term would not be 
conveyed to English readers. When I attended some important meetings, I
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came to appreciate the importance of understanding the underlying meaning 
of terms and how they were used to differentiate members’ role and standing 
in the group. For example, I thought all attendees at meetings were important 
enough to be called “cadres”, however, some were not called “cadres” but by 
their names (or even nicknames) or titles in the union.
In summary, the first two fieldwork trips were successful. The first fieldwork 
trip provided me with important background knowledge and understanding 
of the research setting, the issues, and the research “gap”. As a result of 
former fieldwork carried out for my MSc., not only was I able to build on 
previous good relationships established with railway unionists who agreed to 
help me gain access to key figures for interview purposes for doctoral study, 
I also came to realise some important issues had been neglected and needed 
to be further explored. The second fieldwork trip enabled me to collect data 
through various research methods. The title of union researcher granted by 
the railway union was also a bonus for this research project. As a railway 
union researcher, I used a desk in a shared office where I could closely and 
freely observe union activities. Working as an “insider” helped me to gain 
the trust of those around me which, in turn, assisted the research process. In 
addition, this identity opened up many windows of opportunity and enabled 
me to contact and interview a number of important figures. It was for these 
reasons that the amount of data I collected was massive, complex and diverse. 
It was also for these reasons that I shifted the focus of my research project 
and concentrated particularly on Taiwan.
4.4.3 Further interviews —  November 2007
Although I was sure that the quality and quantity of the data I had collected 
was of a high standard and addressed the key issues of the project, I wanted 
to ensure that I had not misinterpreted the meanings of interviewees. By
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giving a paper1 at an academic conference in November 2007 in Taipei, 
Taiwan, I was able to revisit the Taiwan Railway union office to say ‘hello’ 
and to conduct further interviews with key informants. These interviews 
mainly focused on (re)confirming several issues and themes that I was 
beginning to address. This return to the setting and further interviews were 
important not only for the accuracy of data analysis but also because the 
relationship between myself and informants and others could be maintained 
for the benefit of my future research.
4.5 Reflecting on the fieldwork 
— Involvement and detachment
The social relationship between myself and the head of the Research Group 
of the railway union was unusual and helpful for the success of this research 
project. I came to understand that his generous support successfully 
transformed my role from “outsider” to “insider”. The role of insider helped 
me to become fully involved in the research setting during the fieldwork 
period. This involvement helped me to work out a number of difficult 
situations related not only to (re)negotiating access for interviews and 
participant observation, but also to building up trust between us. I was 
therefore able to discover and explore undocumented issues and stories 
which had not been previously told or disclosed publicly. Without his 
support, this research would not have produced such rich and in-depth 
findings. But why did he trust me and give me so much support? Because our 
relationship went back to the time when I was doing the MSc. project.
When I requested access to study the railway union as my MSc. in February 
2004, the railway union’s confrontation with the government over the issue 
of privatisation had just settled down. The railway union was happy to share
1 Lee, F. H. and Zhao, W. (2007). Study on the Relationship between the Choice of Union 
Policy and Changes in Union Bargaining Capacity: Comparative study on trade unions’ 
attitudes towards the privatisation policy in Taiwan and China. Taiwanese Sociology 
Association Annual Conference. Taipei, Taiwan. 24* -  25th November.
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their experiences and justify their actions with people who showed an interest 
in what they had done. The way in which I chose to make myself known to 
them was successful. I did not criticise their actions but showed an 
understanding of why they had confronted the government by organising 
such a massive event. At the same time, I endeavoured to maintain an 
objective view of the position of both parties to the dispute, as I was aware of 
the importance of neutrality and lack of bias in a research setting where data 
is to be collected and subsequently analysed. When I informed the railway 
union of the research topic I had chosen, and my student identity, and made it 
clear that I held no hostile attitude towards it, it became clear to them that I 
posed no threat. In fact, the union felt it would gain by having their views 
and experiences studied. Their positive attitude towards me was also driven 
by the fact that no Taiwanese student studying abroad had ever showed an 
interest in the railway union before.
Perhaps the most decisive reason for their acceptance of me was that I found 
the right person -  the head of the Research Group1 -  as my main contact for 
the fieldwork for the doctoral project. To-date, he has been the only railway 
union official who has gained a postgraduate degree (in law). He is smart, 
open-minded, rational and enthusiastic about union agendas and issues. He 
belonged to the independent railway workers’ fellowship very early in the 
1980s. For this reason, he has been the most important “think tank” for the 
union, providing legal opinion and perspectives to the incumbent union chair. 
In other words, he has been influential within the railway union. During the 
fieldwork trip for my MSc. project, I had many opportunities to discuss and 
exchange ideas with him on many issues as a result of which we developed a 
good relationship, though he was much older than me. During the fieldwork 
trips, as indicated earlier, he provided me with valuable help and support.
Nevertheless, I would never regard him as a “gatekeeper” because he never 
intervened in the content, process and progress of my doctoral project. All he 
did was tell me to inform him if I needed any help. He then simply did his
1 He was promoted to Chief Secretary of the railway union in 2007.
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best to meet my needs. On some occasions however, he suggested 
alternatives if he thought my requests were inappropriate for some reason. 
His special role had two important implications for the success of my 
doctoral research project. First, because of his help and support, I became a 
union researcher with full “involvement” in the union. Second, because of his 
non-interventionist practice, I could maintain my “detachment” when 
collecting and analysing data.
Nonetheless, my de facto “unionist” role raises a concern in relation to 
whether I could interpret and analyse data “neutrally” without prejudice and 
bias. My research, which was “supported” by the union, aimed to explore the 
role of the state, capital and the trade union in the privatisation process of the 
Taiwan Railway. Aware of this unavoidable set of relations, to claim that this 
research is neutral seems too naive. In addition, throughout the fieldwork 
period, I did my best to collect data from different sources, including 
interviewing a wide variety of people from different classes and backgrounds 
within and beyond the union and the railway industry, and at diverse 
institutions. Besides, I cross-checked the credibility of the data I elicited from 
interviews as much as I possibly could with published sources as well as 
published documents and related materials. This, I believe, not only helped 
me to understand the issues from wider perspectives and to avoid bias, but 
also to avoid prejudice and misinterpretation of data.
4.6 Conclusion
This research project predominantly utilised the semi-structured interview as 
the major data source but also incorporated other data collection methods, 
including observation and participation and documentary analysis. The 
implementation of a multi-methods approach together with the opportunity 
for observation promoted the quality and credibility of data and the success 
of this research. The success of this approach is demonstrated in Party II and 
III of this thesis.
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Part II 
Public Sector Unions and 
Privatisation in Taiwan
Chapter 5 
Public Sector Unions and Privatisation
5.1 Introduction
In Part I of this thesis, I argued that the decreasing power of the party-state 
contributed to the transformation of Taiwanese trade unionism from 
dependent to independent. In turn, the development of independent trade 
unionism in part accelerated the party-state’s decreasing power within the 
industries and partly contributed to Taiwan’s political democratisation. One 
of the main drivers for the emergence of independent trade unionism was the 
privatisation policy of the 1990s. Formation of the privatisation policy was 
driven by international as well as internal pressures. Under the influence of 
both the KMT’s party-state rule and US-led capitalism, the rationale for 
privatisation in Taiwan in the early stage (between 1989 and 1996) focused 
more on political considerations than on economic ones. Marketisation, 
liberalisation and deregulation of public enterprises were not emphasised in 
this period.
One argument is that privatisation of state enterprises and associated 
agencies has significant effects on labour-management relations (Levesque 
and Murray, 2002). The 1 iterature in relation to privatisation and labour 
relations generally focuses on addressing post-privatisation and industrial 
relations (e.g. Arrowsmith, 2003; Femer and Colling, 1991; Pendleton, 1999), 
with a sub-theme examining how and whether trade unions were renewed in 
the aftermath of privatisation (e.g. Barton and Fairbrother, 2007; Dundon, 
1998). The most common argument in relation to the “theory of 
privatisation” is that both advocates and opponents believe that profit 
maximisation and efficiency influence and even shape the traditional trade 
union agency function. This has an impact on employment and working 
conditions (Pendleton, 1999). These developments were driven mainly by the
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nature of privatisation: under pressure from shareholders, management
higher productivity in association with changes in working patterns, 
employment levels and conditions of employment (Arrowsmith, 2003). In 
this context, the managerial approach can be devastating to both workers and 
trade unions (e.g. Barton and Fairbrother, 2007; Fairbrother et al., 2002), and 
inevitably compels a transformation in the relationship between the 
government, employers and trade unions.
The outcome of industrial relations in the wake of privatisation varied. The 
empirical evidence indicates that following privatisation, the impact on 
industrial relations was mixed (see Arrowsmith, 2003; Barton and 
Fairbrother, 2007; Dundon, 1998; Pendleton, 1999). For many trade unions 
and their members, privatisation had a considerable impact (see Fairbrother 
and Testi, 2002). Nonetheless, some trade unions were able to renew 
themselves, even after privatisation. For instance, research shows that unions, 
particularly the train drivers’ union in the privatised British Rail, took 
advantage of the skilled workforce shortages and other factors, such as low 
market competition, to reinforce its bargaining capacity with their new 
employers (Arrowsmith, 2003). In comparison with this union in the railway 
sector, union strength in the electricity sector was relatively restricted, partly 
because of an increase in market competition (Arrowsmith, 2003). In the UK, 
unions in these two sectors showed different bargaining capacities, partly 
because the two sectors faced different levels of market competition 
generated by privatisation.
Union commentators in liberal democratic countries believe that a union’s 
fundamental mission has always been to protect members’ working 
conditions and wages (Hyman, 1975). Therefore, in the face of a hostile 
privatisation policy, unions can be expected to adopt a militant attitude. 
However, in Taiwan’s case, while some public sector trade unions opposed 
privatisation, others did not. Moreover, independent public sector trade 
unions, which attempted to oppose privatisation, were differentially 
positioned and while some lost battles and their bargaining c
regained managerial prerogatives and pursued lower operational costs and
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diminished, others did not. This experience implies that the advantage of 
independent trade unionism seems not necessarily to turn into an absolute 
bargaining power for trade unions in the context of privatisation, but suggests 
that under certain conditions their bargaining capacity will be restricted. In 
order to unpack this paradoxical phenomenon, this chapter focuses primarily 
on questions for trade unions before and after privatisation in Taiwan. 
Specifically, this chapter studies trade union attitudes and policy-choices in 
the face of privatisation and whether their policy-choice is connected to 
changes in their bargaining capacities. This study draws particular attention 
to the ways in which union bargaining capacity is shaped by key structural 
factors within the situations in which trade unions operate (for a structural 
analysis of unions in relation to bargaining capacities, see Botwinick, 1993: 
195-210).
This chapter therefore has two aims. The first is to explore the formation and 
purposes of the Taiwanese privatisation policy. Here I will investigate the 
origins and motives of the Taiwanese government in terms of the adoption 
and implementation of privatisation. This chapter also examines the reasons 
why the Taiwanese privatisation policy was difficult to implement. I will 
argue that the labour conflicts that occurred during the privatisation process 
were a feature of the varied proposals and circumstances of privatisation. The 
chapter’s second aim is to present an analytical framework, based on the 
rationale for privatisation in Taiwan. This analytical framework illustrates 
the relationship between choice of union policy and changes in bargaining 
capacity. The research suggests that the outcome of privatisation varied 
according to the market and industrial structure of firms. A further feature of 
this analysis is to consider the limitations of the analytical framework. To 
anticipate, I argue that a neglected analytical dimension when considering 
union responses to privatisation is the organisational capacity of the unions 
themselves.
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5.2 Rationale for privatisation
When the KMT was in power, Taiwanese economic policies were designed 
and guided by the party-state for political purposes (Wade, 1988). The KMT 
government controlled national resources by means of extensive 
nationalisation to achieve political goals. This policy proved to be the most 
effective technique for strengthening the party-state’s political as well as 
economic capacity. Under the leadership of the party-state, with its complex 
origins in Leninist type political control and state capitalism, Taiwan 
experienced outstanding economic development. Such development attracted 
global attention and was seen as a model for other developing countries 
(White and Wage, 1988). However, this public sector centred approach was 
gradually unsustainable in the wake of oil crises and the demand for open 
markets. In the face of global economic depression, the performance of 
public enterprises, long controlled and intervened by the party-state, became 
a matter of political concern. Under these circumstances, public enterprises, 
once regarded as a valuable “asset” by the party-state, turned into a 
“liability” (Chang, 2002: 71).
To conform to the global neo-liberalisation trend mainly imposed by 
America, the KMT government established an ad hoc National Economic 
Reform and Development Commission in 1985 as an advisory body to the 
government. Having taken the advice of the commissioners, the KMT 
government announced that “Taiwanese economic development would move 
towards liberalisation, internationalisation and institutionalisation” (CEPD, 
1987: 99-100, cited in Chang, 2001: 60). In 1989, the KMT government then 
turned this declaration into five concrete policy-making guidelines:
(1) To lift import regulations;
(2) To reduce foreign currency exchange regulation;
(3) To cancel interest rate regulation;
(4) To liberalise industries (by opening markets and privatisation); and
(5) To open up the public sector to private investment (Hu, 2005: 2).
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The formation of the new economic development strategy was facilitated by 
the lifting of legal regulations and the move toward liberalisation. Then, 
privatisation of government-owned enterprises was promoted. The Act o f 
Privatisation o f Government-Owned Enterprises1 (hereafter the Privatisation
tfiAct) enacted on 20 January 1953 served as the legal foundation for 
developing the privatisation policy. According to Article 3 of the 
Privatisation Act, amended in 1991, the definition of privatisation is that 
government ownership is reduced to below 50 per cent of the total capital of 
the enterprise. The government has discretion to decide what state-owned 
enterprises should be privatised by considering whether or not the 
government should operate the state-owned enterprise (Article 5). The 
Privatisation Act also specifies the ways in which public sector enterprises 
may be privatised. By:
(1) sale of shares;
(2) sale of assets through bidding;
(3) formation of a private-owned enterprise by joint venture with private 
individuals by way of contribution in kind;
(4) merger of companies with the surviving enterprise being a private- 
owned enterprise; and
(5) capital increase by cash (Article 6, the Privatisation Act).
The first privatisation list, involving twenty-two government-owned 
enterprises, was published in parallel with the declaration of the national 
economic reform strategy in 1989 (Table 5.1). It was followed by the second 
list in 1997 (Table 5.2) and the third one in 2003 (Table 5.3). Between 1989 
and 2007, 66 government-owned enterprises were proposed for privatisation. 
Thirty-six were privatised and 17 were closed by the KMT and its successor, 
the DPP, respectively (CEPD, 2007).
1 The Privatisation Act was enacted in 1953 in order to privatise four public enterprises to 
raise money for completing the land reform policy. The government’s land reform policy 
through privatisation was driven by political considerations as addressed in Chapter 1.
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Table 5.1: The first privatisation list, 1989 (1)
Privatised enterprise Date of privatisation
Chung-Kuo Insurance Co. 1994
China Petrochemical Development Co. 1994
BES Engineering Co. 1994
China Steel Co. 1995
Yang-Ming Marine Transport Co. 1996
Liquid Petroleum Gas Supply Department 1996
Veterans Gas Factory 1998
Taiwan Navigation Co. 1998
Taiwan Life Insurance Co. 1998
Chang-Hwa Bank Co. 1998
Hua-Nan Bank Co. 1998
The First Commercial Bank Co. 1998
Taiwan Business Bank Co. 1998
Taiwan Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 1998
Taiwan Land Development Trust & Investment Co. 1999
Taiwan Machinery Co. 2001
------ Steel Factory (1996)
------Vessel Factory (1997)
------Alloy Steel Factory (1997)
Chung-Hsing Paper Co. 2001
Taiwan Motor Transport Co. 2001
Agricultural and Industrial Enterprise Co. 2003
Tang-Eng Co. 2006
Closing-down Date of liquidation(2)
(Agriculture Development Department) (1992)
(Ocean Fishery Development Department) (1993)
(Frozen Processing Factory) (1993)
(Taichung Harbour Vessel Factory) (1995)
(Veterans Blanket Factory) (1996)
(Changhua Factory) (1996)
Kaohsiung Sulphuric Acid and Ammonium Co. 2002
Delayed Expected date of privatisation
Taiwan International Shipbuilding Co. To be announced
Source: CEPD, 2007: Tables 1, 2 and 3; Taiwan Labour Front, 1999:
Appendix 1; Chang, 2002: Table 3-3 
Note: (1) The enterprises in this Table and the following two are put in 
chronological order of privatisation.
(2) Some companies or factories, which closed down before 1996, 
were not published in the privatisation list because they were 
small in scale and unimportant.
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Table 5.2: The second privatisation list, 1997
Privatised enterprise Date of privatisation
Gang-Shan Factory 1998
The Farmers’ Bank Co. 1999
Chiao-Tung Bank Co. 1999
Taiwan Fertilizer Co. 1999
Bank of Taipei Co. 1999
Bank of Kaohsiung Co. 1999
Shin-Sheng Press Co. 2000
Taipei Print Shop 2000
Central Reinsurance Co. 2002
Food Factory 2003
Taiwan Railway Freight Co. 2003
Tai-Yen Co. (Salt) 2003
Chung-Hwa Telecom Co. 2005
Veterans Pharmaceutical Factory 2005
Long-Chi Factory 2006
Closing-down Date of liquidation
Veterans Mining Development Department 1997
Veterans Petrochemical Factory 1997
Nanzih Factory 1998
Veterans Print Factory 1999
Taipei Paper Factory 1999
Taiwan Film and Culture Industry Co. 1999
Taichung Timber Factory 2000
Taipei Iron Factory 2000
Taoyuan Factory 2001
Plastic Factory 2003
Delayed Expected date of privatisation
Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Co. 2008
Taiwan Power Co. To be announced
CPC Co., Taiwan (Petroleum) To be announced
Taiwan Railway Administration To be announced
Aerospace Industrial Development Co. To be announced
RSEA Engineering Co. To be announced
Source: CEPD, 2007: Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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Table 5.3: The third privatisation list, 2003
Privatised enterprise Date of privatisation
Taiwan Cooperative Bank Co. 2005
Ongoing privatisation Expected date of privatisation
Taiwan Sugar Co. 2006-2008
Taiwan Water Supply Co. To be announced
Taiwan Post Co. To be announced
Bank of Taiwan Co. 2008
Central Trust of China Co. 2008
Land Bank Co. To be announced
Source: CEPD, 2007: Tables 1, 2 and 3.
The features of the enterprises in the first list are noteworthy. Most of the 
enterprises in Table 5.1 were attractive either in relation to operational 
profitability or their estate asset value on paper (except Taiwan Motor 
Transport Co., Chung-Hsing Paper Co., and Taiwan International 
Shipbuilding Co. which were in financial deficits). All of them faced market 
competition. Profitability of these enterprises could attract private capital and, 
therefore, their privatisation was relatively straightforward. Some have 
argued that the first list was the most favourable for privatisation (Chang, 
2002: 85). Nonetheless, the progress of their privatisation was slow and often 
delayed. Up to the end of 2007, 13 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), most of 
which were monopolistic, were still waiting to be privatised. Among these 
was the Taiwan Railway, which still operates as a state-owned part of the 
government administration. The reasons for the delay in privatisation are 
explored below.
First, it is evident that the formation of the privatisation policy in Taiwan was 
mainly driven by international forces, and the KMT, as the major policy­
maker, was not so enthusiastic about the implementation of the policy. As 
one researcher observed:
In 1989, the Central Government was merely in charge of making the 
policy and providing policy guidelines for other Ministries [the 
competent authorities of the public sector] to carry out privatisation.
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However, different Ministries did not generate common consensuses 
in terms of privatisation goals, directions and methods. ... 
Privatisation was thus delayed because of uncertainty (Huang, 2002:
24).
In view of the above, therefore, the publication of the first privatisation list in 
1989 and the amendment of the Privatisation Act in 1991 could to some 
extent be regarded as a means to deal with external as well as internal 
pressures. Not until the reshuffle of the Cabinet in 1994 and the new Premier 
incorporated the privatisation policy into his three major administrative 
guidelines was there an increase in moves towards privatisation (Huang, 
2002: 24). This indicates that the KMT government lacked determination to 
fully implement the privatisation policy. This also implies that the KMT 
government regarded the policy as a political instrument to reinforce party 
interests. In view of this, the KMT’s control and domination over the 
Taiwanese economy was still significant.
The second reason for delay lay with the economic implications of the policy. 
During the first half of the 1990s, the KMT government’s privatisation 
policy was considered as key to macroeconomic development. The 
privatisation goals published in 1989 reinforced this view:
(1) To improve enterprises’ decision-making power so as to increase 
their operational performance;
(2) To raise money for infrastructure construction and for public 
investment so as to improve standards of living;
(3) To absorb the excess market loose capital so as to ease inflation; 
and
(4) To increase counters for the capital market, and to enlarge the 
capital market so as to strengthen the development of the capital 
market (MOEA, 2007).
While the first goal was linked to market liberalisation, the rest were 
designed to contribute to the Treasury. Broadly speaking, the KMT viewed 
privatisation as an instrument to raise money, and it sought to develop a
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capital market by means of privatisation of public enterprises. I argue that it 
was this perspective that delayed the progress of privatisation in Taiwan.
During the early stage of privatisation, due to political and economic 
considerations, some privatised companies (the Chinese Petrochemical Co., 
BES Engineering Co. and three factories of Taiwan Machinery Co.) did not 
benefit from market liberalisation through privatisation. On the contrary, 
these enterprises and factories were sold off cheaply, and workers in these 
privatised enterprises were made redundant or had a cut in pay and benefits 
(Taiwan Labour Front, 1999). As a result, in these cases privatisation 
benefited those capitalists who were involved in the process, and the policy 
also caused labour unrest. Many researchers regard the implementation of 
privatisation at this stage as the way in which the party-state sought to sustain 
its power by intentionally colluding with private capital (Wu, 1992: 177-183; 
see also Taiwan Labour Front, 1999 and Chang, 2002). That is to say, in a 
sense, privatisation of government-owned enterprises was the means by 
which the party-state passed its power on to capitalists who were KMT 
supporters and therefore prolonged its sovereignty. Accordingly, for the 
KMT government, the performance of the privatised companies and the issue 
of labour relations were not actually considered as crucial.
With regard to the issue of industrial disquiet, the government argued that 
privatisation was in the long-term interests of public sector workers:
..., workers’ resistance is totally understandable, particularly, those 
who, as beneficiaries, have already enjoyed a higher wage. ..., the 
government ... has endeavoured to compensate their [financial] 
loss. ... Workers must acknowledge, however, that if enterprises do 
not adjust themselves quickly to the fast changing environment, in 
the longer term, their future development will be at risk (CEPD, 
2005).
In 1996, the KMT government set up the National Development and 
Advisory Commission, partly as a response to privatisation problems. In one 
of its conclusions, the Commission stated that privatisation of government- 
owned enterprises should be completed by 2001 (CEPD, 2004: 27). Based on
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the consensus reached by the Commission, the KMT government therefore 
expressed its determination to complete the privatisation programme by 
amending privatisation purposes as follows:
(1) To adjust the role of the government so as to bring market 
mechanisms into full play; and
(2) To open market competition so as to better utilise resources 
(MOEA, 2007).
According to these amended privatisation goals, the government not only 
refocused its attention on pursuing industrial efficiency but also re-examined 
its leading role in this regard. Equally important was that the government 
actively touched upon the problems of labour relations in the privatisation 
process. The government encouraged workers to participate in the operation 
of privatised companies by becoming shareholders (MOEA, 2007). This 
change in government attitude and associated modifications to the 
privatisation process proved to be effective in minimising workers’ as well as 
unions’ resistance. Some cases, notably, Chung-Hsing Paper Co., Taiwan 
Motor Transport Co. and Taiwan Railway Freight Co.1, were privatised by 
the employee-buy-out (EBO) scheme. After the change in government 
approach, the implementation of privatisation accelerated, as shown in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Although the government began to consider the issue of labour, workers’ fear 
of being made redundant remained. Taiwanese public sector employees in 
particular had at that time and still have three common features -  seniority, 
above-average wages and benefits, and highly protective employment. The 
privatisation policies largely undermined public sector workers’ interests. It 
was therefore not surprising that the announcement of radical implementation 
of privatisation in 1996 became a catalyst pushing public sector unions to 
oppose the policies. In the process, unions developed more sophisticated
1 Taiwan Railway Freight Co. was privatised not because of financial losses but because the 
government believed that this company should not be run as a government-owned enterprise 
any more. Therefore, in order to make privatisation acceptable to workers, the government 
sold off this company to incumbent workers by the EBO scheme.
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ways of questioning the policies, particularly the formation of union 
coalitions. Such coalitions were formed between a number of public sector 
unions to address the challenges of privatisation (as explained in Chapter 3).
The formation of these union coalitions seemed initially not to cause the 
ruling KMT too much trouble. The trend carried on even after the change in 
ruling party in 2000. The newly elected ruling party, the DPP, redrew and 
simplified aims of the privatisation purposes so as “to exert the market 
mechanism, and to enhance the operational efficiency of enterprises” (Article 
1, the Privatisation Act). The DPP government further stated:
While there have been different policy goals at different stages, 
privatisation is not an end in itself but liberalisation. The government 
has an obligation to adjust its role, to lift regulations for the public 
sector, and to make the public sector more viable for the future (Hu, 
2005: 22).
The DPP government redefined the goal the government intended to pursue 
through privatisation. It seemed that the DPP government tried to win over 
the public sector workers as well as unions, but at the same time to 
marginalise their capacity. Moreover, the DPP government also guaranteed 
that workers’ rights and benefits would not be altered too much and would be 
compensated generously. However, the DPP government’s effort in this 
regard was not successful, because the tension between the government and 
the independent public sector unions remained. In addition, a number of 
independent public sector unions were able to apply more sophisticated 
means to resist these policies.
To sum up, the Taiwanese state used established means of political control to 
facilitate the capitalist model of economic expansion within which the 
authoritarian party-state system and the New Right ideology were both 
grounded. Under this particular state development strategy, the formation of 
a privatisation policy and its preliminary purposes derived more from 
political considerations than economic ones (Chang, 2002). For the KMT 
government during the early stage of privatisation, the policy was
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implemented to generate money for the Treasury. Further, the policy was 
initiated to pass resources over to those capitalists who supported the party- 
state regime as a means to sustain the KMT’s declining power (Chang, 2002: 
54-58 and 107-109). However, for the opposition party, the DPP, the main 
rationale for initiating the policy was to diminish the connection between the 
public sector and the party-state, to marginalise the KMT’s power over 
politics and the economy (Chen et al., 1991). Although the rationales of the 
KMT and the DPP were seemingly contradictory, what was clear was that 
whatever the ultimate purposes of the two major parties, privatisation 
policies remained a key focus. The outcome of privatisation was 
contradictory; the role and function of trade unions were shaped in the face 
of privatisation, so was their bargaining capacity.
To explore these developments, we need to consider the political, 
institutional and legal contexts in which unions operate. These contexts set 
the scene for the limits and possibilities of unions in the face of privatisation. 
For instance, according to the Labour Union Law: “only one labour union 
shall be organised by workers of one and the same industry in one and the 
same area, or in one and the same factory or workshop” (Article 8). In 
addition, workers have the “right and obligation to join and become a 
member of the union for the industry or craft in which they are engaged” 
(Article 12). This implies that union membership is compulsory and thus the 
union density of trade unions is high, even after privatisation. For instance, 
the union density in the Taiwan Railway was 97.76 per cent in 2006. Even in 
the privatised Chung-Hwa Telecom Company, union membership is still 
automatic. Most importantly, having experienced and engaged in 
independent labour activity in the late 1980s, these public sector unions 
became independent and were led by more active leaders.
The government nonetheless attempted to introduce privatisation as a way of 
realising specific economic goals associated with the neo-liberal agenda it 
was promoting. The main issue here is that the impact of these policies 
varied between public bodies, so that some prospered in this new situation 
while others found the demand of the market somewhat daunting. It has
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frequently been argued (and documented) that opposition to privatisation was 
grounded in the prospect that there would be a diminution of terms and 
conditions of employment (Fairbrother et al., 2002). However, in the 
Taiwanese context, and against the background of the party-state, trade 
unions tended to be optimistic about their prospects, and believed that the 
public body was likely to be financially viable and prosperous in the 
privatised setting. It is when such prospects were not evident that unions 
opposed privatisation. More than this, these unions began to move towards 
the development of a more active presence in ways that had not been evident 
in the past. The analysis shows that in a situation where in the past unions 
had been constrained and limited by political and legal arrangements, with 
the proposals to privatise, some unions were able to revive their agency by 
adopting different policy choices. The following sections will present the 
conditions for developing an active and independent form of unionism in the 
context of privatisation policies.
5.3 Changes in bargaining capacity of public sector 
unions
The Taiwanese government scheduled 66 government-owned enterprises into 
three waves of privatisation (in 1989, 1997 and 2003, respectively). These 
were public utilities, manufacturing, banking and insurance, transportation, 
and mass media enterprises. Out of 66 enterprises, thirty-eight were 
unionised. Of 38 unions, twenty showed no opposition (or very little concern) 
to privatisation (Table 5.4), while 18 strongly opposed privatisation (Table 
5.5).
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5.3.1 U nions th a t  did not oppose privatisation
Table 5.4 Unions which showed no opposition to privatisation
X. Privatisation 
status
Union policy
Privatised Privatisation ongoing
Did not oppose 
privatisation
Manufacturing:
• Long-Chi Factory Union
• Tai-Yen Workers’ Union
• China Steel Workers’ 
Union
• Tao-Yuan Factory Union
Banking:
• The Farmers’ Bank 
Workers’ Union
• Chiao-Tung Bank 
Workers’ Union
• Taiwan Cooperative Bank 
Workers’ Union
• Chang-Hwa Bank 
Workers’ Union
• The First Commercial 
Bank Industrial Union
• Hua-Nan Bank Industrial 
Union
• Taiwan Business Bank 
Industrial Union
• Bank of Taipei Workers’ 
Union
• Bank of Kaohsiung 
Workers’ Union
Transportation:
• Yang-Ming Marine 
Transport Workers’ Union
• Taiwan Railway Freight 
Workers’ Union
Others:
• Liquid Petroleum Gas 
Supply Union
Manufacturing:
• RSEA Engineering 
Industrial Union
Banking:
• Bank of Taiwan Workers’ 
Union
• Land Bank of Taiwan 
Workers’ Union
• Central Trust of China 
Workers’ Union
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As indicated in Table 5.4, those trade unions that did not oppose the 
privatisation policy mainly operated in industries with strong finances 
(except Long-Chi Factory, Tao-Yuan Factory and RSEA Engineering Co.) 
and where market competition was the norm. Clearly these industries 
required more flexible managerial strategies to respond quickly to the market 
to expand business (Wong et al., 2002). The companies’ future economic 
prosperity was the main concern for both management and trade unions. In 
one sense, deregulation through privatisation created more efficient and 
adaptable conditions for enterprises to compete freely with their counterparts 
and to sustain their businesses. Therefore, as long as employees’ working 
conditions, pay and employment could be guaranteed (partly because of the 
financial surplus), unions and employees tended to adopt more positive 
attitudes towards privatisation (National Treasury Agency, 2004: 5-7). These 
processes took place, for example, via the settlement of collective bargaining 
with new employers, in association with generous financial compensation 
given by the government (e.g. The Privatisation Act). Trade unions, therefore, 
generally speaking, chose not to oppose privatisation under the conditions 
that: (1) the agency of unions and their bargaining capacity would not be 
weakened; (2) employee interests and employment conditions would not be 
affected; and (3) the companies would have bright prospects and 
competitiveness. Under these circumstances, industrial relations within these 
privatised enterprises were less problematic.
The bargaining capacity of unions of this kind remained effective. This was 
mainly because these unions had completed collective bargaining agreements 
before or after privatisation with new employers, through which members’ 
working rights and benefits as well as the union bargaining position and 
representativeness were largely secured. Further, the government announced 
in 2003 that “as long as the government takes hold of more than 20 per cent 
of total shares of the privatised companies, there will be at least one labour 
director representing the government on the board” (Executive Yuan, 2003). 
The labour director, regarded as the labour representative on the board of 
directors, will be nominated by the union or elected by union members. This 
“industrial democracy” scheme in conjunction with the effect of collective
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bargaining agreements largely secured bargaining capacity for those unions 
within the firms.
5.3.2 Union opposition to privatisation
A different pattern was observed when unions adopted a hostile attitude 
towards privatisation. Union bargaining capacities varied in the run-up to 
privatisation. In some cases, their bargaining capacity had been reduced 
(even exhausted) by the attempt to oppose privatisation through the use of 
strike, lobbying and petition against the policy. Other unions surprisingly 
became stronger as they opposed privatisation. This raises the important 
question of trade union agency and the way in which this relates to, and is 
shaped by, structural characteristics of the firm, the industry and the market. 
This was particularly significant given the economic goals pursued by the 
government through a privatisation policy. Although the rationale for 
privatisation could not completely rule out the pursuit of political intentions 
(Veljanovski, 1987), economic considerations still comprised the main 
reasons for the privatisation project. To further develop the analysis, it should 
be noted that the economic goals of privatisation were decisive for the ways 
in which unions responded to these developments. One stated goal of 
privatisation is to pursue efficiency in the public sector {financial 
considerations) through increasing market competition {market status). As 
such, the bargaining capacities of the different public sector unions were 
deeply affected by the market as well as financial status of the firms in which 
they operated. Nonetheless, other factors remain important, such as political 
and institutional aspects and union leadership, as will be argued.
Table 5.5 shows the allocation of trade unions who opposed privatisation in a 
two by two grid in accordance with market structure (non-monopoly or 
monopoly), and financial status (deficit or surplus) of the firms in which 
trade unions operated. Four different types of unions are identified.
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Table 5.5 Economic context of trade unions by the end of 2006 (1)
Nv Market 
\  Structure
Financial 
Status n.
Non-Monopoly (2) Monopoly
Deficit
Type I Union
• Taiwan Motor Transport 
Workers’ Union
• Chung-Hsing Paper 
Workers’ Union
• Taiwan Shipbuilding 
Industrial Union
• Taiwan Fertiliser Workers’ 
Union
• Taiwan Machinery Workers’ 
Union
• Tang-Eng Workers’ Union
• Sulphuric Acid and 
Ammonium Workers’ Union
Type IV Union
• Taiwan Railway Labour 
Union
• Aerospace Industrial 
Development Co. Workers’ 
Union®
Surplus
Type II Union
• Chung-Hwa Telecom 
Workers’ Union
• China Petrochemical 
Workers’ Union
• BES Engineering Workers’ 
Union
• Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ 
Union
• Confederation of Trade 
Unions of Taiwan Tobacco 
and Liquor
• Taiwan Provincial 
Confederation of Sugar 
Workers’ Union
Type III Union
• Industrial Workers’ Union 
of Taiwan Province Water 
Supply Corporation
• Taiwan Power Labour 
Union
• Chung-Hwa Post Workers’ 
Union
Note:
(1) Economic context means the situation of the firms in which the unions 
were operating by the end of 2006 or the situation in which the unions 
were operating in the run-up to privatisation.
(2) Non-monopoly includes oligopoly.
(3) One of the main trades of Aerospace Industrial Development Co. (AIDC) 
is designing and producing aeroplanes, particularly for national defence 
purpose; this part of the business is still in monopoly.
I l l
As noted, the Taiwanese government deregulated most markets by 
encouraging private competitors, in the hope of introducing competition- 
induced performance. As a consequence, some industries began to show 
signs of financial difficulty (Type I Union). However, because of the 
preconditions of the existing economic scale and/or the position of the 
franchise, some firms’ finances did not run into the red when their markets 
were opened up to competition (Type II Union). Some of these enterprises 
remained in public hands as the state saw little gain (economically or 
politically) in open competition for these industries (Type III and IV Union). 
In the following sections, these aspects will be discussed and demonstrated 
by examples.
Type I Unions: bargaining capacity shrinking
The Type I Category of union operated in industries facing market 
competition from domestic and/or foreign competitors. At the same time, 
these industries were generating financial deficits which were difficult to 
reverse. The main purpose of privatisation for these companies was to reduce 
the government’s financial burden and introduce efficiency and effectiveness 
through a change in ownership. The bargaining leverage of Type I Union 
appears to have been undermined significantly because of firms’ weak 
industry and market structure. These unions attempted to organise labour 
actions against privatisation but were defeated. In some cases, union officials 
in this category campaigned against each other (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999). 
Therefore, the unions usually showed a limited capacity to resist employers 
and the government.
In other cases, unions were even forced to support privatisation to secure the 
majority of members’ interests and the right to work. For instance, the 
Chung-Hsing Paper Workers’ Union and the Taiwan Shipbuilding Industrial 
Union were initially hostile to privatisation, but their actions were to no 
effect. When both companies’ finances continued to deteriorate, they were 
forced to change their attitudes and began to show no opposition to
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privatisation (Lin, 2001). In the Taiwan Shipbuilding Co.’s case, the Taiwan 
Shipbuilding Industrial Union was forced to accept the Rehabilitation Plan in 
order to save the company from bankruptcy (United Daily News, 21/03/2001: 
21). This Plan was initiated to make the company profitable in order to 
attract private capital involvement. According to the Plan, more than 2,300 
employees, equivalent to 45 per cent of total workers, were made redundant, 
while pay was cut by 35 per cent for those who chose to stay (United Daily 
News, 21/03/2001: 21). The shipbuilding union even admitted that 
“privatisation is the way in which the company must go” to survive (CEPD, 
2004: 132). For this reason, the shipbuilding union was divided into two 
factions: those for and against privatisation (United Daily News, 28/12/2001: 
20). Needless to say, it is difficult to see unions of this kind playing an 
adequate role in defending their members’ interests in the run-up to 
privatisation, as well as in the aftermath of defeated strike action.
Taiwan Motor Transport Co. Ltd. (TMT) and its union provides another 
example of this process. The TMT was one of the biggest loss makers, 
second to the Taiwan Railway. The government believed that its financial 
losses were caused by excess staff. Therefore, a large number of workers 
were made redundant before privatisation was implemented. The idea that 
redundancy was the only way to save the company had a significant impact 
on union bargaining capacity. The redundancies were supported by the union 
because union officials were convinced that they were a necessary step to 
save the company from bankruptcy (Change, 2002). Between 1987 and 1996, 
three waves of redundancies reduced workers by 9,550, from 14,250 to 
around 4,700 (Chang, 2002). Nevertheless, after these waves of redundancies, 
the company’s financial deficits did not improve and it was privatised.
In this context, the union organised anti-privatisation strikes. The TMT 
union’s actions against privatisation were regarded by government officials 
as hostile and aggressive (Chang, 2002), and were unlikely to be successful 
as there were already competitors in the market. The government viewed 
privatisation as a solution to financial deficits and union opposition. It
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therefore asserted that privatisation of the TMT would go ahead (Lee, 2001). 
As a former TMT union Chairman in the run-up to privatisation recalled:
We went on strike [against the privatisation policy], but the 
government basically had no fear of our action ... because first, 
there were already abundant substitutes in the market; second, we 
lacked experience; and third, the union and the workers were 
divided by the employer. ... When we were arguing with the 
government through union actions, the government, instead of 
negotiating with the union, directly negotiated with some union 
officials who were pro-employer and employees who showed 
cooperation in this regard and promised to provide them with better 
benefits after privatisation. ... The union cannot rebel against the 
employer. ... We, by nature, are an unprivileged group (interview, 
04/06/2006).
Bypassing the agency of the union was successful partly because the union 
had been discredited in the eyes of some workers by its earlier support for the 
redundancy programme. The government’s tactic was effective and 
succeeded in weakening the agency and power of the trade union. The 
division happened not only between workers and the union but also between 
union officials who could not agree on whether they should reject, or 
compromise with, the benefits provided by the government. As the former 
TMT union chairman recalled:
In my view, the most powerful weapon that the government can 
exert to deed with unions’ rebellion is division. The TMT Union 
was significantly divided by the government in the run-up to 
privatisation. The government persuaded a number of union 
officials to cooperate with the employer. When these union officials 
publicly claimed that privatisation would be good for workers ... 
then the majority of workers’ anxiety evaporated. This would not 
have happened, if union officials had stood firm against the policy 
collectively (interview, 04/06/2006).
In this case, the success of the employer and the government was clearly 
assisted by the market context and largely limited the union’s bargaining 
capacity. The union in this privatised company remains riven by different 
factions. Accordingly, the role of the union is weak and marginalised. To 
illustrate, one former chairman, elected after privatisation, was sacked by the 
new employer because he attempted to defend workers’ interests by accusing
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the employer of a breach of the Labour Standards Law (United Daily News, 
03/11/2007: A10).
In the context of economic conditions with strong market competition and 
financial deficits, employers and the government could more easily intervene 
and weaken the Type I Union. The bargaining power of Type I Union in the 
wake of privatisation was largely diminished and not strong enough to 
challenge employers. Although some unions had labour directors on the 
board (e.g. Tang-Eng Workers’ Union and Taiwan Fertiliser Workers’ 
Union), evidence shows that their bargaining capacity was undermined after 
privatisation. For example, after privatisation, the Taiwan Fertiliser Workers’ 
Union admitted that they lacked the capacity to negotiate with the employer 
to prevent one of the company’s important factories from being closed down 
(United Daily News, 08/12/2003: A6). Therefore, the bargaining capacity of 
Type I Union was shaped and undermined by the economic contexts of the 
firms in which they were embedded.
Type II Unions: intact union organisation but weakened bargaining capacity
What distinguishes Type II Category from Type I Category is the financial 
performance of the firms in which the unions operated. Those companies in 
which Type II Unions operated were financially strong. Although the market 
structure of these enterprises was as competitive as that in those enterprises 
in which Type I Unions operated, their high market shares or their franchise 
status made their financial performance distinctive. In this context, Type II 
Unions were able to oppose privatisation policies but their bargaining 
capacity was weakened.
As a consequence of the open market strategy that resulted in the break-down 
of monopolistic market structures, Type II unions found it more difficult to 
oppose privatisation. In some cases, such unions opposed privatisation by 
strike action but were defeated (e.g. petrochemical, engineering and telecom 
unions). Others were forced to carry on negotiations on privatisation with
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employers and the government (e.g. petroleum, tobacco and liquor, and sugar 
unions). For example, the tobacco and liquor union undertook a survey on 
workers’ attitude towards privatisation in 2004. With a 97% response rate, 
83% of workers were against privatisation (CEPD, 2004: 108). Successful 
union opposition meant that the government continued to look for suitable 
ways to privatise them (CEPD, 2007). From this perspective, the bargaining 
capacity of these unions, whether privatised or not, was if anything weakened 
because of diminishing market leverage that unions could exercise.
Chung-Hwa Telecom Co. Ltd. and its union, the Chunghwa Telecom 
Workers’ Union (CTWU), is a good example of this situation. Since market 
deregulation in 1997, the company made large profits but experienced market 
competition from private competitors. When the company was scheduled 
into the privatisation list, the CTWU strongly opposed privatisation. On 5th 
December 2004, the CTWU called for a general meeting for a strike ballot 
against privatisation. More than 17,000 members, equivalent to 60 per cent 
of total members, voted in support of strike action against privatisation. 
However, surprisingly, when the union attempted to organise a general strike 
on 9th August 2005, less than one thousand members participated in the 
action (United Daily News, 10/08/2005: A6). The strike was defeated and the 
company was privatised.
The reason why the CTWU’s members took this stance may be understood 
as follows. According to a senior union official, the majority of union 
members did not go on strike because management threatened employees 
with poorer annual performance appraisals (which would directly affect their 
year-end bonuses and promotion opportunities). This union official further 
stressed that it did not mean that those workers who did not go on strike 
supported privatisation (interview, 08/03/2007). However, this explanation 
seems insufficient to explain most union members’ lack of support for the 
strike, particularly because working conditions and employment would be 
affected after privatisation. It seems plausible therefore to suggest that the 
possible reason for workers’ reluctance to strike was that they were more or 
less convinced that deregulation and privatisation would better position the
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company to face market competition, resulting in better performance-related 
pay and bonuses. Accordingly, as long as the government guaranteed no 
compulsory redundancy and maintained benefits, telecom workers, instead of 
listening to the union and going on strike, were more likely to adopt a stance 
that privatisation might bring better prospects to both the company and 
themselves. As a result, in the absence of the majority of members’ support, 
the CTWU’s bargaining capacity was weakened. As the CTWU’s chairman 
recalled:
I already knew that the strike called for against privatisation would 
fail [because of members’ attitude], I had no choice but to carry on 
the strike because I believed that if the strike was called off because 
of the fear of failure, I would not sit here [in the union office] and 
talk to you about this issue as a union chair. ... After the failure of 
the strike, we were privatised in August 2005. ... We now do not 
dare to organise any union activity against the employer, because 
we have lost our strength and capacity (interview, 26/06/2006).
The CTWU chairman indicated that privatisation had had far-reaching 
consequences for the union’s future development. The power and capacity of 
the CTWU had been shrunk to such an extent that they could not confront the 
employer with any significant action immediately after the strike. Although a 
collective bargaining agreement was completed after privatisation and there 
are three labour directors in the board, it should be noted that none of this 
would have happened without the consent of the employer and the 
government. In other words, as emphasised by the chairman, it was not the 
union that made these happen but support both from the Board and the 
government. As the chairman stressed:
I want to give thanks to the director-general as he insisted on 
signing the collective bargaining agreement after privatisation. 
Many people had tried to persuade him not to sign the agreement 
with the union after the company was privatised and the union had 
failed on the strike. But he still agreed to do so. He is marvellous 
(interview, 26/06/2006).
It was not clear why the Board had agreed to sign the agreement, but what 
was clear was that, because of this, the union chairman was re-elected in
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2006, even though the strike he organised ended in failure. This successful 
re-election meant that the union remained accepted by its members as the 
representative of the workers and thus had the capacity for renewal in the 
future. The chairman stated:
Although we lost the strike on opposing privatisation in 2005, we 
still won the union election overwhelmingly this year [2006]. To be 
honest, I was very surprised by this success. ... This gives us one 
more opportunity to think about the union’s future. ... Before 2005, 
anti-privatisation was a clear and simple goal for the union, but 
since we failed in that goal, we have to reposition ourselves and to 
transform. ... We have to find a new direction (interview, 
26/06/2006).
In contrast to Type I Unions, the CTWU was left with an intact organisation 
and therefore in a position to possibly renew itself in the aftermath of 
privatisation. Significantly, union officials were reviewing their missions and 
deliberating how they could renew the union. It could be argued that this is a 
critical turning point for the union.
It is too soon to conclude that other unions of Type II will also fail in their 
opposition to privatisation. Moreover, it is also not clear whether workers in 
the three companies with privatisation ongoing (see Table 5.5) will take 
similar stances as the telecom workers did in the run-up to privatisation. 
However, what is clear from looking at unions of Type I and II is that if the 
market is competitive, the union bargaining capacity is diminished. As a 
consequence, employers and the government have a stronger hand and the 
possibility of achieving their goals during the negotiation process towards 
privatisation.
Type III Unions: strong but shrinking bargaining capacity
This union category operates in enterprises which have a variety of public 
service responsibilities. The government did not consider private competition 
in these areas until the 1990s. As far as the national economy is concerned,
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the state manipulates the product price of these public enterprises in order to 
stabilise consumer price index and to make sure that all citizens benefit. 
Open competition in these industries could to some extent jeopardise these 
goals. However, the government has not changed its commitment to 
privatisation policies. Thus, it acknowledged that the privatisation 
programme for these enterprises must be carefully examined and reviewed 
but not disregarded (CEPD, 2006; MOEA, 2007). Such enterpris es have 
therefore been corporatised so that they c an gain some of the supposed 
advantages of privatisation. Accordin gly, although Type III Unions h ave 
adopted an anti-privatisation policy, they have been forced to negotiate with 
employers and the government on this matter.
In comparison with Type I and Type II unions, Type III unions have a 
relatively strong bargaining capacity, driven by the market status of the firms 
in which they operate. When the financial status of these firms is taken into 
consideration, the bargaining capacity of Type III unions is reinforced. 
Generally speaking, the monopoly position of enterprises, such as postal 
services, has been viewed by government as a problem. However, private 
capital has regarded this situation as an opportunity. As one legislator clearly 
indicated:
When discussion of the amendment to the Postal Act was 
undertaken, some legislators showed great interest in deregulating 
or even privatising the postal delivery to let private capital share the 
monopolistic delivery market. I believe that behind this scenario, 
some consortia hoping to become involved in the business 
attempted to lobby legislators (interview, 22/05/2006).
The government began considering lifting market restrictions to encourage 
competition and improve the effectiveness of these firms (CEPD, 2006; 
MOTC, 2007). Such developments could threaten the bargaining capacity of 
Type III Unions.
Although privatisation of these firms is not a practical policy at present, 
corporatisation has been implemented to achieve increased productivity. In 
addition, the government is considering other reform strategies. For instance,
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after corporatisation of the Taiwan Water Supply Corporation, the 
government considered further improving efficiency by contracting out some 
of its peripheral businesses (CEPD, 2006). The British experience suggests 
that “contracting-out” is an attempt to introduce an element of competition to 
markets which are unavoidably monopolistic by creating competition for the 
market rather than competition in the market (Bishop and Kay, 1989: 645). 
Outsourcing has been the way in which governments have introduced 
deregulation and de facto privatisation. This trend has made it difficult for 
the union to reject this policy because the government has long requested the 
company to be more financially efficient. Since outsourcing would possibly 
diminish the union’s representativeness, based on the current circumstances 
and future development, the bargaining capacity of Type III Unions, while 
still strong, seems to be shrinking.
Type IV Unions: strong bargaining capacity but future unknown
One feature that distinguishes the Type IV Category of union from the Type
III Category is the poor financial performance of the firms in which it 
operates. In a sense, sustaining an industry in a monopolistic position could 
mean that open competition in this industry would be economically 
unsustainable. Moreover, financial deficits provide a limited opportunity to 
make a profit. Therefore, the bargaining capacity of Type IV Unions has 
been shaped within these two economic contexts. However, it has not been 
shaped in the same way as we observed in the former three types of unions 
where their bargaining capacity declined. The bargaining capacity of Type
IV Unions is increasing and strengthening.
As discussed above, unions operating in a monopoly situation could 
strengthen their bargaining capacity as indicated in the Type III Category, 
while financial deficits could decrease the union bargaining capacity as 
shown in the Type I Category. However, when these two economic structures 
come together in one firm, the result appears to be different and striking. The 
bargaining capacity of Type IV Unions remains strong. The poor financial
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performance of the firms in which Type IV Unions operate, in contrast to the 
Type I scenario, has triggered workers’ sense of crisis and bound them more 
tightly together. These unions have opposed corporatisation and privatisation 
on the grounds that it could lead to redundancy and deteriorating working 
conditions and employment. Accordingly, Type IV Unions could benefit 
from these economic contexts and strengthen their bargaining capacities. 
Therefore, when a hostile policy like privatisation is proposed, the role of 
Type IV Unions normally becomes more significant than it was before.
The most significant example of this process is the Taiwan Railway and its 
union, the Taiwan Railway Labour Union (TRLU). Since the 1990s, the 
TRLU has faced two challenges — the development of a private railway 
company and privatisation. The government believed that by introducing 
these policies, the Taiwan Railway would become more market-oriented and 
therefore have the ability to deal with its financial deficits. However, the 
TRLU believed that a private parallel railway and privatisation would 
jeopardise the Taiwan Railway’s future and would reduce working 
conditions and employment. One senior union official put it thus:
We do not oppose reform, but we do oppose the reform that lacks 
vision. ... I just have a feeling that in terms of reform, the 
government simply wants to abandon this financial burden, and let 
the railway run its course. ... In this context, we all worry about the 
future. If we have no confidence in the reform of the future, we 
would rather have the status quo sustained. ... On the one hand, the 
Taiwan Railway director-general insisted on carrying on with this 
visionless reform; on the other hand, more sadly, the government is 
sharing the Taiwan Railway’s resources with the private high speed 
rail company and the Railway is gaining no benefit whatsoever 
from this sharing of resources by way of income. When the 
government’s intended privatisation of the Railway and the 
development of the new high speed rail service happened together, 
the power of the union increased (interview, 05/05/2006).
It could be argued that workers’ sense of crisis resulted from uncertainty 
about the future, and the poor financial performance of the firm. 
Understandably, the firm’s financial deficits could lead to deteriorating 
working conditions and difficulties in increasing pay and bonus.
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Restructuring the firm could imply more redundancies and an increase in 
working intensification, particularly when the firm is in severe deficit, as was 
the TMT’s case. Driven by this thought and the inspired leadership of the 
union, railway workers decided to organise to defend their future.
The response by the TRLU to these government policies points to a 
neglected dimension in the analysis of Type IV unions. In addition to the 
structural position of these unions, it is also important to consider their 
organisational basis. This draws attention to union leadership and 
organisational activity. While all the unions arose out of a background of 
dependency on the state, the additional ingredient in the analysis is how the 
union realises its place as an independent union challenging state policy. This 
fact emphasises the importance of the varied organisational developments 
that may also have occurred in these unions.
The TRLU opposed the construction of the private high speed rail company 
and the privatisation policy. This radicalism has a number of important 
implications. First, it demonstrated union independence against the employer 
and the party-state. It also heralded a situation to its members that the 
existence of this independent union was no longer futile as they were strong 
enough to fight for their future and the right to work. Second, it reminded the 
government that the union was led by workers who had organised the first 
ever railway strike in railway history. Therefore, the union still had capacity 
to organise a politically influential strike. What these two implications 
illustrate is that railway workers provided the union with their support. This 
strengthened representative position and in return secured their ability to 
bargain successfully. As a consequence, the TRLU successfully stopped the 
government implementing a corporatisation policy, let alone privatisation.
However, one private parallel railway company opened to business in 
January 2007. This implies that the Taiwan Railway’s monopolistic position 
in railway transport was actually broken. This could generate a negative 
effect on the TRLU’s bargaining capacity in the future, though the 
consequences remain unclear. In the longer term, the future of the TRLU
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with its strong bargaining capacity, secured by the monopoly status of the 
firm in which it operates, remains unknown. Therefore, while the bargaining 
capacity of the Type IV Union is the strongest, the future is uncharted 
territory.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter first explored changes in the focus of the Taiwanese 
privatisation policy. The emergence of the privatisation policy was initially 
driven by political intentions, which later extended into economic policies. 
Against this background, Taiwanese trade unions, which had just won battles 
for independence against the party-state regime within the industries, took 
different stances towards privatisation.
An apparent paradox in trade union policy choices and behaviour was 
observed in Taiwan. In the face of privatisation, some Taiwanese trade 
unions decided not to oppose the policy. This seems paradoxical in the light 
of prevailing theory in relation to privatisation which emphasises the 
weakening effect upon trade union organisations and their bargaining powers. 
However, this is to ignore the different structural locations that trade unions 
encounter and the possibility of a variety of different policy choices within 
this context.
It is clear that when a privatisation policy brings positive outcomes to 
companies, trade unions and employees, trade unions tended to take 
advantage of privatisation to enhance, or at least sustain, their agency and 
their bargaining capacity with new employers. The consequence of such 
behaviour is likely to be more or less promising. However, when the 
implementation of privatisation causes more job losses and reductions in 
wages and conditions, the trade union could be expected to fight against the 
policy. However, the outcome here is less clear cut -  some became stronger 
but others weaker.
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The results suggest Type I Unions had the weakest bargaining capacity, 
shaped by non-monopoly and financial deficits contexts, while Type II 
Unions under the contexts of a non-monopoly and financial surplus to some 
extent sustained their organisation and keep their influence intact. When the 
market structure of firms shifted to a monopoly, the bargaining capacity of 
Type III and IV unions would to a large extent be sustained or even enlarged, 
depending on the firms’ financial performance, either surplus (Type III) or 
deficit (Type IV).
These findings provide sufficient explanations to understand the relationship 
between union policy choices and changes in bar gaining capacity in the 
context of privatisation. The results also suggest two important developments 
in public sector unions’ bargaining capacities. First, there is a tendency to 
shift enterprises’ market structure from monopoly to non-monopoly form. 
Second, following the first trend, the bargaining capacity of public sector 
unions in the longer term is likely to be reduced. However, a neglected factor 
is the organisational capacity of the union.
Among Taiwanese public sector unions, the TRLU represents the most 
interesting but striking case, not only because of the structural economic 
contexts of the Taiwan Railway in which the union operates but also because 
of the union leadership. The latter provided the TRLU with the ability to 
oppose privatisation policies. In Part III of this thesis, I will discuss the 
railway case in detail by looking at its history, the emergence of railway 
problems (Chapter 6), and the sources of railway union activism (Chapter 7, 
8 and 9).
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Part III 
The Railway Union and 
Privatisation
Chapter 6 
The Taiwan Railway and Privatisation
6.1 Introduction
After the first north-south motorway was completed and opened to business 
in 1978, the Taiwanese domestic transport market underwent fundamental 
changes. The Taiwan Railway no longer dominated the western north-south 
corridor. Although the Taiwan Railway was still dominant in the railway 
transport market, its importance was gradually replaced by road transport in 
association with the booming number of private cars and coaches. As a result, 
the Taiwan Railway’s business faced significant impacts and setbacks and its 
financial performance began to deteriorate. In that same year (1978), the 
Taiwan Railway’s finances went into the red for the first time since the end 
of the Second World War, with a loss of NT$257 million. This led to the 
long-term operational defects of the Taiwan Railway, in terms of financial 
and organisational structure and operational management, being revealed to 
the public. The Railway’s problems, mainly driven by extrinsic changes in 
the transport market as well as intrinsic operational defects, worsened. For 
these reasons, the government began to implement a series of rectification 
and reform strategies. However, the reform process, which lasted for nearly 
20 years, did not generate satisfactory and promising results and the situation 
worsened. This forced the government to seek a more radical and effective 
way to solve the problems, namely, privatisation.
This chapter addresses this reform process through a discussion of the 
changing role of the state and private capital. These two roles once played a 
decisive part in terms of the formulation of the privatisation policies for the 
Taiwan Railway. Nevertheless, things changed dramatically, when the TRLU, 
in alliance with the railway management, began to oppose the privatisation 
proposals and the scheme for the “separation” of railway infrastructure and
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train operations. While the state hesitated in carrying on its leading role in 
this matter, private capital no longer showed an interest in train operations. 
As a consequence, the proposal to privatise the Taiwan Railway is 
temporarily in abeyance.
6.2 The history of the Taiwan Railway
2007 marked the Taiwan Railway’s 120-year anniversary. Unlike British 
Rail, which was first developed privately and then nationalised, the Taiwan 
Railway has been funded and operated by the public all the way through its 
history. The first railroad between Taipei and Keelung (28.6 km) was 
constructed by the Chinese Ching Dynasty in 1887 and was finished in 1891. 
It was then extended southwards to 78.1 km from Taipei to Hsin-chu in 1893. 
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese government as a colony because 
the Chinese Ching Dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. During 
the colonisation period, the Japanese government began to extend the railway 
system simply for the benefit of political control and economic exploitation 
of natural resources. By 1908, the western trunk north-south railway line had 
been completed. In addition, the Japanese government carried on developing 
branch lines and the eastern line to deepen its political control and enlarge its 
economic resources. By the end of the Second World War, the total railway 
length was 911.9 km. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, the government 
first rebuilt the railway infrastructure, ruined during the war, and at the same 
time, extended the railway network. An around-the-island railway network 
was completed in the early 1990s (Figure 6.1). By August 2005, the 
operation mileage was 1,101 km; the railway employed 13,814 workers, and 
there were 216 stations. Daily numbers of passengers averaged 460 thousand 
(MOTC, 2005).
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Figure 6.1: The Taiwan Railway Network
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6.3 Railway problems
Although the Taiwan Railway still plays an important role in the domestic 
transport market, problems began to surface and trouble both the government 
and railway managers in the 1970s. These problems can be broadly divided 
into two parts: financial and organisational. The idea to privatise the Taiwan 
Railway emerged when other efforts by the Provincial as well as Central 
Governments to deal with these problems through various reform committees 
between 1980 and 1994 failed.
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6.3.1 Financial Problems
The first problem with the Taiwan Railway became evident when finance 
deteriorated. The reduction in revenue can be attributed to the change in the 
domestic transportation market structure, insufficient railway transport 
capacity, fares disproportionate to the costs, and an increase in expenses.
(\) The change in the domestic transportation market
The loss of the monopolistic position of domestic transportation became a 
pivotal issue which turned the Taiwan Railway’s finances into the red. 
Between 1950 and the 1970s, the Central Government’s transport policy 
largely favoured the railway transport mode and focused on “maintaining the 
railway service and recovering the railway to the pre-war condition” by 
means of increasing the numbers of locomotives, renewing railway 
infrastructure, and modernisation (Chen et ah, 1990: 8-9). For this reason, 
the railway became the most important form of domestic public transport and 
the Taiwan Railway therefore generated a huge surplus from its monopolistic 
position. This period was viewed as the Taiwan Railway’s “golden age” 
{Economic Daily News, 19/02/1989: 1). During its heyday, the Taiwan 
Railway contributed its annual profits to the Treasury of the Taiwan 
Provincial Government. Between 1950 and 1974, the accumulated amount of 
money contributed by the Taiwan Railway was NT$1.412 billion (Liao, 
1996). Generally speaking, in the 1950s, the Taiwanese transport policy 
restricted the development of road transport through, for instance, the 
restriction of the import of private cars. The aim was to nurture the domestic 
car manufacturing industry, to preserve foreign currency reserves, and to 
protect the railway industry (Chen et al., 1990; Economic Daily News, 
05/11/1976: 2; United Daily News, 12/08/1964: 5). In the 1960s, the 
development of road transport was still not a high government priority.
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However, from the late 1960s onwards, at least two main drivers forced the 
Taiwanese government to consider the possibility of a shift of focus of 
transport policy from the railway industry to road transport. First, in the 
name of economic development, the government decided to develop road 
transport, particularly the motorway (United Daily News, 25/10/1969: 10). 
This idea was mainly driven by the recommendation of one American 
consultancy company (De Leuw Cather International Ltd.) (United Daily 
News, 16/12/1969: 2). The consultancy company’s research report, which 
covered a wide range of analyses, including the plan of the motorway route, 
future estimates of transport capacity and economic benefits, strongly 
suggested that the existing capacity of the road system was no longer able to 
sustain the rapid increase in road transport. Therefore, the development of a 
north-south motorway was necessary in order to sustain the rapid growth of 
the economy (United Daily News, 13/10/1969: 2 and 21/10/1969: 2). Based 
on this recommendation and financial support from the Asian Development 
Bank, construction of the first north-south motorway began in January 1971 
and was completed in 1978.
The second driver which made the Taiwanese government consider the 
development of road transport was the opening of the car market to imports. 
From the early 1970s onwards, Taiwan enjoyed a huge trade surplus against 
the US. For this reason, the US requested the Taiwanese government to open 
its markets and to reduce import custom duties in order to narrow the trade 
gap (Chang, 2002: 60). To open the car market and import cars from the US 
was one of the major policies to achieve this goal {Economic Daily News, 
07/11/1977: 3). Together with economic development and the accumulation 
of public wealth, the increase in the number of private cars was significant. 
For instance, in the 20 years between 1976 and 1995, the number of cars 
owned per one thousand of the population increased by 11 times, from 20 to 
220 cars (DEC, 1997). This caused a significant drop in the number of 
railway passengers. The number of railway users stood at a peak of 140 
million in 1976. This number had dropped dramatically by 10 million to 
around 130 million in 1981. The number of railway passengers did not 
recover to the 1976 level until 1992 (TRA Statistics, 2006: Table 4: Status of
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Passenger Traffic). The recovery of the number of railway passengers was 
because motorway transport capacity had reached its saturation point. 
Frequent traffic congestion encouraged car users to return to the railway 
(Liao, 1996). In the face of the decreasing trend in the number of railway 
passengers, the most immediate result was that the Taiwan Railway’s 
financial performance began to deteriorate. In 1978, the Taiwan Railway 
recorded its first financial losses of NT$257 million since the end of the 
Second World War. Since 1978, the Railway’s financial performance has 
never recovered but worsened, even though the number of passengers has 
gradually gone up since 1992. In June 2005, Taiwan Railway’s accumulated 
cash deficits stood at around NT$87 billion1 (MOTC, 2005).
(2) Insufficient railway transport capacity
The second factor that contributed to the decrease in Taiwan Railway’s 
revenue was insufficient railway transport capacity. With the shift in focus of 
transport policy and the huge amount of money invested in road transport, 
the Central Government was reluctant to fund the Taiwan Railway’s 
infrastructure renewal plan and purchase of locomotives. The Provincial 
Government and the Railway itself lacked the financial ability to improve 
and renew railway infrastructure and locomotives (MOTC, 2005). As a 
consequence, the Railway’s operational performance, transport capacity and 
service quality became adversely affected by the deteriorating infrastructure, 
low-level of automation, and shortage of locomotives.
(31 Fare problems
A decrease in railway income can also be attributed to government 
intervention on fare adjustments. Passenger fare income has been the Taiwan 
Railway’s major source of revenue. Between 1999 and 2004, annual
1 The figure excludes the depreciation amount.
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passenger fare income averaged NT$15.7 billion, which made up 80 per cent 
of the total annual railway revenue (MOTC, 2005). However, despite 
financial deficits, the Taiwan Railway’s management was not allowed to 
increase income by increasing fares. Fare adjustment decisions were subject 
to government approval and the considerations of economic stability and 
inflation restraint. It was believed that the rise in railway tariff could fuel 
inflation and affect the Railway’s competitiveness. The government was 
therefore reluctant to allow fares to rise quickly. In addition, as part of the 
government’s public service responsibilities, the Taiwan Railway was 
compelled to offer fare discounts to students, the police, the military, senior, 
disabled and other vulnerable citizens. The Railway was requested to fund 
this fare-reduction without government subsidy. Both low fare and fare- 
reduction schemes resulted in a significant decrease in the Railway’s income.
(4) Increase in expenses
As for the problem of an increase in expenses, a number of crucial reasons 
were identified for this. First, personnel costs had been significantly rising 
because of the increase in incumbent workers’ salary and retirement pensions 
(IOT, 1993a). Taiwan Railway’s employees enjoyed a status whereby they 
(including those on retirement pensions) benefited automatically from 
general wage increases determined by the Central Government from time to 
time. In addition, such increases were also applied to various other benefits 
and payments, for instance, overtime payments. These were substantially 
more generous than for civil servants (IOT, 1993a). Between 1999 and 2004, 
the average cost of personnel, NT$18.6 billion, took up to 94 per cent of the 
total Taiwan Railway’s annual revenue (MOTC, 2005). Out of the total 
personnel costs, NT$5.3 billion, equivalent to 32 percent, was paid to those 
on retirement pensions (MOTC, 2005). By August 2005, there were 13,814 
employees and 14,880 on retirement pensions. The serious problem of the 
heavy burden of personnel costs was therefore evident.
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Apart from the problem of the increase in personnel costs, the operation of 
unprofitable branch lines and small stations, normally located in rural areas, 
also resulted in an increase in expense for the Taiwan Railway. The Railway 
kept operating these loss-makers to fulfil the government’s public service 
responsibility. Of the 216 stations overall, the operational income generated 
from the top 60 accounted for 92 per cent of the Railway’s total annual 
revenues (MOTC, 2005). Around 40 stations’ operational income did not 
cover their operational costs. To close these unprofitable lines and stations 
seemed to be a feasible approach to reduce expenses. However, local 
authorities held the view that public transport was helpful in the development 
of rural areas. Thus they opposed the idea of closing these lines and stations 
(MOTC, 2005). Therefore, in addition to maintaining a low-fare policy, the 
Taiwan Railway also had an obligation to execute the government’s public 
service responsibilities at great cost to itself.
In addition, in view of the shortage of funds, the Taiwan Railway depended 
heavily on borrowed money to deal with immediate financial crises and it 
had a problem of accumulated losses from previous years. This problem was 
exacerbated by rising interest charges (MOTC, 2005). The Railway received 
little financial support from the government to fund infrastructure 
maintenance expenses. Last but not the least, expenses for depreciation and 
maintenance of infrastructure and accumulated losses from previous years 
also resulted in an increase in costs. Although the government funded some 
major construction projects, for instance, putting tracks underground in the 
Taipei area, these projects contributed little to increase passengers and the 
Taiwan Railway’s revenue since they were really only for the benefit of the 
local government’s administration. Thus, the Taiwan Railway bore a heavy 
financial burden with higher depreciation and operation expenses, such as 
extra maintenance costs due to increased track length and underground utility 
bills. All of these factors undoubtedly deepened the Railway’s financial crisis.
Having highlighted the sources and impact of the Railway’s financial 
problems, the following section will discuss the Railway’s second problem -
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organisational bureaucracy -  which concerned the government, particularly 
the Central Government, very much.
6.3.2 O rgan isa tiona l p rob lem
The second category of railway problems arose from the fact that the Taiwan 
Railway’s organisational authority could not take responsibility for national 
railway transport. According to governmental hierarchy in the Republic of 
China (ROC), the Taiwan Railway Administration before 1999 was located 
at the third governmental level of the Provincial Government (see Figure 6-2).
Figure 6-2: Government Organisation of the ROC (Taiwan)
(Redrawn and simplified by the author)
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There had been a long standing debate as to whether the Taiwan Railway was 
a local railway operated and owned by the Taiwan Provincial Government, 
or a national railway, governed by the Central Government. After the 
Japanese government was defeated and surrendered in 1945, Taiwan was 
returned as a province of the ROC. The Central Government of the ROC 
established the Taiwan Provincial Executive Office as an ad hoc organisation 
to represent the Central Government. The Office was authorised with the task 
of registering various assets, including properties, businesses and 
transportation infrastructure, recovered from Japan on behalf of the Central 
Government. Initially, according to Article 107 of the Constitution of the 
ROC1, the railways, the postal industry and telecommunications were still 
directly governed by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications of 
the Central Government (hereafter the MOTC). However, when Central 
Government officials on the mainland noticed that Taiwan’s affairs were far 
beyond their reach, particularly during the Civil War against the Communist 
Party, the MOTC decided to temporarily entrust the Taiwan Railway to the 
Office of the Chief Executive in Taiwan Province (IOT, 1993a). Later in 
1947, the Office was dismantled and restructured as the Taiwan Provincial 
Government.
Following local government restructuring in Taiwan, the Railway 
Administration Commission, (an ad hoc organisation set up to take over the 
Taiwan Railway in 1945), was also restructured and renamed the Taiwan 
Railway Administration (TRA). The TRA, a governmental agency under the 
Department of Transportation of the Taiwan Provincial Government 
(hereafter the DOT), was set up with the tasks of railway operation and 
supervision. The TRA began to register the Taiwan Railway’s real estate as 
its assets. Since the DOT had jurisdiction over the TRA, this registration 
action implied that the Taiwan Railway was genuinely operated by the 
Taiwan Provincial Government as a local railway.
1 Article 107 of the Constitution of the ROC: In the following matters, the Central 
Government shall have the power of legislation and administration: ... Aviation, national 
highways, state-owned railways, navigation, postal and telecommunication services;...
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In January 1958, the Central Government promulgated the Railway Law. 
Although the Law indicated that “in principle, the railways are operated by 
the State” (Article 3), it allowed a situation where the local government and 
the private sector might also develop and operate the railways subject to the 
approval of the MOTC (Article 31). Based on Article 31, the DOT proposed 
and requested confirmation about ownership of the Taiwan Railway from the 
MOTC in the autumn of 1958. At an Executive Yuan’s meeting in October 
1958, the MOTC, in accordance with the DOT’s request, proposed that 
“During the martial law period, in order not to cause any upheaval, the 
MOTC shall continuously entrust the Taiwan Railway to the Taiwan 
Provincial Government for expediency”. The proposal was officially 
approved by the Executive Yuan of the Central Government (NCTU, 1982, 
quoted in Chen et a l , 1990: 9), thus confirming that ownership of the Taiwan 
Railway belonged to the local provincial government.
However, when the Taiwan Railway’s financial performance deteriorated in 
1978, the issue of ownership became a point of controversy between the 
Central and the Provincial Government. A number of research reports have 
attributed the Railway’s financial deficits in part due to TRA’s low level in 
the governmental hierarchy. It has been argued that the TRA lacked 
jurisdiction and prerogatives to manage the “national” railway system (DEC, 
1978, cited in IOT, 1993b; see also Chen et al., 1990), which led to 
managerial inefficiencies and impacted on administrative authority. 
Moreover, there were too many governmental hierarchies between the TRA 
and decision-makers as shown in Figure 6-2, which resulted in 
communication difficulties. Although the DOT was the Taiwan Railway’s 
direct competent authority, crucial decisions, according to the Railway Law, 
had to be supervised and approved by the MOTC or even at a higher level 
(Article 4, and Articles 30-48). For instance, fare adjustment, personnel 
recruitment, budget, the extension of railway lines and diversification of 
railway businesses, instead of being agreed by the DOT, had to be approved 
by the MOTC (Article 37).
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This arrangement largely limited and impeded the managerial effectiveness 
and efficiency of the Railway. Although seemingly the TRA, as the only 
railway specialist in the government, was an independent institution, it could 
not operate independently, and make decisions of its own accord, but had to 
be guided by the non-railway experts. As one senior railway manager 
sarcastically commented, “The problems of the railway are so professional 
that the competent authority (the former DOT and the MOTC) does not 
necessarily understand them” (interview, 04/06/2006). Therefore, 
understandably, the remedy for railway problems provided by government 
officials was of little avail. This organisational problem caused a number of 
disappointing results. While the Taiwan Railway bore heavy national 
transport responsibility, it was governed by the local provincial government 
over which the TRA had little administrative authority or managerial 
autonomy (IOT, 1993b). Moreover, the Provincial Government, in 
comparison with the Central Government, lacked the financial capacity to 
fund the railway’s heavy operational costs (United Daily News, 06/01/1984: 
02). In addition, insufficient managerial authority resulted in a difficulty in 
recruiting and retaining talented workers (United Daily News, 06/01/1984: 2). 
In order to remedy these drawbacks, lawmakers at the central level and the 
railway management, the railway union and employees frequently requested 
a change of ownership of the Taiwan Railway from the local to central 
government (United Daily News, 21/09/1979: 2 and 06/01/1984: 2). However, 
this idea was rejected by members of the Provincial Assembly, because they 
believed that the reason why the Railway’s problems had emerged had 
nothing to do with ownership but with its internal organisational bureaucracy 
and with a structural change in the transport market. Therefore, it was not 
necessary to return the administration of the Taiwan Railway back to the 
Central Government (United Daily News, 18/06/1979: 2 and 06/01/1984: 2). 
Thus, the Taiwan Railway continued to be operated at the local level until 
1999, when the Taiwan Provincial Government was streamlined and ceased 
to function.
Although in one sense, the Taiwan Railway is a public sector, it has been 
regulated as a government administration system. Therefore, the Taiwan
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Railway’s organisation, personnel, operation, finance, budget, and tariff 
decisions have been bound by various legal regulations, which have largely 
hindered its managerial flexibility and limited room for autonomous 
operations to respond quickly to market demand. Such limitations extended 
to the Railway’s organisational structure and management. As shown in 
Figure 6-3, the Railway’s organisational bureaucracy adopted a centralised 
managerial approach, which although it had some advantages, including 
being easy to supervise and administer, and a clear division of labour (IOT, 
1993b), its disadvantages included difficulty in coordination and lack of 
similar operational goals between different departments; less responsive to 
the market; lack of managerial flexibility; and the emergence of departmental 
sectionalism (IOT, 1993b). These drawbacks still trouble the railway 
management and the government {Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, 
21/06/2007: 2). Due to external and internal organisational drawbacks, it is 
difficult for the Railway to compete with road transport and the private high 
speed railway company.
Figure 6-3: TRA’s Organisational Structure
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From the foregoing discussion of the second railway problem, the complexity 
of the Taiwan Railway’s organisational structure is revealed, and becomes 
even more complex when the local and the central government were both 
involved. This is another reason why the central government initially 
hesitated in prioritising the issue of organisation (or ownership) of the 
Taiwan Railway. The two problems of finance and organisational 
bureaucracy did play a part in the government’s consideration of privatising 
the Taiwan Railway. The government believed that privatisation would make 
solving these problems more straightforward. The following section explains 
how the policy to privatise the Taiwan Railway was formulated by looking at 
the role of the state and capital.
6.4 Reform strategy
Faced with the aforementioned railway problems, railway reform was voiced 
and received much attention from many actors. The main purposes of Ibis 
section are to explore how the idea of privatisation of the Taiwan Railway 
emerged and how the privatisation policy was formulated. In particular, the 
role of the state and capital within this process is examined. The state and 
capital played different roles at different phases in the Railway’s reform 
history. Via the analysis of their roles, it may be possible to gain a better 
understanding of the approaches to railway reform, particularly the formation 
of the policy to privatise the Taiwan Railway.
6.4.1 The role of the state
When the government acknowledged that the Taiwan Railway’s financial 
problems were getting worse, several studies of the railway problems were 
conducted and reform strategies introduced. In 1978, in order to help the 
Provincial Government precisely to identify what the railway problems were, 
the Central Government hired Western Germany Railway Consulting Ltd.
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(Deutsche Eisenbahn-Consulting GmbH, hereafter the DEC) to investigate 
and provide suggestions, particularly in relation to the Railway’s 
organisation, management and finance. In its final report, the DEC identified 
the railway problems, mentioned above, and suggested a number of solutions. 
One of the solutions proposed was that the government should consider 
promoting the TRA to a higher governmental level, from the local to the 
central. Alternatively, the TRA should be corporatised as a publicly owned 
company to have better administrative authority and flexibility (IOT, 1993b). 
This was the first time that it had been suggested that the Taiwan Railway 
should be corporatised so as to deal with railway problems.
Having consulted the DEC, the Central Government then set up an ad hoc 
Rehabilitation Commission on the Taiwan Railway (tai-tie jheng-li wei-yuan- 
huei) in 1980 with the tasks of studying and carrying out the suggestions 
proposed by the DEC. The Commission comprised nine members, including 
the Governor of Taiwan Province who was the chair. Neither a senior railway 
manager nor a union representative was invited to become a member of the 
Commission.
Other members of the Commission included:
• Three representatives from the Central Government: i.e. the 
Deputy Minister of the MOTC, Deputy Minister of Finance, and 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Economic Planning and 
Development.
• Two representatives from the Provincial Government: i.e. the 
Director of the DOT, and the Director of the Department of 
Finance.
• Three railway experts from academia approved by the Central 
Government.
However, instead of promoting the TRA to a higher governmental level and 
corporatising the Taiwan Railway, as suggested by the DEC, the
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Commission proposed increasing operational income and improving service 
through rationalising the organisational structure, modernising railway 
facilities, reducing the number of personnel, and improving operational 
productivity (IOT, 1993b). These proposals actually did very little to help the 
Taiwan Railway because its problems continued and grew worse. These 
reform strategies were mainly focused on reform within the existing system, 
thereby the main causes of the Railway’s problems were left untouched.
In view of increasing financial deficits, the Central Government dismantled 
the Rehabilitation Commission in 1987 and set up a new committee, the 
Supervision and Control Commission on the Taiwan Railway {tai-tie jian-li 
wei-yuan-huei) in 1988, to supervise and guide the improvement in railway 
affairs (IOT, 1993a). This new Commission was again chaired by the 
Governor of Taiwan Province. It comprised the same members as on the 
former Commission with the addition of the Deputy Chair of the Council of 
Labour Affairs and the Director of the Department of Labour of Taipei City. 
The position and role of this newly established ad hoc Commission 
resembled that of the former one. However, by the time this Commission was 
established, the government was busy dealing with an increasing number of 
labour disputes. Therefore, this Commission included government officials, 
who were specialists in labour affairs. Their inclusion suggested that the 
problem of railway industrial relations was one of the railway problems 
being addressed by the government. Again, however, railway management 
and union representatives were excluded from the composition of 
Commissioners.
Between 1988 and 1994, this Commission mainly focused its reform 
strategies on reducing operational expenses through, for instance, leaving job 
vacancies unfilled and streamlining unprofitable rural lines and stations and 
other businesses (IOT, 1993a). Notwithstanding, these reform approaches did 
not succeed as financial deficits kept increasing. As for the Provincial 
Government, as soon as the Supervision and Control Commission on the 
Taiwan Railway was disbanded in 1994, it set up an ad hoc Review Group o f 
the Taiwan Railway Administration Operations Improvement Plan {tai-tie
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ye-wu gai-jin fang-an shen-cha siao-zu) with the task of carrying on the 
railway reform plans. This review group referred to foreign experience and 
finalised 51 railway improvement approaches in 1995 (Lin, 2004). However, 
the outcome was again disappointing as indicated by one MOTC official who 
revealed the government’s expectation and thoughts to the press:
Reform programmes have been proposed many times by the 
Provincial Government for the Taiwan Railway, but no satisfactory 
outcome has yet been achieved. A complete solution to the 
Railway’s problems is still awaited. We [the MOTC] do not have 
high expectations of the present Improvement Plan. To revive the 
Taiwan Railway, the most important reform direction is to conduct 
privatisation through the separation of infrastructure and train 
operations {United Daily News, 05/10/1994: 6).
Thus, the state attempted to solve the Taiwan Railway’s problems through a 
number of reform Commissions and strategies which simply focused on 
financial issues and did not generate a satisfactory solution to help the 
Railway. In the face of this repeated failure, the Central Government decided 
to adopt a more radical approach to attain its goal. The Central Government 
decided to solve the railway problems through a change of ownership, that is, 
privatisation.
6.4.2 Formation of the policy to privatise the Taiwan Railway
Having failed so far to help the Taiwan Railway and being inspired by the 
earlier successful privatisation of British Rail, the Central Government 
decided to study the feasibility of privatising the Railway as a way to solve 
its problems. One legislator commented on the situation, thus:
The ways in which the government reformed [the Taiwan Railway] 
could not completely cure the Railway’s defects, only ease the pain 
to some extent. The only way to cure the Railway’s malaise is the 
implementation of corporatisation and privatisation (interview, 
22/05/2006).
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This respondent was a legislator (at the time of the fieldwork) and a member 
of the opposition party (the KMT) with ten years experience on the 
Transportation Committee of the Legislative Yuan. His comments reflected 
the Central Government’s thoughts for solving the Taiwan Railway’s 
problems, namely, corporatisation and privatisation. The Legislator indicated 
that the reform strategies introduced since the 1980s had not been successful 
because they had focused on the wrong objectives. In his opinion, only 
corporatisation and privatisation policy could fundamentally and effectively 
tackle the Railway’s problems. From the late 1980s onwards, such a view 
became pervasive not only among government officials but also among 
public commentators (c.f. IOT, 1993b; United Daily News, 05/10/1994: 6).
The emergence of the idea that the solution for the Taiwan Railway’s 
operational problems rested on the implementation of a privatisation policy 
can be traced back to the Rehabilitation Commission on the Taiwan Railway 
between 1980 and 1987. This view was also held by the public who pointed 
to the poor operational as well as financial performance of the majority of 
public enterprises (United Daily News, 04/08/1980: 2). One senior railway 
manager (who had been involved in railway reform since the time of the 
Rehabilitation Commission in the late 1970s onwards) recalled:
... A handful of members of the Rehabilitation Commission on the 
Taiwan Railway were convinced that the Railway should be 
privatised because of its ongoing financial losses. ... Nevertheless, 
this way of thinking was only heard in informal discussions. 
Members of the Commission did not come to an agreement on this 
issue (interview, 29/05/2006).
Basically, the legal restrictions and public service obligations that the Taiwan 
Railway had were the main reasons why the idea did not become part of a 
common consensus. According to Article 144 of the Constitution of the ROC, 
“Public utilities and other enterprises of a monopolistic nature shall, in 
principle, be under public operation. In cases permitted by law, they may be 
operated by private citizens.” Moreover, Article 3 of the Act of Privatisation
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of Government-Owned Enterprises1 stated that public enterprises directly 
involved in the business of (1) national defence secrets, (2) monopoly, and (3) 
large-scale public utilities or for strategic purposes shall remain in public 
hands. Therefore, both the Central and the Provincial Government did not 
intend to breach laws by privatising the Taiwan Railway and other large 
scale public enterprises. Referring to the public service responsibilities that 
the Taiwan Railway bore, one Provincial Government official, commented:
... these province-owned enterprises ... bear the task of executing 
different public service policies. We therefore will not consider 
opening [these businesses] to private citizens (Economic Daily 
News, 07/11/1980: 2).
This was an official response to an increasing demand for implementation of 
the privatisation policy. Although discussion as to whether the government 
should reduce its role in the markets became pervasive, the KMT 
government at this stage showed no intention of changing its political and 
economic practices (detailed in Chapter 1).
However, from the late 1980s onwards, the idea of improving the public 
sector’s poor services and performance via a change of ownership came to 
the fore. At least two factors contributed to the formation of this idea. First, 
the high number of industrial actions, mainly in public transportation, was 
described as an “infectious disease” of society and caused the public daily 
problems (Moore, 1988). Among these industrial actions, the Taiwan 
Railway train drivers’ May Day strike in 1988 played a prominent role 
(detailed in Chapter 8). Generally speaking, railway workers’ industrial 
disputes, whose objectives were to improve conditions and pay, gained little 
sympathy from the public. For a long period of time, passengers had 
criticised the poor rail service provided by the Taiwan Railway, but their
1 The Act was enacted in 1953. It was amended in 1991, 2000 and 2003 respectively. In 
order to comply with the neo-liberal ideology, the restriction on Article 3 was lifted in 
Article 4 of the Act in 1991: “Where the authority in charge of the enterprise, in view of the 
situation, considers there is no more necessity to operate a government-owned enterprise by 
the government, such government-owned enterprise may be privatised after it is so proposed 
to the Executive Yuan and approved thereby”. Based on this amendment to the Act, the legal 
restriction against privatisation of public utilities and large-scale business, such as die 
Taiwan Railway, was lifted.
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complaints were basically of no avail, as unsatisfactory services continued 
{United Daily News, 02/04/1988: 9). After the May Day strike in 1988 and a 
number of subsequent labour movements aiming at thorough implementation 
of the Labour Standards Law, railway workers’ conditions and pay improved. 
In the face of emerging labour disputes, the railway management agreed to 
apply the Labour Standards Law to all workers.
However, the Law’s implementation affected passengers, because the policy­
makers decided that “all the increased financial burden resulting from 
application of the Labour Standards Law shall be transferred to an increase in 
fares” {United Daily News, 20/05/1988: 11). As a consequence, rail fares 
were raised by around 32 per cent {United Daily News, 19/05/1988: 3). 
Passengers were upset. They thought that public sector employees were 
already benefiting from better pay, conditions and secure employment than 
the majority of workers in the private sector. Therefore, they became more 
sympathetic to the idea of introducing market competition so as to improve 
railway service quality and to reduce fares {Economic Daily News, 
15/05/1988: 2).
The second factor contributing to privatisation in the late 1980s was the 
success of railway privatisation in Japan. The Japanese National Railway 
(JNR) had once been the biggest loss-maker among Japanese public 
enterprises1. However, this serious financial problem was overturned when 
the Japanese government privatised the JNR in 1987. The JNR was 
privatised into six passenger railway companies and one freight company. 
Since the Japanese government took over JNR’s financial debts as part of 
privatisation programmes, from 1988 onwards, the privatised Japanese 
Railways have become profitable. Although three passenger companies, 
located in three smaller islands, respectively, still receive government’s 
subsidies (Imashiro, 1997; Okano, 1994), the Japanese experience had been 
viewed as successful and influenced Taiwanese academics and the public
1 In 1985, the accumulated debts of the JNR were as high as ¥25 trillion, which was similar 
to the sum of national debts of a number of developing countries at that time (Imashiro, 1997: 
51).
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who urged the government to follow suit in order to solve the Taiwan 
Railway’s financial and service problems {Economic Daily News, 02/07/1988: 
10; see also Chen et a l, 1990 and Tseng, 1991). Research into the Railway’s 
problems at this stage generally referred to the Japanese experience and it 
was suggested that the future of the Taiwan Railway rested with the 
implementation of privatisation (Chen et a l, 1990; Tseng, 1991).
From that time, the issue of the privatisation of the Taiwan Railway was 
discussed extensively. The Central Government, in view of the plight of the 
Railway and the success of the Japanese case, consulted business 
representatives about the possibility and feasibility of the sale of the Taiwan 
Railway in the late 1980s {Economic Daily News, 19/02/1989: 1). However, 
there were two reasons why capital showed little interest in investing money 
in this loss-maker. First, the idea of privatising the Taiwan Railway was still 
under-developed in Taiwan {Economic Daily News, 19/02/1989: 1). Second, 
the Taiwan Railway’s operational costs, particularly those related to 
retirement pensions and the huge annual infrastructure maintenance costs, 
meant that private capital had little interest in running the Railway (IOT, 
1993b). In addition, since private capital would be less likely to buy the 
Railway because of its bleak future due to the imminent completion of the 
mass transit system in the Taipei area, the Provincial Government was 
reluctant to place the Taiwan Railway on the privatisation list {Economic 
Daily News, 28/04/1991: 6). At the same time, despite much published 
influential research urging the government to consider privatisation for the 
Railway (e.g. Chen et a l, 1990; Tseng, 1991), the Central Government did 
not propose railway reform primarily because the Taiwan Railway was still 
under the control of the Supervision and Control Commission on the Taiwan 
Railway which was under the leadership of the Provincial Government.
However, the situation changed from 1993 onwards. The Institute of 
Transportation (IOT, an official think-tank to the MOTC) published two 
important research reports on the Taiwan Railway (IOT, 1993a and 1993b). 
Referring to railway reform experiences both in Europe (France, Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Sweden and Britain) and Japan, the IOT suggested that the
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“separation” of railway infrastructure and train operations should be 
considered (IOT, 1993b). One of the IOT’s reports stated:
If the Taiwan Railway is still maintained and managed within this 
existing organisational structure (i.e. owned and operated by the 
Province) it would be extremely difficult to turn its financial 
deficits into surplus. ... Under this structural limitation the 
Railway’s problems could no longer be dealt with by any reform 
plans.... Having considered the development trend in foreign 
railways, ..., the Taiwan Railway should move towards the 
separation of operations and ownership (i.e. ‘publicly-owned but 
privately-operated’) in which train operations would be privatised 
(IOT, 1993b: 136-137).
The rationale for introducing privatisation through the notion of “separation” 
was as follows. The IOT was convinced that privatisation would help the 
Taiwan Railway to improve its administrative efficiency, operational 
autonomy, finance and other problems, such as labour force excess (IOT, 
1993b: 138). Although the reports did not provide concrete procedures and 
methods as to how to privatise the Taiwan Railway, they set the parameters 
for the privatisation debate. From that time henceforth, the idea of separating 
the railway infrastructure (owned by the public) from train operations 
(owned by private capital) and the concept of ‘publicly-owned but privately- 
operated’ services became core ideas. Further, the publication of these reports 
also implied that the Central Government had shifted its attitude towards the 
reform of the Railway from passive to active and gradually took on the 
dominant role that the Provincial Government had been playing over the 
Railway. From 1993 onwards, the idea of solving the Railway’s problems 
through privatisation was revived. The Central Government was even 
convinced that no other means could revive the failing Taiwan Railway, only 
privatisation via the notion of “separation” (United Daily News, 05/10/1994: 
6). It could be argued that, to a large extent, it was private capital which 
showed an interest in the “separation” scheme that stimulated the 
government to move in that direction.
In this regard, it is important to consider the role of capital in relation to the 
formation of the idea as to how to privatise the Taiwan Railway. Although
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initially the idea of “separation”, according to IOT reports, was primarily 
driven by European experiences, private capital in Taiwan subsequently 
appeared to support the scheme. But why was Taiwanese private capital 
interested in the idea of “separation”?
6.4.3 The role of private capital
As argued in previous chapters, successful implementation of a privatisation 
policy depends on interest from private capital. Therefore, without sufficient 
and adequate incentives provided by the state to attract private capital, 
privatisation either through the scheme of selling off the company as a whole 
or floating shares in the City will be difficult to promote. This is particularly 
the case when those public enterprises that the government wants to privatise 
have poor financial performance, as was the case with the Taiwan Railway. 
Although the role of private capital was weak in the railway case, it did 
initially play a role in consultations when the government was formulating 
the privatisation policy for the Railway.
It was argued in the IOT reports that the Taiwan Railway had borne too 
many unnecessary operational and financial burdens (IOT, 1993a and 1993b). 
In order, therefore, to ensure that the Railway was profitable after 
privatisation, the removal of those financial burdens and clarification of 
operational responsibilities would be necessary. It was hoped that the 
“separation” scheme would make the Taiwan Railway financially attractive 
to private capital and thus make privatisation easier. In other words, the 
government realised that whether the Taiwan Railway was to be sold off 
depended on capitalists showing an interest in buying the Railway. In this 
regard, the role of private capital became significant in the policy-making 
process.
As early as the late 1980s, when the government was studying the Railway’s 
reform, capitalists were consulted more than once about their willingness to
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become involved in the Railway’s business, although no concrete 
suggestions were made. After the publication of two research reports in 1993 
introducing the idea of “separation”, at least two Taiwanese private consortia 
showed an interest in operating train services. One was the Formosa Plastics 
Group and the other was the Evergreen Group. Profiles of these two 
Taiwanese private consortia are presented below.
Formosa Plastics Group 
President: Mr. Yong-ching Wang 
Year of establishment: 1954
The Formosa Plastics Corp. was founded in 1954 by Yong-ching 
Wang in Taiwan. Wang extended his business into chemicals & 
fibres and petrochemicals. Many of the subsidiaries of the Formosa 
Plastics Group are public stock exchange companies. The Group is 
one of the top two Taiwanese private consortia with the highest 
annual turnover in Taiwan.
(Source: Formosa Plastics Group)
Eversreen Group 
President: Dr. Yung-fa Chang 
Year of establishment: 1968
Evergreen Marine Corp., one of the world’s famous shipping 
companies, was founded in 1968 by Yung-fa Chang in Taiwan. The 
business territory of the Group has since enlarged to 57 subsidiary 
companies, including civil aviation, road transport, construction, 
catering, electronics, and so on. Five of its subsidiaries are public 
stock exchange companies. The Evergreen Group is the largest 
Taiwanese owned transport consortium.
(Source: Evergreen Group Stock Service; China.com)
These consortia attempted to lobby the government on the grounds of saving 
the Railway. As reported in the press:
Yong-ching Wong, the President of the board of directors of the 
Formosa Plastics Group, suggested to the Provincial Government 
officials that in order to restore life to the dying, the Taiwan 
Railway should be privatised completely or operated as an industry 
whereby its infrastructure was owned by the public but [its train 
operation was] operated by the private sector [that was the idea of 
“separation”]. ... He thought that the Taiwan Railway’s financial 
deficits could not be solved unless it was privatised. He further 
emphasised that this would be beneficial for the Railway and
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should be done as early as possible. ... The Formosa Plastics Group 
had a great interest in operating railway freight transport. ... The 
governor of the Provincial Government affirmed its interest and 
requested the Department of Transportation to study the feasibility 
of taking its interest further (Economic Daily News, 26/12/1995: 3).
Commenting on the role of capital in railway reform, Chang, the former 
TRLU Chairman, stated:
Yong-fa Chang, President of the Evergreen Group, pressurised the 
MOTC to let the Group operate the domestic rail freight 
business. ... As a matter of fact, both the Formosa Plastics Group 
and the Evergreen Group ... wanted the right to operate [train 
services]. That was why the government had introduced the notion 
of “separation”. It had learnt from the British case, that it could 
operate [train services] by leasing the right to gain access to the 
infrastructure from the infrastructure owner (that is the government) 
at a relatively cheap rent. ... Therefore, introduction of the 
“separation” notion mainly came from on the one hand the British 
experience and on the other, the interest of these consortia 
(interview, 06/04/2006).
Thus, the interest of private capital in the Taiwan Railway reinforced the 
notion of its “separation” as revealed in further research reports. One report 
published by the IOT in 1996 presented a clear and unambiguous procedure 
as to how to privatise the Taiwan Railway through the “separation” scheme.
Having referred to foreign experience and assessed the Taiwan 
Railway’s problems, the Railway’s reform should be handled in 
accordance with the following principles. ... To promote the 
separation of infrastructure and train operations so as to clarify 
management responsibility. Train operations, under the principle of 
market competition, should be managed as a business organisation 
to improve service quality and transport effectiveness. At the same 
time, the government should take full responsibility for the heavy 
financial investment in the Railway’s infrastructure construction 
and renewal. The idea of separation has been a railway reform 
model adopted by many countries. ... This is a correct reform 
direction [for the Taiwan Railway] (IOT, 1996: 6-2).
Obviously, the core idea behind this plan was to reduce financially the 
burden of operational costs so as to make the Railway more financially 
attractive to private capital. The principal technique to achieve this goal was
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to shift heavy infrastructure maintenance costs from train operators to the 
government. The IOT planned that the Taiwan Railway should be separated 
into two companies: one to be a publicly-owned Taiwan Railway 
Administration, responsible for infrastructure maintenance and investment, 
and the other to be a privately-owned Taiwan Railway Co., responsible for 
train operations and other business (IOT, 1996). In addition, in 1997, the 
DOT delegated one private consultation company, THI Consultants Inc., to 
study how to privatise the Taiwan Railway. The final report was not only an 
‘initial plan’ as to how to privatise the Taiwan Railway but also an ‘action 
plan’ specifying clear procedures for the Taiwan Railway’s privatisation. 
Again, the report suggested that the Taiwan Railway should be privatised 
through “separation” (THI Consultants Inc., 1997). Having referred to these 
two influential reports, a Committee for Promoting the Privatisation o f the 
TRA (itai-tie min-ying-hua tuei-dong wei-yuan-huei) was set up by both the 
DOT and the TRA in 1998. Representatives from the TRLU were excluded 
from the Committee. In the same year, the Central Government also 
announced that the privatisation of the Taiwan Railway should be completed 
by June 2002 (DOT, 1999; Hansard, 2000). In order to achieve the 
privatisation goal, the Taiwan Railway and the DOT decided to corporatise 
the Taiwan Railway by June 2000, prior to privatisation (DOT, 1999). It 
should be noted that, at this stage, privatisation was an end in itself for the 
Taiwan Railway. The idea of corporatisation was simply an interim measure, 
which was not emphasised, suggesting that implementation of the 
corporatisation policy was to lead to the privatisation of Taiwan Railway.
In the course of studying the way in which the Taiwan Railway was to be 
privatised, a number of core members of the Committee for Promoting the 
Privatisation o f the TRA consul ted the opinion of private capital on the 
policy to privatise the Taiwan Railway, further strengthening the argument 
that the government took into consideration business interests’ expectations 
before setting about separating infrastructure and train operations. A former 
DOT official, who was directly involved in the planning process, recalled:
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We [the Director of the DOT and Provincial Government officials] 
had consulted [about the idea of privatising the Taiwan Railway] 
with the President of the China Development Industrial Bank in 
1998. We invited this bank to both invest in and operate the Taiwan 
Railway. But the President imposed so many terms and conditions 
that we came to the conclusion that the bank was simply interested 
in operating train services not investing in the infrastructure. ...
That was the main reason why we planned to separate infrastructure 
and train operations and intended to sell off the train operations.
The idea behind this “separation” was to attract private capital 
(interview, 13/04/2006).
The China Development Industrial Bank, the largest commercial investment 
bank owned by the Taiwanese and based in Taiwan, played a different role 
when compared with the former two consortia. Instead of expressing a direct 
interest in operating the Railway and approaching the Provincial Government 
directly with this aim in view, the President of the Industrial Bank was 
invited by the Director of the DOT to invest in and operate the Railway. 
Having accepted the notion of “separation” with the President of the bank, a 
draft plan for privatising Taiwan Railway was drafted by the DOT and 
presented to the MOTC in 1999.
The draft plan, The Plan o f Implementing the Separation o f Infrastructure 
and Train Operations for the Privatisation o f the Taiwan Railway {tai-tie 
min-ying-hua che-lu-fen-li jhih-sing fang-an), was officially introduced in 
January 1999. The Director of the DOT presented this draft plan to the 
Minister of the MOTC at a meeting held in June 1999. The Chairman of the 
TRLU was officially invited to the meeting. This is the first recorded 
occasion that the TRLU attended an official meeting in relation to 
privatisation. The TRLU had been ideologically and practically opposing 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway since 1997 (further developed in the 
following chapters).
At the meeting in 1999, aware that there had been conflicts between the 
union and the DOT in terms of how to privatise the Taiwan Railway, the 
Minister officially instructed that:
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the Taiwan Railway management should again negotiate and 
consult with the TRLU and then draft an optimal plan. This plan, 
when agreed between the Taiwan Railway and the TRLU, will be 
presented to the MOTC (MOTC, 2005: 15).
This policy instruction had a profound impact on the intended reform of the 
Taiwan Railway, mainly because several unexpected variables, particularly 
the role of the railway union and railway management, had been added to the 
privatisation process. Of particular note, they became key players in the 
process. Moreover, after the meeting held in 1999, private capital was largely 
removed from the debate about Railway’s reform and the Railway’s 
management and the TRLU became key players in the consideration of 
privatisation (further explored in Chapter 9).
6.5 Conclusion
In summary, the state initially played an influential role in the issue of 
railway reform after the Taiwan Railway encountered critical financial and 
organisational problems. However, the reform strategies did not generate 
satisfactory results. The introduction of the privatisation policy became the 
last resort for the government. Having been influenced by many published 
reports, and encouraged by private capital and by the successful privatisation 
experience in Japan, and Britain in particular, the government decided to 
adopt the “separation” scheme to attract private capital and make 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway easier. However, private capital 
subsequently played a limited role in railway reform due to the emerging role 
of the TRLU, which forced the government to reconsider the feasibility of 
the “separation” scheme (see Chapters 7 and 8) and the Railway’s managers 
acquiring a significant position in the process by forming a tacit alliance with 
the TRLU (detailed in Chapter 9).
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Chapter 7 
Union Activism in the Taiwan Railway 
-  its origins and development
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I examined the relationship between the Taiwanese party-state 
and the development of trade unionism. Under the KMT’s approach to labour 
policy, the trade union was an organisation that was incorporated into the 
political process. Trade unions were manipulated by the party-state to 
become “an arm of administration” and a means of controlling labour 
(Harper, 1969: 92; Lee, 1988: 194; Lin, 2002: 4; Koo, 1987: 174). This 
control system was so effective that trade unions became subordinate to 
party-state sponsorship. The Taiwan Railway Labour Union (TRLU) is a 
case which was developed to fulfil the party-state’s political ambitions.
However, the TRLU later became one of the most active and hostile unions 
in Taiwan. It developed a strong bargaining capacity not only because of the 
structural economic context of the Taiwan Railway in which the TRLU 
operated but also because of its union organisational capacity and leadership 
(see Chapter 5 for more details). Its transformation from dependent to 
independent union and the adoption of activism are interesting and 
noteworthy. Therefore, in order to understand how the TRLU developed into 
an active and independent union, and what decisive factors made this happen, 
we must look at the historical context of the railway union in relation to this 
process of transformation.
This chapter sets out first to discuss the state-sponsored railway union 
through the railway worker’s perspective and, more particularly, that of the 
nascent independent leadership. The origins of the TRLU and how people
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perceived the role of the union during the party-state period will be explored. 
Second, in the face of the TRLU’s failure to represent members’ interests, 
independent workers began to get together to defend their interests. This 
process first emerged in dealing with the issues of individual pay and meal 
problems at the shop-floor level and led to the formation of an alliance within 
one large workplace in the Taiwan Railway. This unprecedented experience 
provided a lead and inspiration to the development of a more profound 
workers’ solidarity. Challenging the union leadership was the ultimate goal 
for the establishment of the independent workers’ group, namely, the Taiwan 
Railway Workers’ Fellowship (TRWF). This chapter ends with a discussion 
of the implications and impacts that this independent TRWF had not only on 
the TRLU but also on Taiwanese unionism.
7.2 Taiwan Railway Labour Union Dependency
The TRLU was established under the supervision and support of the KMT in 
1947. Traditionally, the KMT exerted its power and control through party 
branches densely spread at regional and workshop levels. In the public sector, 
trade unions became an instrument of the KMT’s control of workers. The 
Taiwan Railway was a strategic industry, not only because its predominant 
domestic transport function provided crucial economic assistance for 
recovery in the aftermath of the Second World War, but also because the 
majority of railway workers were traditional KMT supporters. Therefore, 
control of the Taiwan Railway and its workers was an undoubted 
consideration for the party-state.
The idea of state corporatism was utilised as a means of control over labour. 
During the party-state period, only KMT members could be nominated for 
the position of union official. The railway union thus became an instrument 
for accomplishing the party-state’s goals. Union organisations and activities 
were mainly developed for these purposes. A senior railway manager, who 
had worked in the Taiwan Railway for more than four decades made an
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interesting but pertinent judgement about the role of the Taiwanese unions in 
the party-state period:
In comparison with the now independent unions, all Taiwanese 
trade unions in the early phase were established for the use of the 
‘emperor’ (the party-state) (interview, 07/04/2006).
What the respondent stressed was that, according to his experience and 
observation, the party-state took advantage of trade union organisations to 
fulfil political objectives. Unions were “bom” to serve the party-state’s 
requirements and less to represent members’ interests. This respondent stood 
out among union officials for two interesting reasons. First, he was the first 
elected standing director of one local union branch who was not nominated 
by the KMT. He had been continuously active in the railway union and the 
Chinese Federation of Railway Workers’ Unions throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, an unusual phenomenon during the period of the party-state’s rule. 
But he clearly recognised the connection between KMT membership and his 
own success:
Because I was also a KMT member and offspring of KMT veterans, 
my way of thinking and political ideology were similar to the 
KMT’s. Therefore, my becoming a union standing director [of one 
union branch] did little damage to the KMT. I would not oppose the 
KMT in terms of idea and practice. I accepted most of the KMT’s 
practices and principles in the Railway, apart from potential 
conflicts relating to problems of workers’ rights and benefits. But 
these caused no trouble between us (interview, 04/09/2006).
His success as a union standing director of one union branch mainly resulted 
from his KMT background and the KMT’s subsequent approval of his 
election. Accordingly, it could be argued that if he had not been a KMT 
member and deemed loyal, he might not have been accepted. The party-state 
still had supreme power over the union election, even over someone who had 
not been nominated by the KMT in the union election.
Second, this respondent was a union official who had typically benefited 
from the party-state system, but who had also been critical of this
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arrangement. This is evident by his statement above. In his remarks, it is 
clear this respondent recognised the problems of workers’ rights and benefits 
and the union’s failure to represent members’ interests. However, in the 
shadow of the party-state, he could do little but follow the common approach. 
This case indicates the depth of the impact of the party-state system on 
people, the enterprise, and the union organisation. This respondent was, as of 
May 2008, not only a senior railway manager but also an unofficial 
consultant to the TRLU because of his experience. The railway union 
officials called him da-laol as a mark of respect for his contribution to the 
TRLU.
This senior railway manager’s point of view is made clearer by referring to 
the former TRLU Chairman’s (between 1997 and 2003) response:
There was a union but no union movements at all [during the party- 
state’s period]. I came into the TRLU in 1991 when the KMT no 
longer controlled the union leadership. Before 1991, all union 
activities were controlled by the KMT, and all union officials were 
nominated by the KMT (interview, 06/04/2006).
This informant, in his mid-50s, was also an active participant in organising 
an autonomous workers’ fellowship in the 1980s. During his term of office, 
he organised the 9/11 event in 2003 that successfully prevented the Taiwan 
Railway from being corporatised and privatised. He was one of a handful of 
incumbent union officials who had graduated from university. Therefore, in 
comparison with other railway union officials in office, his way of doing 
things and points of view tended to be more developed. At the time of 
writing, he was the Chairman of the Chinese Federation of Railway Workers’ 
Unions.
The incumbent TRLU chairman (since 2003), in his early 50s, has been one 
of the most active in the Taiwan Railway. Convinced that a strike was the 
best solution to declare the TRLU’s position and to deal with the hardship
1 An honorific term in Mandarin which denotes acknowledgement of an individual’s 
seniority and expertise in some issues.
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that the Taiwan Railway was encountering, he was elected to put the strike 
resolution into effect, decided at the general meeting on 11th September 2003. 
Before he came into the TRLU in 1991, he had been a KMT member but had 
been expelled from the Party in 1990 because he had been very active in 
challenging the KMT’s leadership of the railway union. Before the TRLU 
became independent, his stance was viewed as unacceptable to the KMT 
authority. With his election as a union official in 1991 and then Chair in 2003, 
he demonstrated that KMT membership was no longer a criterion for 
successful election. In the union election in 2003, he was the first non-KMT 
member to be elected Chair of the TRLU.
On the question of the role of the union, he echoed the previous two 
respondents’ points of view:
During the reign of the party-state, what the TRLU did did not 
correspond with the majority of railway workers’ expectations. ... 
When labour disputes occurred between labour and management, 
the role of the TRLU disappeared. During that time, the union was 
controlled by the Party [KMT] and the government; it was not 
possible for the union to make its role significant. Therefore, no 
active role of the union was expected by workers (interview, 
17/04/2006).
What the incumbent TRLU Chairman indicated was that under the party- 
state’s control, the railway union did not have the capacity to demonstrate its 
agency role in relation to workers’ interests. A clear example given by da-lao 
confirmed the failure of the railway union to protect workers’ conditions and 
pay. He recalled:
In the early period [before the late 1980s], railway workers’ pay 
was based on the Remuneration of Workers of Transportation 
Affairs. While Telecommunication and Post workers received full 
pay, railway workers were paid discounted salaries (80 per cent of 
full pay). After a long struggle, eventually, we got full pay. 
However, it was not the union that made any effort in this alteration 
but the Railway director-general. The TRLU, in the early phase, 
was by no means useful (interview, 07/04/2006).
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The reason why railway workers were paid discounted salaries was not 
traceable, but possibly because the TRA was located at the third level of 
governmental hierarchy and governed by the Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Under the influence of state corporatism, trade unions, in particular those in 
the public sector, instead of representing members’ interests, became 
dependent and formed important instruments for control of labour for the 
party-state. As for the effect of democratic centralism, it created a structure 
whereby unions abided by party-state hierarchical rule. Accordingly, the 
agency of trade unions could hardly be implemented freely and 
independently in the context of state sponsored unionism.
In the railway case, when the party-state’s power showed signs of 
disintegration in the face of external and internal pressures from the 1980s 
onwards (detailed in Chapter 3), radical workers who were opposed to the 
dependent role of the union, began to overtly rebel. The general pattern of the 
workers’ rebellion process occurred as follows. The activists first initiated an 
informal social group at the shop-floor level. Later, this unofficial group 
transformed to become a bigger one with more representativeness at the 
regional and even national level. This informal workers’ group replaced the 
dependent official union in representing workers’ interests. Its ultimate goal 
was to challenge the union leadership through union election, in an attempt to 
transform the existing party-dominant union to a workers-led one. It was 
against this background that the railway workers took the first steps to 
establish an independent trade union. The following section documents this 
process, which had implications for the development of union activism in the 
railway industry.
7.3 Rebellion from below
-  Taiwan Railway Workers9 Fellowship
Trapped between the party-state’s repressive and corporatist management, it 
was difficult for Taiwanese trade unions to establish themselves as
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independent and autonomous. Under state corporatism, trade unions were 
structured hierarchically by forms of democratic centralism and its associated 
regulations and laws (often enacted for the party-state’s political purposes). 
Railway workers who showed loyalty to the KMT gained benefits from 
nomination as union officials and promotion. This was an effective technique 
to tie workers to the KMT.
During the late 1970s, workers who had become dissatisfied with the role of 
the trade unions and chose not to obey the party-state’s rule began to 
organise together to reclaim their rights. Initially, these private gatherings 
were loosely linked and informal. However, over a period of time, such 
casual gatherings evolved into a strong link among workers to pursue their 
interests. During the party-state period, under the prohibition of martial law, 
workers who organised unauthorised and unrecognised groups were punished 
by the state. They might be persecuted, dismissed and put in prison. In order 
to break through this hostile political environment, these nascent forms of 
organised labour began to campaign within the established unions.
Nevertheless, the workers’ rebellion was prolonged and complex, especially 
in the case of the Taiwan Railway. The strong and united railway union, 
which we observe today, had its historical roots in the railway workers’ 
rebellion back in the 1970s. In the beginning, the purpose of the workers’ 
rebellion was little more than a small group of workers seeking to redress 
immediate grievances. As these workers began to question the prevailing 
approach, they laid the foundation for the Taiwan Railway Workers’ 
Fellowship (TRWF). This Fellowship became the driving force within the 
TRLU seeking independence from the party-state. In this respect, it is worth 
tracing how this process came about and what impacts and implications it 
had for the transformation of the TRLU and Taiwanese trade unionism.
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7.3.1 It’s all about pay and meals!
In the 1970s, the Taiwanese economy was booming, due to the success of the 
export promotion policy implemented in the late 1950s and throughout the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Taiwan Year Book, 2004; Wade, 1988). This 
economic structure (which shifted from reliance on agricultural exports to 
light manufacturing in the 1960s and 1970s) was associated with a demand 
for a cheaper labour force (Wade, 1988). Reform of the labour market drove 
a large number of young and inexperienced labourers into the job market. 
This labour market development was also seen in the Taiwan Railway which 
was regarded as one of the best employers and a prosperous industry at the 
time.
The three-year apprenticeship, a legacy of the Japanese managerial style, was 
used to train new and inexperienced railway workers (except train drivers), 
who passed the national Special Examination for Railroad Workers. 
According to the Entry Requirements of the Special Examination, during the 
three-year apprenticeship, newcomers, entitled “temporary employees”, were 
paid discounted salaries (70% of full pay in the first year, 80% and 90% in 
the second and third year, respectively). This wage system was viewed as 
unfair by some new workers. Nevertheless, since this wage system was 
clearly stated in the Entry Requirements, their participation in the 
examination meant that they had agreed to all entry requirements, including 
discounted salaries during their apprenticeship. Under these circumstances, it 
could be argued that there was no so-called “pay dispute” but particular 
complaints with respect to the pay issue among a small number of young and 
energetic workers. For this reason, the scale of “pay dispute” was small and 
limited and was easily concluded. However, the “pay dispute” had an 
importance in laying the foundation for rebellion from below in the Taiwan 
Railway.
Rebellion in the Taiwan Railway began at the Taipei Locomotive 
Maintenance Factory (hereafter the Factory). In the 1970s, around two
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thousand workers were based in the Factory. It was one of the largest and 
most important workplaces in the Taiwan Railway. One senior railway union 
official, who was involved in the rebellion process, recalled:
The reason why I engaged in union affairs was to redress the issues 
of [unfair] pay [on the one hand], ... and expensive, and poor 
quality meals [on the other] (interview, 05/09/2006).
This informant became a railway worker at the Factory in 1972 when he was 
15 years old. He was one of a handful of workers who engaged in the 
rebellion process against railway managers, and one of the key figures who 
helped to establish the TRWF. At the time of writing (May 2008), he was a 
senior secretary in the TRLU. He recalled the issues facing workers as low 
pay and poor quality meals. These issues provided the occasion for activists 
to oppose the system and factory management.
He and his fellow colleagues thought that as apprentices, they should not be 
entitled “temporary employees” as the Entry Requirements stated, and thus 
paid a discounted salary, because they had passed the national examination 
through which they became qualified as official staff. This was the first time 
anybody had collectively challenged this arrangement.
To be honest, it was very difficult to overcome this poor system, 
but we had believed all the time that this system was 
unreasonable. ... We requested the employer to return to us the 
money they had taken from us over the past three years. There were 
43 people in the 24th training series in which I was based. We 
formed an alliance with colleagues of the former 23rd training series 
[also based in the Factory] who had the same problem with pay. 
Around 90 people who were dissatisfied with this arrangement 
joined this alliance. We attempted to work out solutions for this 
problem. A powerful interaction therefore emerged [among us]. In 
addition, because we were of the same class, our alliance was 
rigorous (interview, 05/09/2006).
However, when they presented their grievance on “pay” to factory managers, 
this respondent recalled:
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[In the face of our discontent,] factory managers simply showed us 
the Entry Requirements in which the condition of paying 70%, 80% 
and 90% of full salaries for the first three years of apprenticeship 
was clearly stated. They [factory managers] then confirmed and 
emphasised that we were temporary workers who should be paid 
discounted salaries (interview, 11/11/2007).
Of note, their grievance was neglected by factory managers because their 
request for full pay was not in accord with the Entry Requirements. Although 
this group of people believed that the Entry Requirements were wrong in this 
matter, they did not immediately argue with factory managers. As the 
respondent further explained:
In the beginning, because we were still young, and did not know 
how long we would work here, we did not argue immediately on 
this matter. Not until dismissal from compulsory military service1 
did we actively work out these matters. After two to three years of 
compulsory military services, we, the same group of activists, 
gathered again with mature and thoughtful ways of thinking 
towards pay and, later, meals at the workplace (interview, 
11/11/2007).
However, the experience of forming this informal alliance provided the 
foundation for the later larger and more formal, but still unofficial, workers’ 
group when people faced more widespread trouble at the Factory, the 
problem of meals.
While the pay issue only affected a small number of workers, the second 
issue involved many more workers at the Factory. The issue of meals became 
the key driver that stirred many more workers into expressing grievances 
collectively. This problem centred on the expensive but poor quality meals 
provided at the employees’ canteen in the Factory. These events happened in 
the second half of the 1970s. As the current union chairman recalled:
Before the Taiwan Railway Workers’ Fellowship was established, 
we [key organisers] were in the Taipei Locomotive Maintenance
1 According to the Taiwanese law, it is compulsory for Taiwanese males to serve in the 
military as long as they are 18 years old. In the case of this respondent, he could keep his 
railway post until dismissal from the army.
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Factory. We thought that the meals that were provided for us were 
so poor that we began to rebel against this (interview, 17/04/2006).
Another informant who was directly involved in the issue provided more 
detail:
A pervasive thought that workers in this working environment had 
was that something was wrong with the food. ... It [the canteen in 
the Factory] was monopolised. The right to operate this employee’s 
canteen was outsourced and had never been put into the public 
bidding process but was at the factory manager’s disposed. After 
operating it for a long period of time, his [the canteen manager] 
attitude became arrogant. ‘Take it, or leave it’. Workers’ emotions 
were stirred up by this situation. ... We were young, energetic, hot- 
tempered and meddlesome. It [rebellion] began from here 
(interview, 05/09/2006).
Poor quality and expensive meals provided in the Factory were seen as the 
direct cause of an increasing number of workers drawing together. In 
comparison with the former alliance, the latter larger group of workers 
evolved into a bigger and relatively more formal organisational structure, 
with leaders representing the group. These workers met informally with each 
other. They exchanged views about the meals and they developed a case 
against the current situation. They nominated representatives to negotiate 
with the factory management on this issue. The factory management did not 
make negotiations difficult for representatives for two reasons. On the one 
hand, management was sympathetic to workers’ grievances (interview, 
11/11/2007). On the other hand, the fact that workers knew that management 
had been “bribed” by the canteen owner with more cheaply priced meals and 
better service was also a powerful driver (interview, 05/09/2006). This 
“bribery” incident was believed by the workers to be part of the reason why 
the canteen owner was able to continuously operate the service for years 
(interview, 05/09/2006). At the meeting with management, workers’ 
representatives indicated that if they were given the opportunity to manage 
the canteen, they could operate it much better than the incumbent owner. 
Management agreed to their request and handed the canteen’s business over 
to the workers in the Factory. The union official recalled:
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We successfully acquired the right to manage the canteen. We 
handled the canteen very well (interview, 05/09/2006).
Representatives of the workers’ alliance began to operate the canteen in the 
late 1970s. They not only shopped for food in the early morning but also 
designed a menu everyday in the afternoon for the next day by conducting a 
questionnaire survey among workers to better understand workers’ opinions 
and meal preferences. When they could see that the canteen business was 
back on track, they handed it over to a Catering Committee whose members 
became responsible for its day-to-day running. The senior union secretary 
recalled:
We were not experts in this matter [managing the canteen], so we 
could not manage it for long. As soon as we saw that everything 
was back on the right track, we handed over the canteen 
business. ... Because of this incident and because we were young, 
many of our colleagues praised us for what we had been doing for 
the Factory and realised that we truly wanted to be of service. They 
thus supported us in the union election at the factory level 
(interview, 11/11/2007).
This was the first time in railway history that workers had acted collectively 
to secure their goals from Factory management. The initial thought of 
forming an alliance on behalf of workers stemmed from the need to have 
more strength and representativeness to express grievances to and negotiation 
with management. Such an alliance started with the problem of meals, which 
was, in one sense, not a direct challenge to managerial prerogatives. 
Importantly, management did not make things difficult in negotiations with 
representatives of the alliance.
The meal issue was highly visible and involved most workers within the 
Factory. The success of dealing with the meal problem gave workers an 
experience of collective organisation. It also provided other workers with a 
favourable impression of the main organisers, and emphasised the possible 
importance of an independent workers’ group. This led to a stark contrast 
between the inadequacy of the dependent railway union and the success of 
this workers-led alliance. It encouraged their identification with the
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forthcoming autonomous workers’ group, which was bigger and much better 
organised, and aimed to tackle tough issues at the national level. The meal 
issue, in retrospect, had strategic implications for the subsequent radical 
workers’ movement. It inspired these workers to continue to attempt to 
organise collectively. Moreover, this event inspired less radical workers to 
begin to question the inadequacy of the TRLU and to support an independent 
labour movement.
7.3.2 The June Revolution
By dealing with the meal problem in the late 1970s, this group of activists 
became known to many workers in the Factory and were supported in the 
local union election. Radical workers had little, if any, intention of seeking 
the TRLU’s help in developing and extending the alliance. They were aware 
that the union could not help to solve problems on their behalf. Having taken 
charge of the employee canteen, the alliance gained a popular reputation 
among workers, not only because it had successfully represented workers’ 
grievances, but also because workers were pleased with the meals provided 
by the reformed canteen. In fact, the main organisers of the alliance asserted 
that, during the course of operating the canteen, it was their intention to do 
their best to provide better food and services to please the Factory’s workers. 
What the representatives were doing was, first, illustrating the alliance’s 
ability to solve problems and, second, demonstrating that, instead of relying 
on the dependent TRLU, they were qualified to represent workers’ 
grievances.
The leadership of the alliance used their stewardship of the canteen to 
promote themselves as possible leaders of the union in the Factory. They 
stood in opposition to the pro-KMT leaders in the union election at the 
Factory level. In other words, in retrospect, control of the canteen served as a 
foundation for this group of activists to move forward. It was a strategically 
significant act. One union official related:
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After we took charge of the canteen, what we did for workers was 
to show them our ability and to make ourselves known to more 
workers. ... we gained an excellent reputation. ... When we were in 
charge of the canteen, the union branch [of the Factory] was 
therefore taken over by us (interview, 05/09/2006).
Importantly, the reputation of the leaders running the canteen was the 
springboard that enabled them to gain control of union organisation at the 
local level. Activists were fully aware that without taking over the official 
union, which was the only legally approved labour organisation for 
representing workers’ grievances, they would not be able to sustain the 
alliance for long.
The activists set up an election campaign group, called the ‘Labour Alliance’, 
to help their colleagues at the Factory become elected as Union 
Representatives. These representatives had two basic responsibilities. First, 
they represented workers interests in the workplace and, second, they had to 
elect 27 union directors, from whom 9 union standing directors were elected 
and who in turn elected the Union Chairman. Therefore, to challenge the 
union’s incumbent chair, the Labour Alliance campaign had to win at least 
half (plus one) of the total Union Representatives’ seats. In 1981, out of 
seven Union Representatives’ seats of the Factory union branch, nominees of 
the Labour Alliance won 3 seats. Although not a victory, it was a huge 
breakthrough for independent workers to successfully compete with pro- 
KMT candidates and to win seats as Union Representatives. This was also 
the first time in railway history that autonomous workers had attempted to 
gain control of the union through an election campaign.
The ways in which this Labour Alliance challenged the union at the local 
level gradually drew the attention of other autonomous workers at different 
railway workplaces and opened up the possibility of forming a workers’ 
association across workplaces. However, before the enactment of the Labour 
Standards Law (LSL) in 1984 and the lifting of martial law in 1987, the 
establishment of a cross-workplace alliance was still uncertain and possibly
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dangerous. In other words, these two legal issues provided the opportunity 
for independent railway workers to move into a new stage of collective 
organisation.
The enactment of the LSL in 1984 provided railway workers with a genuine 
opportunity and a platform to express their grievances. The main purpose of 
the LSL was to “provide minimum standards for working conditions, protect 
workers’ rights and interests, improve employee-employer relationships, and 
promote social and economic development” (Article 1). Railway workers had 
long experienced poor working conditions and pay. Some railway workers, 
train drivers in particular, were working a 24-hour shift without overtime pay. 
This seriously breached the LSL requirements that eight hours a day and 48 
hours a week was the working standard1. However, to their disappointment, 
not only was the railway management reluctant to implement the LSL, but 
the TRLU did not stand up against this decision. The majority of railway 
workers therefore became increasingly irritated and came to the conclusion 
that rather than rely on the official union, they had to count on themselves 
and oppose management decisions.
However, before the lifting of martial law in 1987, which prohibited people 
from organising unauthorised groups, independent workers’ activity on a 
cross-workplace basis was prohibited. It was not legally possible for railway 
workers to express their grievances through public collective actions2. The 
lifting of martial law opened up an unprecedented opportunity for radical 
workers to establish workers’ fellowships without being persecuted or 
prosecuted. In addition, the lifting of martial law encouraged less radical 
workers to engage in the process, though often their engagement was still 
secret. After martial law was lifted in 1987, those radical railway workers 
could then publicly get together to represent their grievances. The first cross­
workplace association, called the Railway Workers’ Northern Region
1 According to LSL (Article 30, amended in 2002), legal working hours is eight hours a day 
and 84 hours every two weeks.
2 The Labour Alliance’s success at the Factory was unusual and contingent, because its 
members chose the right issue at the right time. Workers’ full support was also crucial in this 
regard.
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Fellowship, was formed at the regional level in 1987. This fellowship in 
association with other workplaces in the Taiwan Railway in northern Taiwan 
was based on the independent alliance at the Factory. The ultimate goal of 
this new Fellowship was to establish a national workers’ group representing 
railway workers as a whole. It was an initial step towards national 
organisation.
Following efforts made by organisers of the Railway Workers’ Northern 
Region Fellowship, workers who sought to secure their interests and identify 
themselves with the ideas advocated by the fellowship, agreed to support and 
participate in the group. The TRWF was established on the 20th March 1988, 
with an estimated five thousand ‘members’ (around one-quarter of the total 
number of railway workers at that time). This date was chosen because 
according to the railway union election regulations, candidates for election 
had to be nominated three months before the Union Representatives Election, 
which was set for June 1988.
The TRWF was regarded as an organisation ‘outside the official system’ (ti- 
jhih-wai) by the railway union, management and the government. The 
official purpose of the TRWF was “to return labour rights which belong to 
workers back to workers” (TRWF, 1988). While its short-term goal was to 
make the TRLU autonomous and independent, its ultimate ambition was to 
recover basic human rights for the Taiwanese working class. After the 
establishment of the TRWF, activists set up the Labour Alliance election 
campaign. They called this event the “June Revolution” (TRWF, 1988). 
Their achievement brought about permanent changes, not only directly in 
relation to the dependent official union, but also as part of the more general 
collapse of the party-state system within the railway industry. As stated by 
the Fellowship:
For a long time, while the Taiwan Railway’s management has been 
publicly breaching the Labour Standards Law and cheating and 
oppressing employees, the Taiwan Railway Labour Union, which 
has abandoned and surrendered itself to being an instrument for the 
employer and the Party, has lost its ground in representing labour
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interests. This situation has led to railway workers’ dignity and 
rights being trampled on and crushed. Having no alternative, a 
handful of workers has stood up to defend the rights of fellow 
workers, action which has since won a great deal of support from 
railway workers. The TRWF has therefore been bom from a 
consensus to labour resistance, struggle and self-preservation 
(TRWF, 1988).
People may find that in this official announcement, the TRWF presented 
ambitious objectives with militant but clear and well-structured directions, 
concretely aiming at improving unjust and unlawful labour processes within 
the Taiwan Railway. Such sophisticated objectives and the ways in which 
radical workers intended to achieve the goals were driven by two forces. The 
first, discussed earlier, was the experience of a small number of workers at 
the Factory seeking to redress pay and meal problems in the 1970s. The 
second driver came from the direct help of the political elites. The latter 
element provided more subtle and sophisticated legal and organisational 
support to these railway workers.
In the late 1970s, a number of political elites (known as tang-wai1) as well as 
a handful of disgruntled KMT members, began to rebel against the party- 
state system. These highly educated political elites generally shared a 
commitment to democratic values as a result of studying abroad (mainly in 
the US) or possibly through the American Labour Attache programme in 
Taiwan. They proposed democracy and opposed the government and the 
ways in which the party-state controlled Taiwanese politics and society 
through political elections. As regard, the support from political elites, one 
senior union official recalled:
External support could be divided into two parts: one from tang- 
wai, which later became the Democratic Progressive Party, and the 
other from the sub-group within the KMT, which later broke away 
from the KMT and established a new political party, called the 
Chinese New Party. By the time we were engaged in rebellion, the 
TRWF had association mainly with these two political groups
1 People who refused to join the KMT membership or withdrew from the KMT because of 
their American democratic values and stood up against the party-state system were 
categorised as tang-wai (literally outside the Party) or political rebels.
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which provided us with direct legal and organisational support 
(interview, 11/11/2007).
Other support was possibly from the American Labour Attache programme. 
After the Second World War, the United States assigned labour attaches to 
the newly developed countries, particularly those in Africa and Asia as a 
“response to the emergence of labour elites clamouring for political power” 
(Fiszman, 1965: 203-205). The role of the American labour attache was 
partly to oversee human rights practice and to help establish democratic 
labour processes. When I tried to confirm whether the American labour 
attache ever played a role in developing union alliances in Taiwan with one 
government official (who had been a Taiwanese labour attache to the US 
between 1995 and 2001), he replied:
I think it would be reasonable to infer that this has been the case. ... 
When I was in America, the Department of State of the US invited 
many Taiwanese union officials, including scholars, to visit 
Washington DC and other institutions. Of course, [the main goal 
was] to make everyone known to one another. Such invitation was 
undoubtedly in America’s interests. ... Generally speaking, funding, 
training and inviting labour elites to America, American values of 
democracy could be spread to Taiwan. Although I cannot state the 
actual practice of American Labour Attache to Taiwan since the 
Second World War, I believe the ultimate goal has been to promote 
independent trade unionism and to encourage the Taiwanese state 
towards democratisation. Frankly speaking, I would not be 
surprised if American labour attache had played a role in 
developing independent labour movement to further autonomy and 
democracy (interview, 06/09/2006).
Although the respondent could not directly confirm whether there had been a 
labour attache programme in Taiwan during the party-state period, he 
implied that this was likely to have been the case. By means of funding, 
training and invitation to elites, America had endeavoured to establish the 
concepts of independence and democracy within countries where they 
appeared not to exist or were at a fledgling stage. This respondent’s 
background and experience enabled him to reveal that the Americans had 
indeed had connections with Taiwanese elites for the purpose of promoting 
democratic values.
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Of note, a number of radical elites who were concerned about labour issues, 
established the Taiwan Labour Legal Support Association in 1984 (in 
parallel with the enactment of the Labour Standards Law) to provide a free 
legal consultation service to Taiwanese labour who were experiencing unfair 
treatment and participating in industrial disputes in the workplace (Taiwan 
Labour Front, 2006). In 1988, aware of the emergence of a large number of 
labour disputes organised by the grassroots in the wake of the lifting of 
martial law in 1987, this Association both transformed itself and renamed 
itself as the Association of the Support for Taiwan Labour Movement. It not 
only provided various types of support and consultations with respect to 
organisation, law and education, but also served as a platform for different 
groups of independent workers who engaged in labour movement activity at 
different levels to get to know each other. Further, organisers of the 
preparatory committee formed to establish the TRWF directly benefited from 
the assistance of this Association in terms of how to develop the TRWF’s 
organisational structure and advice on ways in which to achieve their goals.
The newly evolved independent labour movement was an important source 
for political elites to bring their influence to bear on Fellowship 
developments as recalled by da-lao:
There were two reasons why the Fellowship (TRWF) was 
established. First, after the lifting of martial law, political groups 
[which operated outside the party] became actively involved in 
assisting autonomous workers and encouraging them to establish 
fellowships at different enterprises. These political elites could then 
make the best of the fellowships’ solidarity and activism to 
challenge the hegemony of the KMT. Second, political elites 
believed that these fellowships [including the TRWF] could help 
them to achieve their [political] ambitions which had never been 
possible before (interview, 04/09/2006).
Although da-lao seemed to express a negative impression towards tang-waV s 
political ambition by taking advantage of independent labour movements, it 
cannot be denied that the TRWF was established with the assistance of 
political elites who shared democratic values. All of these elements are part
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of the explanation as to how those radical railway workers, who were less 
familiar with the law and this type of representation, successfully organised 
themselves and established the independent TRWF.
However, the June Revolution within the Railway failed, simply because the 
power of railway managers with the assistance of the party-state still 
prevailed over that of independent workers. Although the TRWF had strong 
solidarity and activism, its members were still defeated in the first attempt to 
challenge the union leadership in 1988.
7.3.3 Challenging the union leadership
In the election of Union Representatives in June 1988, people of the Labour 
Alliance campaign wore red jumpers, with the words “Labour Alliance” and 
the candidate’s number embroidered on the back. They were called the “Red 
Guards” (hong-wei-bing) to reflect their intention to defend and protect their 
fellow workers’ rights and interests. At the Factory, which had a long history 
of rebellion, the ‘Red Guards’ won a landslide victory, taking all seats. 
However, the Labour Alliance campaign only won around two-fifths of the 
total 107 Union Representative seats at the national level in 1988. In terms of 
the number of seats won by the TRWF, the outcome of the election in June 
was not decisive, though impressive. However, its members still decided to 
campaign for the union director election, because they thought that another 
fellowship, the Train Drivers’ Fellowship (TDF), was on their side. However, 
the TRWF soon realised that they had misjudged the support from the TDF, 
as the latter had already colluded with the KMT for this election. Having 
noted the TDF’s intention to support the KMT, members of the TRWF thus 
decided to boycott the General Meeting of Union Representatives on 15th 
September 1988 at which 27 union directors were to be elected. However, 
the meeting still proceeded in the absence of TRWF members. As a result, no 
TRWF member was elected as union director, let alone to the position of the 
union Chair.
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Although the TRWF did not succeed in its first attempt, the courage of its 
members and the way in which they had organised the Fellowship to 
challenge the union leadership had far-reaching consequences for the 
dependent TRLU. One of the marked achievements was to stimulate the 
incumbent TRLU leadership to shift their dependent practices towards a 
more member-oriented approach. The TRLU, under pressure from railway 
workers and the TRWF, began to negotiate with railway managers about the 
issue of the application of the Labour Standards Law. Further, the TRWF’s 
failure in the 1988 union election did not deter these activists but spurred 
them to carry on.
These activists again participated in the 1991 union election. There were 
three candidates, all KMT members, campaigning in this election for the 
union chair, namely, the incumbent union chair supported by the KMT, one 
candidate on behalf of the railway management, and one candidate on behalf 
of the TRWF. The union chair was elected from among nine union standing 
directors. At this election, the TRWF candidate re ceived four votes, the 
railway management candidate won three votes and the incumbent union 
chair received two votes. Thus, the TRWF candidate succeeded in winning 
the union chair by one vote. As a result of this election outcome, the union 
chair was no longer nominated by the KMT. This change heralded the 
shrinking of the KMT’s power within the railway sector. In addition, since 
the union chair had been nominated by workers, this indicated that the TRLU 
had become independent of the party and state. The TRWF was subsequently 
disbanded in the early 1990s because its mission to win the union chair and 
to transform the dependent railway union into an independent one had been 
successfully accomplished. The solidarity and activism of the TRWF 
fostered during the Factory period from the 1970s onwards were passed on to 
the independent TRLU and successfully prevented any attempts by 
government to take over control of the union again.
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7.4 Discussion
The fact that the TRLU failed to represent workers’ interests served as the 
fundamental driver for workers to rebel from below. The process began at 
one major work site, the Factory. Apart from the pay issue and the workplace 
meals issue, one feature in relation to the Factory should not be overlooked. 
It was one of the largest workplaces in the Taiwan Railway and recruited a 
large number of workers. It was possible for the early organisers to campaign 
informally among the work force. It was also possible for workers to gain 
security from the large number of workers at the Factory. This feature made 
the gathering of workers much easier. As Kelly (1988: 14) indicates, “By 
bringing workers together in large factories, ..., helped to create 
combinations of workers, or trade unions”. Kelly’s argument was supported 
by the current TRLU Chairman:
One of the important features of the Factory was that more than 
2000 workers worked together in a workplace. This feature helped 
us to get together more easily. Then key members [the main 
organisers] ... began to connect with all the railway workers. The 
framework of the fellowship was based on the Taipei Locomotive 
Maintenance Factory, and then became the Taiwan Railway 
Workers’ Fellowship (interview, 17/04/2006).
The size of the Factory was one of the factors that enabled workers at the 
Factory to challenge management.
The success of the TRWF’s early campaigns provided valuable experience 
for the following events, not only at the industrial level but also at the 
national level. In particular, although the June Revolution in 1988 failed, the 
aim of organising independent workers in the union was maintained. 
Eventually, those key players and representatives of the TRWF successfully 
won the union election in 1991. The efforts of the TRWF in association with 
other labour movements throughout Taiwan in the late 1980s were not only 
an important turning point for the TRLU but also served as an important 
element in the collapse of the power of the party-state within the railway 
sector.
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Without doubt, the success of the TRWF had ramifications throughout 
Taiwan. Most workers in the railway industry had been used to obeying 
instructions and orders. However, what the new independent union wanted 
was to facilitate change b y  means of union activism and struggle. Such 
attitudes and ideas were novel to many workers who had little experience of 
independent collective action. The TRWF’s experience, developed under a 
hostile environment in the 1970s, gave the leadership the experience to 
respond to workers’ concerns and grievances as well as to take the 
appropriate steps to win workers’ support. Further, the articulation by TRWF 
of core democratic values enabled them to counter the employers’ and the 
KMT’s attempts to regain control over the union, and the railway sector. In 
the following five union elections from 1991 onwards, the union chairmen 
were all core members of the TRWF. This ongoing legitimate delivery of the 
TRWF’s “core democratic values” has made the TRLU one of the strongest 
unions in Taiwan. As da-lao further pointed out:
One thing that made the TRLU special was the existence of the 
spirit of the TRWF [when compared with other unions in Taiwan]. 
Since they [members of the TRWF] came into the union, there have 
been core democratic values that have sustained this organisation, 
and passed from one chair to another. Without such core 
democratic values, it would be very difficult for new chairmen to 
get on with difficult tasks (i.e. opposing privatisation policies) 
quickly and easily. No other unions have this feature, and this is the 
crucial reason why the TRLU is stronger than other unions 
(interview, 07/04/2006).
The “core democratic values” which have been inherited from the 1970s 
have served as a decisive element that has made the return of KMT control 
over the union impossible. Of course, it should also be noted that the power 
of the party-state also decreased in line with the democratisation process 
from the late 1980s onwards, which, in turn contributed to the independence 
of Taiwanese trade unionism.
One of the problems now facing the leadership is how to renew itself. The 
idea of ‘core democratic values’ may make it difficult for new members to
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enter the centre of policy-making. In other words, the union could easily 
exclude ‘new blood’ who had not belonged to the former TRWF. This was 
confirmed by da-lao:
However, ... there is a drawback about the legitimate delivery of 
the TRWF’s core democratic values. The most significant 
disadvantage is factionalisation of the union, because there are 
many talented workers who cannot enter the centre of union policy­
making (interview, 07/04/2006).
In fact, the current union chair has also noticed this feature of the union, and 
has been seeking resources to introduce ‘new blood’ into the union 
organisation. The biggest problem is the attitude of the union officials 
themselves (field note). It is always difficult for people to reform the system 
developed by themselves. However, fortunately, the TRLU is still facing a 
number of challenges which is forcing its members to re-examine the way 
they organise and operate. Da-lao commented:
However, at this difficult time [in the face of the government’s 
strong intention to corporatise and privatise the Taiwan Railway 
and competition from the private railway company], I do not want 
to see these unique union’s features to be discarded, mainly 
because they are the only reason that equips the TRLU with 
fighting capability (interview, 07/04/2006).
The government’s intention to corporatise the Taiwan Railway remains. 
Therefore, the same union characteristics and components, to a large extent, 
could play a role in renewing the union leadership and, at the same time, 
limit the government’s intentions to privatise the Railway.
Although the TRWF successfully challenged the union leadership and even 
broke down the party-state’s power and control which was embedded in the 
Taiwan Railway, the union still operates in a state industry that has been in 
place for 60 years. The TRLU has been influenced and shaped by that 
bureaucratic structure. In other words, it would be difficult for the railway 
union to resist the state as employer, if the state introduced, for example, 
restrictive legislation (as occurred in Britain in the early 1980s). Being aware
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of this point, the independent union has continued to challenge the state, 
evident in the privatisation campaigns. Therefore, the relationship between 
the union and the state, in this context, is fragile and often tense (field note).
After addressing the way the TRLU maintains itself as an active union, as 
illustrated by the privatisation campaigns, it is necessary to consider another 
workers’ group in the Taiwan Railway. This second Fellowship, the Train 
Drivers’ Fellowship, also played an important role in the process of the 
developing independent labour movement.
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Chapter 8 
Sectionalism in the Taiwan Railway
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7 ,1 discussed the sources of TRLU activism and its impact on the 
development of the contemporary independent union movement in Taiwan. 
The TRWF played a decisive role in pushing the dependent TRLU into 
independence. This chapter aims to examine another independent workers’ 
group within the Taiwan Railway, the Train Drivers’ Fellowship (TDF). This 
Fellowship was established in the wake of the establishment of the TRWF to 
pursue train drivers’ sectional interests. The emergence of the TDF has been 
as important as that of the TRWF for Taiwanese union movement history.
Craft sectionalism has long existed in the labour market. Craft workers enter 
privileged occupations through education, training and lengthy 
apprenticeships (Haydu, 1991: 1). Their distinctiveness arises from skills, 
qualifications and knowledge (Hyman, 1989: 27). Craft workers, particularly 
those with strategic skills, may gain significant advantages in the aspects of 
employment, pay and working conditions (Hyman, 1989: 25). The 
segmentation of the labour market is reflected in the structure of the labour 
movement (Hyman, 1989: 27).
One type of sectionalism appears in sectional unions (representing particular 
groups of “skilled” workers) pursuing better interests at the possible expense 
of other unions of different or similar trades. For instance, the Associated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), a sectional union 
specifically representing train drivers of British Rail, negotiates better pay 
and working conditions for its members than workers of different professions 
in the railway industry, represented by the National Union of Rail, Maritime 
and Transport Workers (RMT) and the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association
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(TSSA), respectively (Arrowsmith, 2003). Another type of sectionalism 
appears in industrial or enterprise unions, which incorporate and therefore 
represent all kinds of workers, whether manual or white collar, in different 
trades or professions or in the same industry, enterprise or branch of 
production. Soviet trade unions are typical cases of this category, as are some 
Western unions, like the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in the UK 
(Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993b; the NUM website). The sectionalism of train 
drivers in the Taiwanese railway industry, discussed in this chapter, belongs 
in this category.
In the Taiwan Railway case, the segmentation of railway posts had long 
existed but became apparent when the two independent workers’ groups (the 
TRWF and TDF) developed. The TDF was established on May Day in 1988 
by way of strike action not long after the TRWF’s inaugural meeting (on 20th 
March, detailed in Chapter 7). Whereas the TRWF was developed to advance 
all railway workers’ collective interests, the TDF was formed to strive for 
and defend train drivers’ sectional interests.
Conflicts between the two groups worsened when both fellowships engaged 
in negotiating pay and conditions in the late 1980s. The idea that train drivers 
deserved higher pay and allowances was seen to be against the collective 
interests of the railway workers. Therefore, sectional identities and 
consciousness drew train drivers more tightly together, by which they 
demonstrated a higher commitment than other railway workers to defend 
their own specific interests. This “working-class politics” (Haydu, 1991: 3), 
which involved a clash between craft and unskilled railway workers, gave 
railway management an opportunity to exacerbate the divisions between the 
two groups. Railway management manipulated train drivers’ sectionalism to 
weaken the railway workers’ collective power. Unlike the TRWF that was 
disbanded when its members successfully gained control of the union chair, 
the TDF is still actively in operation.
Although the TDF is an unofficial workers’ agency within the Taiwan 
Railway, it actually represents train drivers in negotiations with management
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on particular issues. In other words, its support of train drivers’ interests is 
recognised by the employer in the Taiwan Railway. This was evident in the 
late 1980s with regard to the May Day strike and union chair election in 1988, 
and in the early 2000s with the union members’ general meeting on 11th 
September 2003. As a result, craft sectionalism has become an issue in the 
Taiwan Railway.
In order to understand how craft sectionalism became an issue in 
contemporary labour movements in the railway industry, this chapter needs 
to consider how the TDF emerged and developed, and its relationship with 
the TRWF and TRLU. An account of the challenges of union leadership, 
involving both Fellowships, shows how the Fellowships began to pursue 
separate interests. These divisions are then considered in relation to the 
general meeting on 11th September 2003 and subsequent events.
8.2 The Train Drivers’ Fellowship and the 1988 May 
Day Strike
8.2.1 Train Drivers’ Fellowship
A train driver’s mode of work is unusual when compared with other workers 
in the railway industry. In addition to their higher salary, train drivers are 
paid driving allowances as fringe benefits. While train drivers are working 
(driving trains), they must pay attention to specific aspects, such as level 
crossings, speed limits, signals and many unexpected incidents on the railway. 
Prior to the 1990s, for safety reasons, train drivers were required to assemble 
under supervision at their workplaces four hours before their work shift (five 
hours on the night shift) without overtime pay to ensure they were sober and 
sufficiently alert to work. In addition, working in a small and isolated control 
cabin, a train driver is always pressured to safely deliver hundreds of 
passengers to their destinations. Moreover, the apprenticeship stresses that
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younger trainees should respect older trainers and obey their orders.
The context and situation of the train drivers that stimulated organisation of 
the TDF is remembered clearly. One train driver who had been in this post 
for more than 20 years recalled:
Of all modes of railway work, we, train drivers, participate in the 
most unique one. We receive higher pay than others. ... But we 
often work on the night shift. ... For a long period of time, train 
drivers inherited Japanese apprenticeship [managerial] style. We 
very much emphasised rank. Up to the present, we still call the 
senior train driver ‘Master’ (shi-fu). We cannot call him by name or 
even mister. ... Therefore, because, in general, our supervisors are 
‘Masters’, we are expected to respect and inherit their outmoded 
way of thinking. ... Train drivers are basically isolated from the 
outside world. ... (interview, 06/09/2006).
This respondent was one of a handful of train drivers involved in the 
establishment of the TRWF. However, after the TDF was launched with his 
active involvement, he withdrew from the TRWF and became a cadre of the 
TDF and remains so to this day.
When asked to recall what was thought of their working conditions, another 
respondent, who had been the first general-president of the TDF (between 
1988 and 1990), further stressed:
Our working hours were too long. We worked in an environment 
where loud noise and high temperature were the norm. In addition, 
driving a train was dangerous. We often worked on the night shift 
and rarely had a vacation. To be honest, our pay was not 
commensurate with the work loads we had (interview, 05/09/2006).
In fact, such working conditions and unsatisfactory pay had existed since the 
Japanese colonial period. In the early 1980s, two crucial events triggered 
workers’ discontent. First, in 1983 and 1984, a large number of military 
personnel were compulsorily dismissed from the army. A number of them 
were allocated by the government to the Taiwan Railway and trained to be 
train drivers. These ‘atypical’ railway workers were not deeply influenced by 
the rigid managerial style but had a strong self-identity and consciousness
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which was distinct within the existing railway culture. This feature drew 
these newcomers tightly together. One respondent (who had been the main 
founder of the TDF and was general-president of the Confederation of the 
TDF when I interviewed him) recalled the characteristics of these newcomers:
They [these new trainees] were young, militant and bold, ready to 
openly complain about their grievances. They were obviously 
discontented with the working environment and conditions, and 
often got together privately to discuss problems they had (interview, 
05/09/2006).
The way of thinking of these new railwaymen and their actions gradually 
spread and influenced other train drivers. In this way, a voice that called for a 
change from the outdated managerial style, slowly but steadily emerged. This 
group of militant train drivers later became the core founding members of the 
TDF.
The second critical element that triggered train drivers’ discontent with 
working conditions was the Labour Standards Law (LSL). As has been 
emphasised in earlier chapters, railway workers were irritated by their 
exclusion from the protection of the LSL. Train drivers who had long 
expected improved working conditions and wages were also disappointed 
with this exclusion:
Between 1984 and 1988, the Taiwan Railway did not implement the 
Labour Standards Law. ... [During this period,] everyone was 
angry over this exclusion. We constantly expressed our grievances 
to management, but they showed no respect for our view (interview, 
05/09/2006).
It was their exclusion from the protection of the LSL in association with 
mismanagement and poor allowances that stimulated militant train drivers to 
think of fighting for their interests collectively. By the 1980s, there were 
more than 1,500 train drivers, including assistant drivers, in the Taiwan 
Railway. Before they actually got together and formed an alliance to 
represent their grievances, a handful of the most radical workers attempted to 
negotiate with managers individually. However, instead of obtaining what
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they requested from managers, these workers were punished for their 
effrontery. Under martial law and managerial power, they were either 
compelled to transfer to other posts which might be far away from where 
they lived or granted a poor annual performance assessment (which would 
directly affect their promotion and year-end bonus). However, this oppressive 
technique did not dampen their enthusiasm. In 1988, another opportunity 
presented itself. After martial law was lifted, with the encouragement of the 
autonomous workers’ movement within the Taiwan Railway, these train 
drivers began to unite, seeking to strengthen their bargaining capacity to 
address their grievances. The decision to form a fellowship for train drivers 
was encouraged and supported by “a number of enthusiastic workers giving 
speeches and holding informal discussions [for train drivers] at different 
workplaces throughout the nation” (interview a cadre of the TDF, 
05/09/2006).
On 19th March 1988, the day before the TRWF was established, all the TDF’s 
core members met for the first time at the Cosmos Hotel in Taipei to organise 
their own Fellowship. They also decided to hold the first preparatory
thcommittee meeting to establish the Train Drivers’ Fellowship on 29 March 
1988. This date for the preparatory committee meeting was chosen because it 
was a national holiday, and, according to the LSL, “a worker shall be granted 
time off on all holidays, Labour Day and other days as prescribed by the 
central competent authority” (Article 37). The TRWF also supported the train 
drivers’ action (TRWF propaganda, 1988). Although not permitted, a number 
of radical train drivers declared they would take the day off to achieve their 
goal of establishing the Fellowship. This decision had a twofold purpose. On 
the one hand, to have a national holiday without the employer’s consent had 
never happened in the Taiwan Railway before. Therefore, their announced 
action amounted to a small scale strike and the employer’s reaction to their 
action would be tested. On the other hand, this declaration would show their 
determination to establish a Fellowship for train drivers. These train drivers’ 
determination to take a day off influenced many other train drivers who also 
stopped work.
183
Accordingly, on 29th March 1988, nearly 500 train drivers and assistant 
drivers collectively took a day off to attend the preparatory meeting at the 
Cosmos Hotel in Taipei. The press revealed what happened at the meeting:
Nearly 500 train drivers bitterly complained at the venue and 
condemned inadequate remuneration, including fringe benefits, and 
working environment. ... Every worker who spoke on the stage 
was emotionally charged. Each speaker accused [management and 
government] of exploiting labour and breaching the LSL, providing 
concrete examples. Workers loudly applauded when speakers spoke 
from the bottom of their hearts. At the meeting, someone circulated 
leaflets requesting the TRLU to be independent {United Daily News, 
30/03/1988: 3).
One cadre of the TDF recalled the situation on that day as follows:
The meeting venue was crowded with people. ... We were so 
touched and oveijoyed [with the number of spontaneous 
participants]. We believed that it was because people had no fear of 
punishment from the employer. ... We were very satisfied with that 
meeting (interview, 06/09/2006).
Scheduled trains were not affected at all by this event, because managers had 
prepared for drivers’ absence {Min Sheng Daily, 30/03/1988: 7). However, 
the above interview suggests that the respondent was surprised by the 
number of train drivers who attended the meeting to show their determination 
to support the establishment of the TDF. The outcome was encouraging not 
only because of the high number of those who attended the meeting but also 
because those workers who took a day off to attend the meeting without their 
managers’ permission were not punished. The railway director-general, in 
response to their collective absence without his consent, acknowledged that 
“having a day off on national holiday is a worker’s basic right”. In addition, 
he defined workers’ attendance at that meeting as “a private activity”, and 
therefore, “they would not be punished” {United Daily News, 30/03/1988: 3).
Although the director-general publicly regarded workers’ behaviour as 
private in nature, drivers took a somewhat different view. As one TDF core 
member recalled:
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Railway managers were fully aware of what we were doing. But 
they seized upon the thought that what we intended to do would not 
succeed. They thought we were playing the fool. Even on the day 
of the [May Day] strike, they still believed that the strike would not 
succeed (interview, 05/09/2006).
This comment was echoed by another TDF respondent:
The success of the meeting on 29th March 1988 was to some extent 
because the employer left us alone. They subjectively thought that 
we would not succeed. ... I can confirm that if the employer had 
intervened in the process, we would not have succeeded at all 
(interview, 06/09/2006).
Managers’ attitudes, according to the respondents, played a role in the 
success of the meeting. The main reason why managers did not publicly 
interfere in the process and stop them attending the meeting was twofold. 
First, having punished those who had expressed their grievances before the 
lifting of martial law, managers simply believed that the workers would not 
dare to organise such an illegal activity again. The second reason, related to 
the first, was that managers did not consider workers could succeed in any 
significant way in bringing the railway network to a halt as revealed by the 
fact that scheduled trains were not affected. The Director-General of the 
Taiwan Railway proudly stated in the press:
None of the scheduled trains stopped running. In fact, trains ran 
more on time than on normal days’ (United Daily News, 30/03/1988:
3).
Although managers, according to the two respondents, downplayed the 
success of the meeting, the solidarity and militancy of the train drivers that 
was demonstrated by their attendance at this preparatory meeting should not 
be overlooked.
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8.2.2 May Day Strike in 1988
At the meeting on 29th March, a number of important issues were discussed. 
First, it was confirmed that the TDF would be established on May Day 1988 
(a national holiday for workers). Second, in order to attend the inaugural 
general meeting of the TDF on May Day, train drivers would collectively 
take a day off on that day. Although they claimed that having a day off on 
that national holiday was lawful under the LSL, they were fully aware that 
such action could be construed as a strike, which was illegal. Nonetheless, 
they avoided using the term ‘strike’ publicly:
Our slogan was: ‘to have a legal vacation is our rights’. We wanted 
to declare and exercise our rights and interests by doing so. 
Because essentially according to the LSL, we should have a day off 
on a national holiday. In other words, we used our legal right to 
cover up this illegal strike intention (interview, 06/09/2006).
The goals of this action were, on the one hand, to demonstrate the 
determination to defend train drivers’ legal rights, and, on the other hand, to 
express train drivers’ grievances through the establishment of the TDF. It is 
noteworthy that before this ‘strike’, there had not been an occasion when a 
labour movement had called a day off collectively in the railway industry, let 
alone on a national scale. Therefore, not only did managers and the 
government have no prior experience in dealing with a situation of this kind, 
workers themselves had little idea as to what would happen as a result of 
such industrial action. As for managers and the government, as indicated 
above, they did not intervene in the process simply because they did not 
believe strike action would succeed.
However, both train drivers and TDF cadres were worried about the 
consequences of their action. Workers’ dilemma became significant, when 
managers offered them a deal in response to their request for an increase in 
monthly driving allowances. As a result of this offer, TDF cadres had a sharp 
argument about this industrial action. Managers offered to increase driving 
allowances by NT$2,000 (New Taiwan Dollar) per person per month
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(hereafter pppm) for both drivers and assistant drivers as a deal for calling off 
the strike. In 1988, driving allowances were NT$5,000 pppm for train drivers 
and NT$3,000 pppm for assistant drivers. While some train drivers were 
inclined to accept the offer and call off the strike, the more militant drivers 
refused. An inside story, related by a senior TDF cadre, highlights the 
dilemmas and uncertainties with regard to this industrial action:
Because we had not so far received any positive response from 
managers in response to our appeals for improved working 
conditions and wages, cadres held a meeting on 26th April 1988 at 
one cadre’s house in Changhua (a town in central Taiwan). ... We 
were fully aware that we were going to participate in the first strike 
at the national level in Taiwanese labour history. In addition, 
martial law had just been recently lifted, and White Terror1 still 
haunted us. Everyone was afraid of a setback [as a result] of the 
strike, which made us very cautious and wary. Everyone began to 
voice their opinions. I stood up and said with a firm tone, ‘First, 
there are many opportunities for us to make money outside the 
railway industry. Therefore, we do not have to stick to this job. 
Second, it takes at least five years to train a worker to become a 
qualified train driver. Because a qualified driver must be familiar 
with legal regulations, he must know how to deal with emergency 
situations, and he must know how to fix a locomotive breakdown 
should one occur while he is driving. It takes five years for a trainee 
working as an assistant driver to become a chief driver and to reach 
the situation where he is solely responsible for everything [while 
driving].
The third reason is that we might not have this opportunity to 
increase our allowances for some time. Listen! It might be 10 or 
even 20 years from now that allowances are considered for increase 
again.’ They therefore asked me my opinion. I suggested, ‘we must 
request that the allowance be increased once and for all. If everyone 
agrees to accept the amount of money management has offered, 
then we will not have to go on strike.’ Because, I have stressed, 
after this increase, we have no idea when allowances will be raised 
again. If we let this opportunity slip away now, we may regret 
doing so. Given that we are likely to want to request an increase in 
allowances at another time in the future, we may have to show our 
militancy and circumstances may be such that it will be even more 
difficult to do so than it is now.
Before we began to vote by a show of hands whether we would 
accept managers’ offer or not, one of the cadres furiously pointed at
1 In Taiwan, White Terror is the term used to describe the KMT’s suppression and massacre 
of political dissents (who were accused of being pro-communist) under martial law.
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me and shouted, ‘you must take full responsibility, if everything 
goes wrong because they agree to your suggestion.’ I replied loudly 
and firmly, ‘I will. I hope this is the first and also the last strike 
[that we organise].’ Everyone voted to accept my suggestion that 
the monthly driving allowances should be increased by at least 
NT$5,000 (pppm) for both train drivers and assistant drivers 
(interview, 06/09/2006).
Train drivers and TDF cadres eventually requested management to increase 
driving allowances by NT$8,000 pppm for train drivers and NT$6,000 pppm 
for assistant drivers (.Economic Daily News, 08/05/1988: 23). This story 
clearly illustrates how anxious and concerned cadres were about organising 
the first national strike in Taiwanese history. At the informal meeting on 26th 
April, they further discussed how the strike would proceed on May Day. 
They decided that at midnight on 1st May, all running trains would stop at the 
closest main station and train drivers stop working and begin their vacation. 
However, they also decided that the possibility of negotiations would remain 
open to managers and the government, because cadres were still hoping that 
they could persuade managers and the government to accept train drivers’ 
request so that the strike could be avoided.
On the same day (26th April), in the afternoon, government officials and the 
railway director-general, on their own initiative, met up with cadres to seek a 
resolution to the dispute. Government officials promised that they would
f V imeet up again at 2 o’clock in the afternoon on 29 April in the Provincial 
Government building office in Nantou (a county in central Taiwan) and give 
them a satisfactory answer to their request (United Daily News, 30/04/1988: 
3). At the appointed hour and venue, train drivers’ representatives turned up, 
but, unexpectedly, neither management representatives nor government 
officials were there (United Daily News, 30/04/1988: 3). After waiting two 
hours, train drivers’ representatives left. Although still willing to meet 
representatives from government and management, the drivers announced a 
deadline for negotiations of 10 o’clock on the morning of 30th April. The first 
general-president of the TDF recalled:
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We were still waiting for a firm answer to our request. ... [Since the 
employer and government had made no response,] by 10am on 30th 
April, I began to call all cadres, and said, ‘things are confirmed, just 
act on the resolution we made at the meeting [on 26th April]’ 
(interview, 05/09/2006).
The strike therefore took place. At that time, 942 trains were scheduled to 
operate everyday, including freight trains. On the day of the strike, only 62 of 
the scheduled passenger trains were operating; of these, only 12 trains 
operated on the western trunk line, the main line {Min Sheng Daily, 
02/05/1988: 7). Over 90 per cent of scheduled trains stopped running. Of 
more than 1,500 drivers and assistant drivers, less than 100 drivers and 
assistants went to work, and these included two drivers who were assigned 
by TDF cadres to drive two trains to carry workers from southern and eastern 
areas, respectively, to attend the Taipei meeting. Of the more than 1,400 
drivers who took the day off, around 500 attended the TDF’s inaugural 
meeting {Min Sheng Daily, 02/05/1988: 7). No picket line was required 
because train drivers eagerly joined this industrial action. As the former 
general-president of the TDF recalled, “It [the whole process, including the 
inaugural meeting of the TDF] went smoothly” (interview, 05/09/2006). 
Almost all trains stopped running on that day, and the TDF was successfully 
established.
Train drivers showed their solidarity and determination in the matter. 
Undoubtedly, managers and the government were alarmed by the train 
drivers’ success, since they thus agreed to increase driving allowances and to 
update outmoded managerial styles. For train drivers, this was a successful 
industrial action (or ‘strike’, though they tended to avoid this term).
The importance of this strike cannot be overemphasised. As one TDF cadre 
stressed, “it was this strike that ultimately led to a flourishing [Taiwanese] 
labour movement” (interview, 16/06/2004). This viewpoint was echoed by 
the former TRLU Chairman (1997-2003).
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The strike genuinely stirred workers’ consciousness and those who 
had not understood [the meaning of] the union [its organisation and 
function] became aware of what was possible. ... The effect of the 
strike was like a sudden downpour in an extremely hot day in 
summer (interview, 04/09/2006).
The simile used by this respondent to describe this industrial action precisely 
explained the impacts of the strike. The strike had at least two impacts. First, 
inside the railway industry, the railway union, dependent on the party-state, 
was in a sense humiliated by this industrial action, which clearly 
demonstrated the impotence of the dependent TRLU, which was unable to 
play a role, on the one hand, to defend workers’ interests and, on the other 
hand, prevent labour disputes.
The second crucial impact of the May Day strike was that the Taiwanese 
independent labour movement developed throughout the nation. The success 
of the TDF in conjunction with some local industrial actions outside the 
railway industry directly inspired independent labour movements in various 
industries to stand up against employers and defend workers’ interests. These 
independent labour movements, particularly those in the transport industry, 
followed the pattern set by the TDF on May Day. According to the press, by 
July 1988, at least seven local bus companies’ workers and one national bus 
company’s workers had gone on strike for better conditions and wages 
(United Daily News, 19/07/1988: 3). “An infectious disease” was the term 
used by government officials to describe these emerging phenomena (United 
Daily News, 19/07/1988: 3). In short, the May Day strike organised by the 
TDF successfully opened the way for other workers to follow suit and defend 
their interests and rights. Employers were forced to change their practices to 
calm this wave of labour disquiets. In addition, the rise of independent 
workers’ actions (organised by both the TRWF and TDF) within the Taiwan 
Railway significantly marginalised the TRLU, which was controlled by the 
party-state. It was the May Day strike in conjunction with the TRWF’s 
challenge on union leadership in 1988 that forced the TRLU to adopt more 
member-oriented approaches and endeavour to recover members’ support 
{Min Sheng Daily, 13/08/1988: 12).
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8.3 Conflicting interests between the TDF and TRWF
However, despite the encouraging outcomes of the May Day strike, one side- 
effect emerged. Inside the Taiwan Railway, the relationship between the TDF 
and TRWF deteriorated when the railway director-general granted train 
drivers generous rises in allowances after the May Day strike, and when the 
TDF publicly defended their interests against those of the rest of the railway 
workers. As argued above, train drivers held the view that driving trains was 
a specialist mode of work in the railway industry. Moreover, as skilled 
workers, they were difficult to replace within a short time period and, while 
they were working, they were isolated and had very little direct face to face 
contact with other railway workers. In addition, train drivers received higher 
pay than other workers. In this situation, the majority of train drivers were 
not enthusiastic about joining the TRWF but hoped to create a Fellowship 
exclusively for themselves. Craft sectionalism therefore became evident 
within the Taiwan Railway.
When the TRWF was in its initial period of establishment, a number of 
radical train drivers who later became cadres of the TDF were also involved 
in it. Basically, cadres in the TRWF regarded it as the umbrella organisation 
for all independent workers’ groups, because it was the first workers’ group 
and also promoted all railway workers’ interests. This suggested that the TDF 
should be incorporated within the TRWF’s leadership. However, the train 
drivers rejected this idea, as the first TDF general-president emphasised:
They [leaders of the TRWF] said that we were under their 
command. We ignored what they claimed and walked along our 
own way (interview, 05/09/2006).
This diversion of paths carried on through the preparation for the May Day 
strike. Although cadres of the TRWF claimed they had been involved in 
planning the strike, cadres of the TDF generally denied this account. In 
several interviews, respondents who were cadres of the TDF strongly
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emphasised that the TRWF had played no role in this process. The incumbent 
general-president of the Confederation of the TDF stressed:
It [the May Day strike] was worked out by the TDF alone. The 
TRWF had nothing to do with it. (interview, 05/09/2006).
This point of view was reiterated by one of the TDF’s cadres (who had once 
been a TRWF official):
No, they [cadres of the TRWF] were not involved in the planning 
process. It was mostly done by ourselves [train drivers]. We spent 
our time and donated our money to make this strike happen 
(interview, 06/09/2006).
One thing is evident: the TRWF was eager to draw all railway workers under 
its leadership in order to strengthen its bargaining capacity and to protect 
railway workers’ interests as a whole by means of challenging union 
leadership through elections. The TRWF was therefore eager to incorporate 
all types of railway workers under its umbrella so as to make the best use of 
this collective strength to win union elections. In contrast, the primary goal 
of the TDF was exclusively to defend the interests of train drivers. The senior 
railway manager, da-lao, also acknowledged the TDF’s practice (with a 
disdainful look on his face as he spoke):
You should be clearly informed that the TDF was established 
purely to defend their drivers’ interests, not all railway workers’ 
interests, nor to challenge the union leadership through elections 
(interview, 04/09/2006).
Another union official used a stronger expression to describe the role of the 
TDF:
The TDF was monolithic, or to put it bluntly, its members were 
selfish (interview, 05/09/2006).
Conflicts between train drivers and other railway workers deepened when the 
railway director-general (despite protest from the TRWF) agreed to give train 
drivers better allowances. This largely undermined any agreed understanding
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between the TRWF and TDF. Soon after the May Day strike, and following 
complaints from passengers and the public, a large number of railway 
workers condemned the self-centred train drivers. This is clearly seen in a 
TRWF’s publication, dated 11th June 1988:
Although we [the TRWF] have never given up on any opportunity 
to address members’ grievances, that is, to improve pay and 
working conditions, and never went on strike, we failed to achieve 
our goals. ... We therefore felt very upset and unjustly treated when 
train drivers who had not taken a day off received NT$3,000 bonus, 
while other workers who had worked on that day received 
nothing.... Besides, more surprisingly, why did the employer 
increase the pay (driving allowances) of train drivers who had gone 
on strike on May Day? {TRWFpropaganda, 1988).
Labour unrest due to differentiated remuneration remained among railway 
workers. For instance, in an interview with the media, a train controller made 
a very interesting but striking comment about the TDF’s behaviour:
While train drivers can collide with people, train controllers are 
people who often collide with trains. After train drivers collectively 
went on strike, the Taiwan Railway soon increased their driving 
allowances ..., and also gave a bonus of NT$3,000 to those who 
had worked on May Day... If train controllers are injured in the 
course of our job, we got nothing but basic labour health insurance 
{United Daily News, 12/08/1988: 3).
This comment indicates that train drivers receive what they had requested 
through the May Day strike, but other railway workers received nothing. In 
the face of this differentiated treatment, the TRWF decided to put pressure on 
railway management and request an increase in pay, implementation of the 
LSL, and control of the railway union. They organised a walk-out protest on 
12th August 19881, recorded as the first railway workers’ walk-out protest. 
More than 800 railway workers collectively took a day off and walked out in 
the afternoon of that day (interview, 05/09/2006). Nevertheless, on the same 
day, in the morning, the TRLU had held a press conference criticising the
1 Initially, the walkout protest was organised for 18th June but was called off because railway 
management promised to increase all railway workers’ (except train drivers’) pay. However, 
when the protest was cancelled, die employer reneged on its promises. Therefore, a second 
walk-out protest on the 12* August 1988 was organised.
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TRWF’s walk-out protest. At the press conference, the TRLU not only 
rejected the charge of dependency on the party-state but also emphasised 
what the union had done and had been doing to improve the position of 
railway workers. It also stressed that the railway union was by no means a 
useless and dependent union (United Daily News, 13/08/1988: 3). What was 
surprising was that the general-president of the TDF appeared at this press 
conference in order “to endorse the TRLU’s contribution and to make a clear 
break with the TRWF” {Min Sheng Daily, 13/08/1988: 12). The rift between 
the TRWF and the TDF was evident and striking.
In this scenario, managers strategically played an interventionist role to 
manipulate and deepen the gulf between the TRWF and the TDF. Initially, 
the TDF had agreed to support TRWF candidates who stood for union 
election in 1988. However, this agreement broke down when the KMT, in 
association with railway management, strategically bought off a number of 
core members of the TDF by supporting them as union standing directors, 
and thus eligible to elect the union chair. Since the TRWF lost support from 
the TDF in the union election of 1988, the first challenge by the TRWF to 
take the union chair failed. As one union official recalled:
They [the TDF] initially had an agreement to cooperate with the 
TRWF in the Union Representatives General Meeting and to 
support the candidates nominated by the TRWF. But ultimately the 
TDF’s cadres chose to accept advantages provided specifically to 
train drivers by the KMT. Their position then shifted and they 
supported the planned KMT candidate (interview, 05/09/2006).
Da-lao echoed this statement:
The failure of the TRWF’s first attempt to take the union chair was 
mainly due to the TDF’s decision to support the KMT nominee. ... 
There was initially an agreement to support each other (interview, 
04/09/2006).
The collapse of the alliance between the TRWF and the TDF in the run up to 
the union election of 1988 was confirmed by the current general-president of 
the Confederation of the TDF:
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A number of our cadres were supported by the KMT in 1988 union 
election. We were very strong [in capacity] at that time, because out 
of 9 union standing directors’ seats, we won 6 seats. But, strangely, 
the candidate who won the union chair was not a train driver but 
the KMT’s nominee... It was because union elections were still in 
the KMT’s control (interview, 05/09/2006).
Under normal circumstances in the union chair election, when one workers’ 
group holds more than half of the total seats belonging to union standing 
directors, it will be ‘as easy as winking’ to win the union chair. However, the 
case above reveals two implications. First, during the party-state period, 
union elections were actually under KMT control. Second, in order to 
prevent the loss of control over the union leadership, the KMT strategically 
bought off cadres of the TDF so that they would not cooperate with the 
TRWF in union elections. In other words, cadres of the TDF became an 
instrument of the KMT in order to destroy the workers’ alliance and workers’ 
solidarity.
From the general-president’s description of the 1988 election, the ‘incentive’ 
of being supported by the KMT to become union standing directors 
succeeded in preventing the TRWF from winning the union chair. After this, 
the relationship between the two workers’ groups broke down. While the 
TRWF carried on working towards an independent railway union, the TDF 
seemed to become a more inward-looking grouping, only working for train 
drivers’ interests. This development, whereby “the policies and priorities of 
unions [the TDF] often reflected narrow sectional concerns rather than 
broader class solidarity” (Hyman, 1989: 26-27), reinforced the position of the 
TDF.
Despite criticism of sectionalism by the TRWF and other railway workers, 
the TDF did not change its practice. In the face of such criticism, one senior 
TDF cadre replied:
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Our way of responding to their criticism was very simple. ‘Since 
you [those who criticise train drivers’ practice] consider that our 
benefits are better than yours, then, why not come and join us 
through the train drivers’ qualification exam?’ The present number 
of train drivers is insufficient (interview, 06/09/2006).
This ‘simple’ response clearly demonstrates that train drivers believed they 
deserved what had been granted to them because they were skilled, well- 
trained, and qualified. The sectionalism was manipulated by railway 
managers to minimise railway workers’ collective strength. The TDF also 
concluded that to maximise train drivers’ interests it had to keep a similar 
distance from both railway management and other railway workers’ groups 
(the TRWF and the later independent TRLU).
In spite of this division within the railway industry, the TRWF, supported by 
the rest of the railway workers, won the union chair election in 1991. 
However, the tension between the TDF and the rest of the railway workers 
persisted, even when the TRLU became independent. The conflict between 
the TDF and the TRWF in the late 1980s was extended to the TRLU but in a 
more subtle and sophisticated way. While the TDF made a clear break with 
the TRWF simply to defend its interests in the union election of 1988, the 
9/11 event in 2003 demonstrated how the TDF manipulated its sectional 
advantages without offending either the TRLU or railway managers.
8.4 Internal Conflicts on the 9/11 event
From the late 1990s onwards, the independent TRLU encountered two 
unprecedented developments — competition from the private Taiwan High 
Speed Railway Company (THSRC) and corporatisation and privatisation 
policies. These two critical challenges were seen by the TRLU as damaging 
railway workers’ rights {Railwaymen News Report, 30/06/2003). The TRLU 
therefore began to take action to oppose the policies to defend members’ 
interests. In 2003, the government announced the deadline for corporatisation 
and privatisation of the Taiwan Railway, and the THSRC began to threaten
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the traditional railway business. The TRLU began to address these policies 
and the impact of the THSRC.
After prolonged and disappointing negotiations with the government in 
association with small scale protests, the TRLU decided to go on strike to 
oppose government intentions. However, according to Labour Union Law, a 
decision to go on strike must be supported by more than half of the entire 
union members through a membership general meeting and the strike 
resolution must be adopted by more than two-thirds of the members present 
(Articles 20, 21 and 26). The TRLU therefore intended to hold a membership 
general meeting seeking members’ endorsement for a general strike. At a 
union directorate on 12th June 2003, the TRLU chair was given permission to 
hold this meeting on a national holiday (Mid-Autumn Festival) on 11th 
September 2003 in order to gain members’ support for a 7-day strike on the 
Lunar New Year holiday in 2004. By holding the membership general 
meeting, the TRLU intended to paralyse train services leading to de facto 
strike action by means of encouraging its members to attend the meeting.
For the TRLU, the difficulty of this complex intention was not in gaining 
enough support from its members at the membership general meeting but in 
how to paralyse train services successfully. The TRLU, TDF and railway 
management were aware that without the train drivers’ support, it would be 
impossible to paralyse train services, since only train drivers can stop trains. 
The TRLU therefore actively negotiated with the TDF to make a deal with it 
to support this industrial action. On their part, managers hoped to persuade 
the TDF not to follow the TRLU’s initiatives by offering its members 
financial incentives.
In fact, from 1997 when a new union chairman was elected to office, he had 
attempted to draw the TDF to the union’s side. The idea for this incorporation 
was to strengthen the TRLU’s capacity against managers and the government, 
because the TRLU understood the important role of the TDF in the railway 
industry. One of the most important leaders of the TDF, when I interviewed 
him, the incumbent general-president of the Confederation of the TDF,
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accepted the invitation and became a full-time union official of the TRLU in 
February 1998. He related:
Before the 9/11 event, when Chang was the union chair, I was 
working in the TDF. He sincerely hoped that I could also serve in 
the union [as a full-time union official]. I accepted the invitation 
resolutely and determinedly.... I was aware that he was hoping to 
draw the TDF inside the union, because the union clearly 
understood that without the participation of the TDF, the union 
would have no end of misgivings, should they decide to take hostile 
action (interview, 05/09/2006).
In addition, this respondent went on to reveal the true motive for his decision 
to become a full-time union official of the TRLU:
The TDF is not an official organisation within the Taiwan Railway. 
Therefore, there are some concerns if we [the TDF] want to take 
industrial action against managers. It is almost impossible for a 
non-union organisation to organise industrial action [in Taiwan, 
because it would be against the law]. ... So, by the chance of 
working in the union, we can take advantage of the union’s 
resources to develop and sustain the TDF’s business (interview, 
05/09/2006).
Although the TDF remained at an arm’s length from the TRLU and managers, 
such incorporation was viewed as a union of the two workers’ groups. 
However, according to interviews with senior officials of the TDF, train 
drivers voiced their concerns about the incorporation of the TDF. This 
concern became particularly acute when the current general-president of the 
Confederation of the TDF accepted the union chair’s offer and became a 
union official (interview, 05/09/2006). The concern of TDF members reveals 
that the TDF tried to maintain its independence from both the TRLU and 
management so that it could gain better interests for its members. This 
situation became evident when the TDF was involved in negotiations with 
the TRLU and management on the 9/11 event.
In negotiations regarding the support for the 9/11 event, the TDF and TRLU 
came to an ‘under-the-table’ agreement in late July 2003. One TDF senior 
cadre, who participated in the negotiations, revealed:
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The union chairman, chief secretary, union standing supervisor, and 
a number of union officials attended a handing-over ceremony of 
the chairmanship at the TDF’s Chyayi branch [a county in mid- 
southern Taiwan] [in July]. By chance, we embarked on 
negotiations concerning the 9/11 event there. ... At the meeting, in 
order to win over the TDF’s support, the TRLU acceded to three 
preconditions: first, the TDF would not play a leading role in the 
9/11 event; second, the TRLU would mobilise at least 90 per cent 
of total members to attend the membership general meeting; and 
third, the TDF would take no responsibility for the industrial 
action. ... The TDF accepted these three assurances (interview, 
06/09/2006).
Having obtained the TDF’s commitment to support the 9/11 event on the 
basis of the aforementioned assurances, the union chairman then publicly 
announced that “all trains will stop for 24 hours on 11th September. It is 
imperative that members collectively take a day off to attend the membership 
general meeting on 11th September” {United Daily News, 28/07/2003: A10).
In the meantime, railway managers, on behalf of the government, had begun 
to negotiate with the TDF. Railway managers actively convened meetings 
with train drivers’ representatives in the hope of persuading them not to 
participate in the union action. In the face of the conflicts of interest between 
the TRLU and railway managers, the TDF divided into two factions. One 
TDF cadre recalled:
In my view, it was very hard to predict whether this industrial 
action would succeed or not. ... Moreover, the railway official 
delegate had begun to negotiate with us. ... [In the face of this 
dilemma,] we were divided into two factions. One faction 
suggested that as we were union members, we should abandon 
sectionalism and support the union. However, in my opinion, the 
union had had little involvement in obtaining our existing benefits, 
which had been largely achieved by the TDF alone. Thus, as long 
as we had sufficient bargaining capacity, we should prioritise our 
interests. Second, we did not have an official document stating 
confirmation of the fringe benefits, including the driving 
allowances, granted to us after the May Day Strike in 1988. It was 
felt we should take full advantage of our forthcoming meeting with 
the government representative and request such documentation. We 
[TDF representatives] were discussing these issues on the way to 
meet the government representative [Da-wen Hsu, Chief Secretary
199
of the Taiwan Railway] in Hsinchu (a county in northern 
Taiwan). ... We decided to take the opportunity this meeting 
presented to resolve this long-standing problem. After this, we 
could decide what support we could provide to the TRLU in 
relation to the 9/11 event. During the negotiation, we said that by 
the end of August we must see an official document authenticating 
the driving allowances. If we did not see such documentation 
(before the deadline), then we would spare no effort in our support 
of the TRLU (interview, 06/09/2006).
The way in which the TDF negotiated with the TRLU and government 
representatives left room for the government to manipulate and divide the 
TDF and the TRLU. In late August 2003, the government agreed to grant 
what the TDF wanted and, in turn, requested its members to operate all trains 
on 11th September. After this, the Taiwan Railway director-general publicly
t f iannounced that train services would run on the 11 September and tickets 
would be sold (United Evening News, 27/08/2003: 1). The government’s 
decision left the TDF with a dilemma as to whether it should completely 
abandon the TRLU so as to secure its own members’ interests. Nevertheless, 
this dilemma did not cause the TDF too much trouble because the TRLU 
failed to mobilise at least 90 per cent of total members to attend the general 
meeting. According to the TRLU’s public announcement, of its more than 
14,000 members, around 12,000 agreed to attend the general meeting, that is, 
85.7 percent of total membership (United Daily News, 09/09/2003: 3). This 
outcome gave the TDF an excuse not to support the action of paralysing train 
services on 11th September. At a meeting held in relation to this issue on 8th 
September, the TDF made a final decision, recalled by a TDF cadre:
We were required to operate all train services on that day by 
railway managers because our request had been fully granted. 
However, we were aware that if we did what railway managers 
expected, it could mean that we would have to come to an open 
break in our relationship with the TRLU. We therefore decided to 
stop some trains. ... We later explained to the TRLU that because 
the union had not fulfilled all its assurances to us, we were unable 
to fully cooperate with the union. ... We reached an agreement with 
railway managers to stop 20 trains on that day. Through this 
stoppage, we maintained our collaboration with the TRLU. Thus, 
not all trains ran, some stopped. This was a face-saving solution for 
all parties concerned (interview, 06/09/2006).
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Accordingly, due to the agreement made between the TDF and railway 
managers, 20 unimportant commuter trains were out of service on that day 
{United Evening News, 09/09/2003: 3). For this reason, the TRLU’s initial 
intention to paralyse train services by means of holding the membership 
general meeting thus failed. It could be argued that, in a sense, sectional 
interests were again the TDF’s top priority. Such sectionalism gave the 
government an opportunity to minimise the possible political impacts that 
would result from this industrial action. All negotiations and resolutions 
between the TRLU, the TDF and the government took place in private. None 
of the press released related information until the day after the general 
meeting {United Daily News, 12/09/2003: A2). “The meeting would hold and 
the trains would run” was an untold common consensus as a means to break 
the deadlock between the three parties {Min Sheng Daily, 12/09/2003: A3). 
Although the TDF had confirmed its unwillingness to support the 9/11 event, 
it was still publicly in solidarity with the TRLU as confirmed by the general- 
president of the TDF:
I did not dare say plainly to the union chairman that train drivers 
would not cooperate with this industrial action on 11th September. 
According to Labour Union Law, it was simply a membership 
general meeting not strike action. We therefore would not stop train 
services by simply attending the meeting. To paralyse train services 
by holding a membership general meeting was legally untenable. 
Train drivers therefore would not be in the forefront of this action.
We would budge in this regard. We would only support the strike 
action if certain assurances were met.... Nonetheless, the TDF was 
reluctant to totally break away with the TRLU and therefore, 
strategically, we still verbally announced ‘we support the TRLU 
strike’ (interview, 05/09/2006).
Accordingly, as the respondent revealed, instead of support by action, the 
TDF simply offered their verbal as well as moral support as a way of 
eschewing criticism from members of the TRLU. Against this background, 
the outcome of the membership general meeting was polarised. In terms of 
the strike ballot, the TRLU gained more than half of the railway workers’ 
support for a 7-day strike against corporatisation and privatisation of the 
Railway on the Lunar New Year holiday in 2004. Of 14,268 members, 7,829 
attended the general meeting. Of the total attendees, 7,812 voted to approve
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the strike action. While the attendance rate was 54.9 per cent, approval for 
the strike was 99.7 per cent (United Daily News, 12/09/2003: Al).
This was the first such case of legal strike action (although the strike did not 
ultimately take place). Also, it was the support for it that forced the 
government, in the shadow of the May Day strike in 1988, to reconsider 
corporatisation and privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. However, the 
TRLU’s initial intention to paralyse the passenger train service by holding 
the membership general meeting failed. This failure more or less damaged 
the TRLU’s reputation, and the union chairman expressed his intention to 
resign because of this failure (although, subsequently, he did not resign). It 
could be argued that although both the TRLU and railway managers gained 
what they wanted, support for the legal strike and the running of trains, 
respectively, the biggest winner was undoubtedly the TDF, which more or 
less, sustained its relationship with both the TRLU and railway managers, 
while making gains for their members.
8.5 Another Union?
The railway industry has long been an important mode of domestic transport 
in Taiwan. Although all railway workers are important in terms of making 
trains run safely and on time, the importance of train drivers’ skill still 
transcends that of others in the railway industry. This sectional differentiation 
results in differentiated interests and benefits and creates occupational strata 
in which train drivers dominate the higher and more privileged position 
within the railway industry. They tend to display more solidarity and militant 
attitudes than others in order to secure or improve their beneficiary status in 
the railway industry. While solidarity resulted from privileged occupational 
identity, craft radicalism stemmed from limited internal resources and from a 
hostile external political environment in which the party-state reigned. These 
two fundamental elements in association with the critical skill in driving 
trains secured the success of the TDF in the late 1980s.
202
This chapter’s focus is on the issue of craft sectionalism and the 
consequences of this phenomenon. Although train drivers’ sectionalism 
operates against collective railway workers’ interests and provides the 
opportunity for railway managers to weaken the TRLU, the TDF has made 
its own gains in the process. Clearly, train drivers hold a critical function in 
railway operations. Train drivers’ strong craft identity and common interests 
have enabled them to act together to uphold their own sectional concerns. 
Nonetheless, their solidarity served as a model for workers to challenge the 
government. Therefore, as well as achieving their sectional interests, train 
drivers’ successful strike action in 1988 provided the TRWF with an example 
to follow for subsequent industrial actions as well as inspired other 
independent labour movements outside the railway industry. In other words, 
the strike inspired working class consciousness throughout the nation which, 
in turn, made the majority of railway workers understand the importance of 
the independent union. More specifically, in terms of the 9/11 event, although 
the TDF seemed to be the biggest beneficiary, its role still, in part, 
contributed to the success of the TRLU in terms of restricting the 
government’s intention to implement privatisation of the Taiwan Railway.
Although their privileged position did not go unchallenged by other railway 
workers, evidence shows that train drivers were committed to defend their 
own interests. The role of train drivers and their affiliation to the TDF placed 
them in a critical position. Therefore, both the independent workers’ groups 
(the TRWF and the later independent TRLU) and railway managers 
endeavoured to seek train drivers’ support and assistance. Evidence indicates 
that the TDF gained from a ‘dual track’ negotiation with the TRLU and 
railway managers. As for the TRLU, it understood that it could not fight 
against railway management without the TDF’s involvement. This situation 
was made clear by one senior union official. In responding to the question as 
to how important the train drivers’ role was in terms of going on strike in the 
railway industry, he replied:
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Yes, [train drivers are very important]. To be honest, we felt 
wounded because we were overshadowed by TDF’s capacity to 
paralyse train services. We realised that we have to draw them to 
our side simply to increase our momentum. Frankly, as long as the 
TDF did not obstruct our goals, we let them pursue their own 
interests, (interview, 05/09/2006).
Therefore, the TRLU could not publicly break off its relationship with the 
TDF. However, the TDF’s practice of prioritising train drivers’ interests 
above those of other railway workers gradually deepened the rift between the 
TDF and TRLU. Arguably, the extreme consequence of craft sectionalism 
would be to completely break away from the incumbent industrial union and 
establish a new one. Since the majority of train drivers noticed that they 
could gain what they wanted through direct negotiations with railway 
managers, the power of the TRLU over train drivers seemed to be limited. In 
return, this encouraged the idea that train drivers should set up another 
railway union. The incumbent general-president of the Confederation of the 
TDF emphasised:
I have constantly suggested that the union chairman should 
incorporate more train drivers into the centre of union decision­
making. ... I believe this could increase train drivers’ impetus to 
support union policy. If he really hopes to see a strong railway 
union, this is what he must seriously consider. But I am not sure 
whether the idea is acceptable to him. As a general-president (and a 
full-time union official), I have a responsibility to bring train 
drivers into the union. If by chance the union should disappoint us, 
we would set up a new union. This would be a choice that we 
would want to make. ... Railway managers hope to stop train 
drivers working closely with the TRLU by means of granting us 
whatever we ask. This has made train drivers wrongly imagine that 
they do not necessarily have to rely on the union to strive for their 
interests. To be honest, this is a serious problem (interview, 
05/09/2006).
The TDF, which is “highly autonomous and not controlled by the TRLU” 
(United Daily News, 12/09/2003: A2), performs functions similar to those of 
a real union. Therefore, the idea that the TDF would like to establish an 
independent train drivers’ union seems to be simply bravado to demonstrate 
its strength and independence in relation to the TRLU and railway managers.
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8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explained the idea of craft sectionalism in the railway case. 
The Train Drivers’ Fellowship, which is independent of the official TRLU, 
illustrates how craft sectionalism influenced union policy and practice. In the 
railway case, craft sectionalism resulted from strong craft identity and was 
strengthened by craft radicalism and solidarism. The features of train drivers’ 
sectionalism were demonstrated through the first railway strike on May Day 
1988. Although the strike was initiated simply to defend train drivers’ 
sectional interests, it surprisingly had caused profound impacts not only in 
part upon the railway union’s transformation but also on the wave of 
Taiwanese independent labour movements in the late 1980s.
The success of the TDF also created an ‘atypical’ model of labour- 
management negotiation in the railway industry. The most significant 
evidence of this type of negotiation was an increase in industrial disputes 
between the TRLU and railway managers over the issue of the development 
of the private THSRC and corporatisation and privatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway. The TDF strategically kept at arm’s length from both the TRLU and 
railway managers in order to maximise train drivers’ interests. Unlike its total 
break with the TRWF in 1988, the TDF manipulated its extraordinary 
position with the TRLU and railway managers in the run up to the 9/11 event 
in a more subtle and sophisticated way. Thus, the TDF maintained its 
relationship with the TRLU and gained what it wanted from railway 
managers.
In view of their privileged position within the railway industry, train drivers 
hold the view that instead of depending on the resources of the TRLU, they 
should be able to break away and set up another union for themselves. 
However, in my view, this way of thinking is more hot air than pragmatic. It 
could be argued that the TDF has sought to demonstrate its independence and 
to highlight its decisive role, particularly at the time when industrial disputes 
have occurred. In the foreseeable future, craft sectionalism will remain an
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issue in the railway industry, in particular, when the government considers 
corporatising the Taiwan Railway, and when the private THSRC begins to 
threaten the prosperity of the traditional railway industry. However, although 
the TRLU has faced internal conflict with the TDF, it has still successfully 
demonstrated its hostility to privatisation and corporatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway and even shaped government policy.
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Chapter 9 
The Union and State Management
9.1 Introduction
Chapters 7 and 8 discussed the sources of union activism in the Taiwan 
Railway. This chapter further explores how the TRLU made use of union 
activism and its structural “advantages” in the Taiwan Railway and 
attempted to enhance bargaining capacity to oppose the privatisation policy. 
Although initially the TRLU was reactive to the issue of privatisation, it 
changed and has played a decisive role in influencing and shaping the 
privatisation policy from 1997 onwards. Aware of the emerging role of the 
TRLU, railway managers (many of whom were actually not keen to see the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway but lacked the ability to voice their 
opinion and concerns on the issue to the government) privately began to 
support the TRLU on this issue. The union then effectively spoke on the 
railway managers’ behalf. As for the TRLU, in practice, it needed to gain a 
bargaining status that was free from management intervention. The TRLU 
could make the best use of activism to impose pressure on the government by 
means of union action. I call this special relationship a “tacit alliance” since 
it was built upon the coincidental interests of the TRLU and railway 
managers. The formation of such an alliance was to stop the government 
implementing privatisation of the Taiwan Railway as well as to defend the 
interests of both parties in the alliance.
In Chapters 7 and 8 ,1 argued that railway workers endeavoured to break off 
the connection with the KMT and develop the TRLU as an independent 
union. In the wake of the collapse of the party-state, railway managers also 
sought to insulate themselves from government intervention and to secure 
their own position. In the process, the TRLU and railway management 
recognised their mutual interests, and established a ‘tacit’ alliance in relation
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to the privatisation policy. This chapter documents how the TRLU actually 
cooperated with railway management to collectively oppose privatisation for 
the sake of the future of the Taiwan Railway.
Railway managers held the view that railway problems mainly resulted from 
the failure of the government’s inconsistent and careless transport policies 
towards the railway industry. They were therefore convinced that a change in 
ownership from the public to the private would not be the best policy choice 
to deal with these problems. Nevertheless, as revealed in Chapter 6, railway 
managers had a relatively low government status and lacked the capacity to 
effectively express their concerns and to oppose orders from the upper 
government level. Under these circumstances, railway managers sought help 
from other sources, and the TRLU was the railway managers’ optimal 
“partner”.
It could therefore be argued that the main rationale for collaboration between 
the TRLU and the railway management for collective resistance against 
privatisation was not similar to what has been observed in many post­
socialist countries, for instance, Russia (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993). 
Unlike Russian trade unions which showed collaboration with enterprise 
managers because they were dependent on management, the reason why the 
TRLU worked closely with management was because it was independent of 
railway management and the state. In the Taiwan Railway case, the cross­
class collaboration had different meanings for both sides. Despite a common 
goal to delay the privatisation of the Railway, while the TRLU attempted to 
strengthen its independence and bargaining capacity, railway management 
regarded this as an opportunity to acquire proper managerial discretion and 
autonomy over the railway business.
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9.2 Tacit alliance
During the party-state period, the state not only had full control over labour 
through the trade unions, but also intervened in the management of state 
enterprises both for considerations of national economic development and 
social stability (see Chapter 3). The managers of state enterprises served as 
civil servants delegated by the state to manage public enterprises and 
employees. In general, under government intervention, managers of state 
enterprises were required, on the one hand, to pursue efficiency related to 
higher productivity and profitability and, on the other hand, to take on a 
service responsibility. In order to achieve these often contradictory objectives, 
managers of public enterprises were limited in what they could do as 
managers.
The state managed the Taiwan Railway for various purposes, principally 
because of its role as a strategic industry in Taiwan (see Chapter 6 for more 
details). For instance, railway fare pricing is still in the state’s control as part 
of its practice to counter inflation and for welfare programmes. 
Understandably, little managerial autonomy was granted to railway managers. 
However, when the Taiwan Railway’s financial deficits and ineffective 
services became a major focus of public criticism, and when its monopolistic 
transport capacity was threatened by other modes of transport, railway 
managers became impatient with contradictory objectives and insufficient 
managerial prerogatives. Further, as the power of the party-state declined, 
managers attempted to limit political intervention and to regain managerial 
autonomy to manage the Taiwan Railway. The privatisation proposals 
provided railway managers with an opportunity to reverse what they saw as 
an unacceptable situation. In the face of a privatisation policy based on the 
separation of railway infrastructure and train operations, railway managers 
decided to present their voice through the emerging activist role of the TRLU. 
I will argue later in this chapter that railway managers and the TRLU 
attempted to prevent the Taiwan Railway from being privatised via a ‘tacit 
alliance’ between them.
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The essence of this tacit alliance was a shared understanding between railway 
managers and the TRLU, and the furtherance of their coincidental interests, 
especially to restrain the state from implementing privatisation policies and 
the “separation” scheme (for a similar tacit alliance between the railway 
unions and railway management in British Rail, please see Pendleton, 1988: 
289). This tacit alliance was formed when both railway managers and the 
TRLU faced threats in relation to privatisation. The formation of this tacit 
alliance was not based on formal or informal agreement but on coincidental 
interests between the two parties. These coincidental interests focused on the 
future sustainability of the Taiwan Railway. The TRLU and railway 
management became convinced that privatisation would put the future of 
Taiwan Railway in jeopardy and impose a threat to working conditions and 
pay. In this chapter I argue that this tacit alliance during the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s played an influential role in terms of the withdrawal of the 
notion of “separation” and the delayed privatisation of the Taiwan Railway.
What made the formation of this tacit alliance interesting was that while the 
TRLU once attempted to break relations with state management, in the wake 
of the independent union movement, now, a cross-class collaboration was 
created to oppose privatisation. This chapter aims to illuminate this cross­
class collaboration process. But before doing so, this chapter needs first to 
assess the emerging role of the TRLU in representing railway workers’ 
opposition to privatisation. The role of the TRLU in the issue of privatisation 
became significant from 1997 onwards. I will then examine railway 
managers’ perspective towards privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. After 
discussing the different standpoints of railway managers and the TRLU, the 
tacit alliance will be examined.
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9.3 The role of the TRLU in privatisation
It was not until the end of 1997 that the TRLU began to actively respond to 
privatisation, even though the union had been independent since 1991. Prior 
to 1997, the reasons why the TRLU’s attitudes towards the idea of privatising 
the Taiwan Railway had not been clear cut were threefold. First, the Taiwan 
Railway was not placed on the privatisation list until the end of 1997, though 
the government had been studying an appropriate means to do so since the 
early 1990s. Second, TRLU officials generally did not believe that the 
Taiwan Railway could be privatised, because privatisation of the Railway 
would be too complex and would have profound impacts on the domestic 
transport market. As the incumbent TRLU Chairman stated:
At that time, we had heard of the government’s intention to 
privatise the Taiwan Railway but we paid no serious heed to the 
idea. ... Why? Because the Railway’s problems were too 
complicated. ... Not until the THSRC began to be constructed did 
railway workers take the issue [of privatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway] seriously (interview, 17/04/2006).
This way of thinking was not only found among members of the TRLU but 
also among railway managers. Railway managers’ perspectives towards 
privatisation have been discussed in the following sections.
The third reason why the TRLU had not felt any sense of crisis was because 
the government had not come to a final decision about the development of a 
parallel high speed rail system. For these reasons, the TRLU still considered 
the proposal for privatisation of the Taiwan Railway as unlikely.
However, from late 1997 onwards, the TRLU’s attitudes towards the issue of 
railway reform began to shift. The year 1997 saw a number of crucial events 
and decisions made by the government in relation to the future of the Taiwan 
Railway. First, the first private high speed railway bid was publicly 
determined in September 1997. The bid winner, a consortia alliance called 
the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation, (THSRC), announced that
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construction would officially begin in early 1998 and the system shall be 
opened to the public in 2003 (United Daily News, 26/09/1997: 1; Min Sheng 
Daily, 26/09/1997: 21). Given that the Taiwan Railway’s business would be 
largely undermined by this new private railway company, the government 
decided to place the Taiwan Railway on the privatisation list and implement 
its privatisation before the opening ceremony for the THSRC.
Having become conscious that the prospects for the Taiwan Railway were 
bleak, the TRLU began to take action to oppose the aforementioned 
developments. The first prominent union action occurred in the union 
election held in November 1997. Chang, a union activist known for his 
hostility to privatisation, was elected as the new union chair. In his election 
speech, Chang clearly indicated that his mission was to strive for an increase 
in bonuses for train crews and to oppose privatisation (United Daily News, 
15/11/1997: 6). From that time on, the TRLU, under Chang’s leadership, 
became hostile and actively involved in the issue of railway reform, 
particularly in relation to the development of the THSRC and privatisation. 
As a consequence, the relationship between the TRLU and the government 
gradually deteriorated, and the union frequently threatened to go on strike to 
defend members’ interests.
It was not until 1999 that the TRLU’s role became crucial in the issue of 
privatisation. At a meeting in 1999, with the Minister of the MOTC and the 
Director of the DOT, Chang was invited to hear and express opinions about 
the privatisation proposal presented by the Director of the DOT. At the 
meeting, Chang, on behalf of railway workers, strongly opposed the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway and the notion of “separation”. In view 
of the TRLU’s opposition to privatisation and the “separation” scheme, the 
Minister of the MOTC gave an official indication that consultation with the 
TRLU on the issue of privatisation would take place before the completion of 
the privatisation plan (see Chapter 6 for more details). As related by one 
senior railway manager:
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At a meeting in late 1999, we [DOT officials and Taiwan Railway 
representatives] presented the plan to privatise the Taiwan Railway 
to the Minister [of the MOTC]. ... Chang, the union chairman, 
spoke up clearly and plainly in front of the Minister that the TRLU 
strongly opposed privatisation and the idea of separating the 
Railway’s infrastructure and train operations. As a consequence, the 
Minister decided that such a meeting would not be held again until 
the Taiwan Railway’s management and union generated a common 
consensus on how best to privatise the Taiwan Railway. ... It was 
the union’s strong opposition stance that forced the government to 
shift its policy focus from ‘separation’ to ‘integration’ (interview, 
29/03/2006).
When the Provincial Government was streamlined in 1999, the DOT (which 
had been merged into the MOTC) was no longer in charge of railway reform 
business. The MOTC therefore requested railway managers to continue to 
consider railway reform. This request made by the Minister at this meeting in 
1999 could be regarded as a turning point for the TRLU. Henceforth, the role 
of the TRLU became decisive in the policy-making process. Nevertheless, in 
view of the deteriorating finances, the government had not given up the idea 
of solving the Taiwan Railway’s problems through privatisation. In 2000, the 
government appointed a new Taiwan Railway director-general, Huang, who 
had never worked in the railway industry. It was believed that this new 
director-general was appointed for one primary goal, which was to work out 
a feasible privatisation policy for the Taiwan Railway that was acceptable to 
the TRLU.
Under the new railway director-general’s leadership, privatisation through 
the “separation” scheme remained core to the government’s plan, but it 
would be achieved through an indirect route (first corporatisation and then 
privatisation) and in a more moderate way. The idea was that the Taiwan 
Railway should be broken up. Accordingly, the new director-general 
presented to the MOTC in June 2000 The Draft Plan for the Corporatisation 
Policy o f the Taiwan Railway (tai-tie gong-sih-hua cao-ari) and an 
amendment to the three Railway Acts (tie-lu-san-fa cao-ari). In contrast to 
the former “separation” scheme drafted by the DOT in 1999, this new plan 
emphasised that only when corporatisation had been successfully completed 
could privatisation of the Taiwan Railway be implemented. This new
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director-general believed that outright privatisation could possibly jeopardise 
railway operations, as he stated at a Parliamentary enquiry in November 
2000:
The reason why, before consideration of the privatisation of the 
Taiwan Railway, the TRA should first be restructured in a 
corporatised form is because the Taiwan Railway plays a decisive 
role in Taiwan’s domestic transport market; therefore, its reform 
should be undertaken at a moderate pace. ... The Taiwan Railway 
should be granted reasonable operational conditions and 
environments whereby its operations and finances can be 
improved. ... Otherwise, if employees are worried about the 
privatisation policy and organise labour actions against it, this will 
cause trouble {Hansard, 2000).
The TRLU however, was irritated and would not cooperate with the director- 
general because it felt that he had not fully consulted with it, as requested by 
the Minister of the MOTC, regarding these proposals and listened to its 
members’ concerns and suggestions before he finalised the corporatisation 
and privatisation plan. Therefore, the TRLU refused to endorse the plans. In 
November 2000, in the face of opposition of the TRLU, the MOTC had no 
choice but to ask Huang (the director-general) to continue negotiations with 
the TRLU and make a new plan (MOTC, 2005). In view of a number of fatal 
train accidents that had occurred in Britain and been attributed to the failure 
of privatisation, Huang, with the government’s permission, decided to alter 
the privatisation plan from the notion of “separation” (the British model) to 
that of “integration” (the Japanese model). Huang thus drafted and proposed 
a new plan, The Basic Concept o f the Corporatisation o f the Taiwan Railway 
{tai-tie gong-sih-hua jhih ji-ben gou-siang [cao-an]), to the MOTC in 
November 2001 (MOTC, 2005). The emergence of this draft plan conveyed a 
number of important messages. First, in the draft plan, the idea of 
“separation” was officially withdrawn and replaced by the idea of 
“integration”. Second, in this new plan, the idea of solving railway problems 
through privatisation was marginalised and more emphasis was placed on 
corporatisation. However, it should be noted that the privatisation of the 
Taiwan Railway was not completely withdrawn. In fact, in order to elicit 
various opinions among different Ministries and government departments,
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the MOTC established a Committee for the Promotion o f the Privatisation o f 
the TRA (tai-tie min-ying-hua jhuan-an tuei-dong siao-zu) in August 2002.
Under pressure from the TRLU, this Committee was renamed the Committee 
for the Promotion o f the Corporatisation o f the TRA {tai-tie gong-sih-hua 
jhuan-an tui-dong siao-zu) in April 2003. In line with the establishment of 
this ad hoc Committee in the MOTC, the TRA restructured the Committee 
for Promoting the Privatisation, established in 1997, into two units. One was 
a decision-making unit, the Committee for Corporatisation o f the TRA {tai-tie 
gong-sih-hua jhuan-an siao-zu), and the other was an executive unit, the 
Working Group for Corporatisation o f the TRA {tai-tie gong-sih-hua gong- 
zuo siao-zu). From that time, the privatisation of the Taiwan Railway was no 
longer emphasised, (but not withdrawn) to calm railway workers and the 
TRLU. However, despite the government’s huge concession towards 
privatisation, railway workers intensified their opposition to the government 
and adopted even more radical actions against the policy. This was because 
they were convinced that corporatisation was simply an interim measure, and 
privatisation was the government’s ultimate goal. The TRLU threatened to 
go on strike as one senior TRLU official recalled:
From the 1990s onwards, the idea that the government wanted to 
privatise the Taiwan Railway had gradually developed. But the 
government’s intention only became clear and stronger when the 
new director-general, Huang Teh-chih, came to office [in 2000]. ... 
Before his appointment, senior railway managers did not take the 
privatisation plan seriously. When he came to office, we all felt that 
he had simply come to be an executioner and to complete the 
[privatisation] policy. ... He acted without delay. ... He worked out 
a Rehabilitation Plan for the Taiwan Railway, within which he 
specified how the Taiwan Railway would be restructured and 
presented a detail schedule. ... He also came to us for advice about 
the Rehabilitation Plan, but he did not take our advice into 
account. ... We therefore used this opportunity to inform our 
members that ‘he was coming to terminate the Taiwan Railway.’ ... 
Therefore, in face of the director-general’s hostility and ignorance, 
and the build-up of pressure for corporatisation and privatisation of 
the Railway, the union told members to defend their fan-wan [rice 
bowl, literally livelihood]. The 9/11 event [in 2003] was simply to 
defend our fan-wan (interview, 05/05/2006).
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Prior to the 9/11 event, a number of union actions had taken place to express 
the TRLU’s opposition to both the privatisation policy and the THSRC. Of 
these union actions, the protest on 24th February 2003 was prominent because 
its scale and the way in which the TRLU expressed its grievances were 
unusual. The protest was mainly against the government’s decision to lease 
half the infrastructure (two platforms and four tracks) at the Taipei Main 
Station to the THSRC. This decision would force the Taiwan Railway to 
reduce 104 scheduled trains per day with an estimated NT$2.4 billion loss 
per year (United Evening News, 19/02/2003: 4). The TRLU accused the 
government of apparently favouring the private competitor and ignoring the 
Taiwan Railway’s interests {Taipei Times, 13/06/2003: 2). Responding to a 
call by the TRLU, more than 2,300 union members got together at Taipei 
Main Station to protest against “the exploitation of the Taiwan Railway with 
the intention to profit the THSRC” {United Daily News, 25/02/2003: 2). 
Under Chang’s leadership, some activists even lay on the track to stop trains 
running, thus demonstrating their determination to protect their interests and 
the future of the Taiwan Railway. These protest actions upset the government 
and Huang. Nonetheless, the government still announced that the provisional 
deadline for corporatisation remained 2004, before the THSRC opened in 
20051 {Taipei Times, 25/02/2003: 2 and 12/09/2003: 3). The railway union 
and its members decided to intensify their confrontation with the government 
because they were deeply convinced that workers would lose their jobs and 
have to undergo a cut in salaries {Taipei Times, 13/06/2003: 2).
At a union directorate on 12th June 2003, Chang won support from union 
directors to hold the first membership general meeting on the national 
holiday on 11th September 2003. The union planned that railway workers 
would take a day off on this national holiday to attend the meeting to cast 
their votes as to whether they supported a 7-day strike on the Lunar New 
Year holiday in 2004 to oppose the privatisation policy. Despite the strike 
threat, in August 2003, Huang still gave a presentation of the Draft Plan o f
1 The initial anticipated date of the opening ceremony for the high speed railway was 
delayed from 2003 to 2005. However, it actually opened to business in 2007. As for 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway, the scheduled date was also delayed from 2002 to 2007.
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the Corporatisation o f TRA (TRA Rehabilitation Plan; tai-tie gong-sih-hua ji- 
ben fang-an [cao-an]: tai-tie zai-sheng ji-hua) to the MOTC. In reply, Chang, 
the TRLU Chair, developed several counter proposals which included:
(1) The government must publicly announce the termination of 
corporatisation and privatisation of the Taiwan Railway.
(2) The government must propose a solution and execution schedule 
for the Taiwan Railway’s debt problems.
(3) The government must subsidise the Taiwan Railway by covering 
the deficits of local train stations and take care of the debts 
incurred by senior and disabled citizens’ discount tickets and 
infrastructure maintenance expenses.
(4) The government must make the employment restructuring of the 
Taiwan Railway a priority, and finalise plans by the end of the 
year (2003).
(5) The government must respond to the TRLU’s three labour 
disputes concerning bonuses for employees, flexibility of shifts 
and adjustments to the amount subsidised for work-related travel 
(Taiwan Railway Labour Union; Taipei Times, 28/08/2003: 1).
These proposals were announced publicly and set the terms of debate 
(discussed below).
As indicated in Chapter 8, although the strike-like action failed, more than 
half of the TRLU’s members still attended the meeting and voted in support 
of strike action to oppose the privatisation policy. This historic event alarmed 
the government and it therefore decided to make a concession to the TRLU’s 
requests. Accordingly, the idea of privatising the Taiwan Railway faced an 
unprecedented setback and was even temporarily withdrawn because of the 
TRLU’s opposition.
In short, the emerging dominant role of the TRLU had a far-reaching effect 
on railway reform through privatisation. The TRLU had not responded to 
privatisation until a change in leadership in 1997 had taken place.
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Subsequently, the TRLU began to demonstrate its determination and hostility 
towards privatisation, making it difficult for the state to promote the policy. 
In addition, this standpoint coincidentally attracted railway managers whose 
role had long been neglected by the state in the issue of railway reform.
9.4 Railway managers9 perspective towards 
privatisation
While the anti-privatisation stance became evident within the TRLU and 
among the majority of railway workers, many railway managers also became 
concerned about privatisation policies. In fact, railway managers possessed 
mixed feelings towards privatisation. What they actually expected to see was 
a revitalised traditional railway system by means of organisational 
restructuring. They were convinced that corporatisation was the best future 
development for the Taiwan Railway. Privatisation was not welcomed 
among railway managers for two reasons. First, it could be argued that 
railway managers lacked financial incentives to support this state-driven 
privatisation policy. In contrast to the British experience (e.g. Bishop and 
Kay, 1989: 652), managerial advantages were never mentioned in the policy 
proposals. Therefore, it could be argued that in the absence of other 
incentives, privatisation was less likely to be supported by railway managers.
Second, railway managers were generally annoyed that, as the only ‘genuine’ 
experts in the railway industry, and practitioners in Taiwan, their opinions 
and experience in studying railway problems and solutions had been 
neglected and overwhelmed by the so-called ‘railway experts’ who had never 
actually worked in the railway network. One senior railway manager 
commented in this regard:
The reason why the Taiwan Railway encountered such difficult 
problems was because the issues of the railway industry required 
professional expertise. We had always done our best to present our
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experience on site, the problem was that the government did not 
value solutions we provided (interview 06/04/2006).
This was echoed by the former railway director-general (1995-2000):
The Taiwanese government did not conduct an in-depth 
investigation of the ramifications of privatising the Taiwan Railway.
The government did not take professionals’ [meaning railway 
managers] advice seriously (interview, 20/04/2006).
In one sense, nostalgia made railway managers unwilling to see the end of 
the railway network and organisation to which they had devoted their entire 
working lives. Instead, they even thought that the privatisation goal was 
virtually impossible to achieve in light of the current financial situation. As 
one respondent, who was the first railway director-general (between 1995 
and 2000) and directly involved in planning privatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway, indicated:
The government simply thought that the Taiwan Railway should be 
privatised because of its heavy financial losses. It seemed to me 
that the government believed that privatisation was its only and the 
last resort to deal with railway problems. The government thought 
that only privatisation could save the Taiwan Railway. ... However,
I explained to workers that due to its poor financial performance, 
the Taiwan Railway could never be privatised. Who would buy the 
shares of a loss-maker? In contrast, corporatisation could bring us 
many advantages. As long as the Taiwan Railway was corporatised, 
we could conduct business diversification to increase revenue. ...
The government should not regard privatisation as the only means 
[to solve the Railway’s problems]. ... To be honest, [I was 
convinced that] privatisation of the Taiwan Railway was not 
possible (interview, 20/04/2006).
This point of view was echoed by his successors and other senior managers. 
For instance, another former railway director-general (between 2003 and 
2006) remarked:
I believe that the railway system in Taiwan cannot be privatised. ... 
Yes, I totally agree that the reform of the Taiwan Railway must be 
conducted thoroughly. But, the Taiwan Railway cannot be 
reformed under the existing organisational structure. 
Corporatisation could make the Taiwan Railway’s managerial
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techniques more commercially oriented. It would help to reform the 
Taiwan Railway’s organisational structure and remove current 
hardships. ... Therefore, in my view, corporatisation is the only 
way to save the Taiwan Railway from its troubles. If the Taiwan 
Railway could be corporatised, it might survive, otherwise, it will 
not. This is a plain and obvious fact (interview, 19/04/2006).
As I argued in Chapter 6, one of the main reasons why the government 
insisted on implementing privatisation of the Taiwan Railway was because of 
its poor financial performance. However, railway managers denied these 
claims and attributed such performance to the government’s negligence and 
inconsistent railway policies. Railway mangers did not know what 
managerial objectives they were pursuing. Were they providing public 
services (which would increase operational costs) or striving for profits? In 
other words, they were not convinced that a change in ownership would be 
the best policy choice to increase efficiency and solve problems. Instead, 
they believed that the solution for the Railway’s problems rested with the 
clarification of responsibilities between the Taiwan Railway and the 
government. In addition, they also expected that, by means of this reform 
opportunity, any past and future financial debts would be underwritten by the 
government to make the Taiwan Railway debt free and able to compete with 
competitors. They were convinced that privatisation was too radical and risky 
for the future of Taiwan Railway, whereas corporatisation was much more 
moderate and acceptable. For them, corporatisation was a decisive action to 
help the Taiwan Railway out of current hardships but without drastic change. 
As the former director-general (between 2000 and 2003) confirmed:
We all agreed that the focus of corporatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway was to clarify the Taiwan Railway’s operational objectives 
as to whether it was an organisation focusing on making profits or 
providing public services, and to clearly divide its cost structure as 
to what operational costs would come under the government’s 
responsibility (interview, 07/04/2006).
This respondent’s remarks indicate that the objectives of the Taiwan Railway 
were not clearly understood. As a manager of the Taiwan Railway, he had an 
obligation and responsibility to clarify operational objectives for the benefit 
and long-term interests of both the Railway itself and railway workers.
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Therefore, in general, railway managers believed that if the government 
could clearly define operational objectives, reduce intervention and grant 
autonomy to railway managers, the Taiwan Railway could perform 
differently. This idea has been constantly emphasised by respondents who 
worked in the Taiwan Railway. One senior railway manager reiterated:
At a meeting held by the Committee for the Promotion o f the 
Privatisation o f the TRA, the first question asked by experts and 
scholars was how the government defined the Taiwan Railway’s 
objectives. Actually, no one was able to answer this question even 
up to date. If the government saw the Taiwan Railway as a public 
service provider, it should not take account of its financial deficits 
resulting from providing unprofitable public services. Similarly, if 
the government regarded the Taiwan Railway as a profit making 
institution, it should reduce intervention and grant the Railway 
managerial autonomy. Unfortunately, the government provided no 
clear-cut response or objective (interview, 06/04/2006).
The TRLU’s chief secretary also made a similar judgement about the 
Railway’s problems and the failure of the government to define the 
Railway’s obj ectives:
Instead of making profits a guideline for transport policy, the 
government has obligations to provide convenient and cheap 
transportation for the public. ... It should not be important whether 
the Railway makes profits or not. The more the Taiwan Railway 
loses in finance, the better the service the government provides. 
Besides, the government should not denounce railway workers as 
the main cause of the Railway’s financial losses. ... The Railway’s 
operational objectives must be clearly defined by the government 
for this reason (interview, 15/06/2004).
However, even though railway managers thought this way about privatisation, 
they could not oppose publicly because the status of the Taiwan Railway 
within the governmental hierarchy made it impossible for railway managers 
to argue against government policy and to express their concerns plainly and 
clearly to the government. They could only abide by the government’s orders 
to plan and study privatisation, even though they were reluctant to do so. In 
the face of their vulnerable situation, what they could do was, on the one
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hand, to react slowly and passively, and on the other hand, seek help from a 
third party.
In short, it was striking that even railway managers did not fully support the 
idea that the Taiwan Railway’s problems should be dealt with by 
privatisation. Although railway managers are regarded as being delegated by 
the state to manage the Taiwan Railway, they perceive themselves more 
specifically as part of the railway. For this reason, they had obligations to 
defend the railway’s reputation as ‘railway workers’. Therefore, as long as 
the Taiwan Railway bore the hardships that stemmed from the state’s policies, 
they were placed in an invidious position. However, as a state management, 
their status was dependent on the state. The question was how could their 
voice be heard?
9.5 Formation of the tacit alliance
In view of their invidious position and the emerging dominant role of the 
TRLU, railway managers decided to rely on the TRLU to speak for them. A 
tacit alliance was therefore established between the TRLU and railway 
managers on the privatisation issue. The former general-director clearly 
explained the rationale for the formation of this alliance:
I had been persuading Chang, the union chairman, [in the late 
1990s], that I, as a representative of the Taiwan Railway, must 
understand what railway workers were thinking, whilst he, as a 
workers’ representative, should also understand what the 
employer’s thought was. ... We should therefore closely cooperate 
with each other to help the Taiwan Railway to become better. 
Sometimes, it was through you to express an opinion, whilst at 
other times it was mine to lead the way. This was the only way to 
help the Taiwan Railway prosper (interview, 20/04/2006).
Although it was not made clear how Chang responded to that invitation, what 
is evident is that since his leadership, the TRLU began to play a dominant 
role in negotiations with the government, regarding privatisation. In the face
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of the privatisation threat, a tacit alliance was formed between the TRLU and 
railway management opposed to the idea presented by the Director of the 
DOT to the Minister of the MOTC in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, in light of 
the TRLU’s strong opposition to the idea, the Minister of the MOTC 
hesitated to make an outright decision on privatisation and, instead, requested 
railway managers to formulate a plan with the TRLU that would be 
acceptable to all parties concerned. After this meeting, both railway 
managers and the TRLU gained what they wanted. Managers gained an 
important role in railway policy-making, which had long been in the hands of 
provincial government officials and railway experts. They were now able to 
make a plan that would be suitable and applicable to the Taiwan Railway’s 
management. The TRLU gained a critical negotiation position where its 
opinion in relation to railway reform would be valued and actively 
considered.
Nevertheless, in 2000, the government appointed a new railway director- 
general, with no direct experience of the railway industry, with the task of 
continuing the planning process for privatisation. The new director-general 
still proposed the “separation” scheme. His stance worried both the majority 
of railway managers and the TRLU. For this reason, the tacit alliance was 
again activated. The success of the 9/11 event was in part the outcome of this 
tacit alliance. Although the strike action failed because the government had 
intervened and, consequently, train drivers were bought off, more than half 
of union members still attended the general meeting. The TRLU hoped that 
railway managers would not threaten to implement administrative 
punishment to workers who attended the general meeting so that this 
industrial action could proceed smoothly. The TRLU could then exert union 
activism to the utmost to impose the strongest pressure possible on the 
government. A former TRLU Chief Secretary related:
One of the reasons why the first union membership general meeting 
was so successful was because local railway managers did not 
intervene, which enabled us to display a vigorous mass movement 
against government policy. Otherwise, such massive union action 
would have been difficult in Taiwan (interview, 15/06/2004).
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The majority of railway managers hoped to create an environment in which 
the Taiwan Railway could prosper and operate successfully in the future. 
They wanted the government to clearly define the role of the Taiwan 
Railway and to subsidise financial losses. As one senior railway manager, 
who had been directly involved in planning railway reform, explained:
Of course, seemingly we, as the employer, hoped that the TRLU 
would not hold the general meeting. However, privately, we were 
all convinced that if we did not cooperate with the TRLU, our 
requests for the underwriting of debts and managerial autonomy 
with regard to the Railway’s future would have never been valued 
and granted. ... I even helped union officials to make their demands 
and arguments to be more complete and sound when they were 
confronting the government. ... Without our alliance with the 
TRLU, the government would never have consented to or respected 
our requests. Under such circumstances, we needed the TRLU’s 
help. No matter how much effort we have expended on considering 
the reform proposal and making suggestions, the government 
simply ignored or even rejected our ideas. But, as soon as the 
TRLU opposed the privatisation policy, the government began to 
take the railway issues seriously (interview, 16/06/2004).
The government delegated Da-wen Hsu, who was the Taiwan Railway Chief 
Secretary and the then director-general, with the responsibility of negotiation 
with the TRLU to avert the intended industrial action. Hsu made use of union 
activism and a potential general railway strike to persuade the government to 
accept the TRLU’s requests, particularly those for a delay to privatisation 
and the granting of financial support to the Taiwan Railway so that the strike 
action might be called off. This strategy succeeded. In view of the potential 
strike, which would have had a catastrophic impact on the upcoming 
presidential election in March 2004, the government took Hsu’s advice and 
responded to the TRLU’s five appeals (p.217) by issuing an official 
document on 16th December 2003 (United Daily News, 17/12/2003: A11). In 
part, it stated:
a) The basic preconditions for the implementation of 
corporatisation of the TRA are: (1) all historical and future 
debts (estimated around NT$180 billion), including pensions,
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will be underwritten by the government; (2) the government 
will subsidise unprofitable public services provided by the 
Taiwan Railway; and (3) the government will take full 
responsibility to fund infrastructure construction, and 
maintenance, and purchase locomotives. (The estimated amount 
of the first precondition was around NT$180 billion, while the 
annual total expenditure for the following two elements was 
around NT$4.6 billion.)
b) Having agreed these basic preconditions, the government will 
consult the TRLU and gain its consent on all necessary legal 
enactments in relation to the corporatisation of the Taiwan 
Railway. Only when all related legal and administrative 
measures have been completed can the government implement 
corporatisation.
c) Corporatisation of the Taiwan Railway is the goal at this stage. 
Only when the objective and subjective conditions are met can 
the government begin to consider the schedule of the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway (Executive Yuan, Official 
Document No. 0920093777).
Apart from the above, which directly related to the future of the Taiwan 
Railway, the government also agreed to increase the allowance and bonus for 
train crews by 50 per cent, to pay an incentive bonus for workers who had no 
direct or indirect responsibility for a train accident, and to adopt a flexible 
day shift (that is three shifts a day) (Executive Yuan, Official Document No. 
0920093777).
The TRLU chairman subsequently held an ad hoc membership representative 
general meeting on 19th December to discuss how to respond to the 
government’s response in relation to the industrial action. At the meeting, 
union representatives decided to call off the strike action. As the union chair 
pointed out, “if the Executive Yuan has made such concrete commitments,
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the strike will be extremely difficult to carry out” (Lee, 2003). In one sense, 
both railway managers and the TRLU obtained what they wanted. Railway 
managers further gained the government’s written confirmation and 
guarantee granting them a dominant role in railway policy-making. In many 
senses, the commitment to subsidise unprofitable public services and 
underwrite debts meant that the government had attempted to define 
managerial objectives. Although this was more ideological than practical 
because the government was still in control of some managerial authorities, 
like fare pricing, this was a huge breakthrough for railway managers. As for 
the TRLU, it obtained firm confirmation that implementation of the 
privatisation policy would be delayed. A senior railway manager indicated:
I thought that the opposition to government’s privatisation would 
be successful only if we [railway managers and the TRLU] 
cooperated with each other. You see, the 9/11 event was very 
successful (interview, 15/06/2004).
Referring to the tacit alliance between the TRLU and railway management, a 
union official remarked:
After the 9/11 event, there was a delicate relationship between the 
TRLU and railway managers. There was no so-called the employer, 
since managers identified themselves as part of the railway. Both 
employees and managers collectively benefited from better 
conditions provided by the government. If there was something 
which managers did not dare to negotiate with the MOTC, the 
TRLU would speak up on their behalf. ... Without the TRLU 
cooperation with managers, Hsu would not have been promoted to 
the director-generalship. ... The government thought Hsu made a 
great contribution in terms of dealing with the 9/11 event (interview, 
17/06/2004)
However, the ‘achievement’ of this tacit alliance created polarised 
perspectives. One emphasised that what the TRLU and railway managers 
wanted was more money and more financial subsidies which ignored the 
government’s and passenger’s requests for an improved railway service and a 
reduction in operational defects. A legislator commented:
I thought the TRLU’s requests resembled blackmail. Its members
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simply thought that the precondition of corporatisation [and 
privatisation] of the Taiwan Railway meant that the government 
would take full responsibility for the Railway’s debts. ... The 
Taiwan Railway would have made more money, if railway workers 
had improved their efficiency (interview, 24/05/2006).
This comment was underpinned by the thought that the removal of debts and 
an increase in subsidy were nothing to do with solving the problem of the 
Railway’s inefficiency. This respondent believed that the TRLU and railway 
managers had made best use of the fact that the government wanted to 
remove the threat of the upcoming strike since it would have catastrophic 
consequences for the ruling party and asked the government to grant them 
what they demanded. The issue of inefficiency still remained unsolved, 
because, obviously, the focus of the TRLU’s five appeals and the Official 
Document were basically on issues of finance and privatisation. Efficiency 
improvements were not considered and discussed in the negotiation process. 
Deficits would be accumulated again as long as inefficiency remained.
Understandably, both the TRLU and railway managers denied this account 
by presenting their points of view. First, they argued that “without 
calculating expenditure of public service obligations and historical retirement 
pensions, the railway transport business is essentially profitable” (interview 
with the former director-general, 19/04/2006). Therefore, they believed as 
long as the government could help to reduce the financial burdens, the 
Taiwan Railway should be able to survive. Second, the government’s 
commitment to subsidise infrastructure maintenance costs and the provision 
of unprofitable public services helped to clarify operational responsibilities 
between the government and the Taiwan Railway, which railway managers 
had long been requesting. Third, both the TRLU and railway managers 
thought the financial commitments made by the government were what the 
government should have made previously, what the government needed to 
maintain to secure the future of the Taiwan Railway, and were a precondition 
for a sustainable business. A senior railway official explained:
After the 9/11 event, the government promised to pay for the 
Taiwan Railway’s historical debts. This would give us at the very
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least a chance to restart and revive. If the government wants the 
Taiwan Railway to reform, then the government should give the 
Railway a new opportunity to operate. It is unfair to require the 
Railway to bear those debts, which did not generate mainly from 
inefficiency, and at the same time to ask the Railway to accept 
corporatisation and privatisation (interview, 05/05/2006).
In other words, both the TRLU and railway managers believed that what they 
had requested was fair and justifiable. Only if the government promised to 
provide financial support did the corporatisation of the Taiwan Railway 
become meaningful and practicable. Otherwise, “Taiwan Railway Co. Ltd. 
would go bankrupt soon after it was corporatised” (interview with the former 
director-general, 19/04/2006).
Although in one sense the tacit alliance was very successful, the TRLU was 
still disappointed that its goal had not been achieved. A union official 
contended, “the ultimate outcome [of the 9/11 event] was to allow railway 
managers to do things freely and easily” (interview, 16/06/2004). Chang, the 
main organiser of the 9/11 event, stated, “In terms of the essence of the 
labour movement, the 9/11 event was not successful, because we did not 
accomplish the expected goal [the paralysis of train services]” (interview, 
16/06/2004). The reason why Chang said the event had failed was because 
the intention of causing strike action on that day had not succeeded (for more 
details, see Chapter 8). But it should be noted that Chang did not attribute the 
failure to the effect of the train drivers’ sectionalism but to the government’s 
intervention. This implied that the TRLU in effect still hoped to maintain a 
good relationship with train drivers and their association, the TDF. 
Nevertheless, even though the TRLU argued that it was railway managers 
who gained benefits from the union action, the TRLU actually won an 
unprecedented bargaining position with the capacity to influence railway 
reform. The tacit alliance was exerted most tellingly.
Even though the government still lacked the determination and strategies to 
deal with the Taiwan Railway’s problems, understandably after the issuance 
of the Official Document, the government’s attitudes towards railway reform 
via corporatisation and privatisation was less strident. In contrast, because of
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the success of the tacit alliance, the role of the TRLU and railway managers 
became decisive. However, the formation of the tacit alliance did not imply 
there was no conflict of interest between the two parties. Although they 
formed the tacit alliance to oppose privatisation, they adopted different 
perspectives towards the effect of corporatisation. While railway managers 
believed corporatisation was an appropriate policy to sustain the Taiwan 
Railway’s future, the TRLU was convinced that privatisation would follow 
soon after corporatisation. This latter view implied that the TRLU believed 
that corporatisation was the first step towards privatisation. As a result of 
these conflicting perspectives, the railway reform process became slow and 
even came to a standstill. The government had delegated railway managers 
on behalf of the MOTC to continue negotiations with the TRLU in order to 
reach a consensus on corporatisation. However, after a six-round negotiation 
between managers and the TRLU between 2004 and 2006, union officials 
decided not to carry on any negotiation on this matter, and further requested 
the government to stop not only privatisation but also corporatisation.
9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the rationale for the formation of a tacit alliance in 
the Taiwanese railway industry and the role that this tacit alliance played in 
the railway reform process. In the wake of the decreasing power of the party- 
state, the TRLU endeavoured to strengthen its independence by breaking off 
its relationship with railway management, while railway managers attempted 
to regain managerial autonomy. Their interests obviously were antagonistic 
to each other in many respects. However, in the context of privatisation of 
the Taiwan Railway, the TRLU and railway managers found coincident 
interests which drew them together with shared and seemingly unspoken 
understandings. This cross-class collaboration was surprisingly successful in 
that the idea of dealing with railway problems through privatisation was 
postponed and de facto withdrawn. Their collaboration represented an 
unusual but understandable practice in which the TRLU and railway
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managers pursued their collective interests for a sustainable future for the 
Taiwan Railway.
However, this is not to suggest that there was no conflict of interest between 
the TRLU and railway managers. The most significant conflict of interest 
between them was their perceptions towards the corporatisation policy. 
While the TRLU regarded corporatisation as a threshold for complete 
privatisation, railway managers saw corporatisation as the only way to save 
the Taiwan Railway and to strengthen their managerial prerogatives. In the 
face of this apparent conflict, the TRLU decided not to carry on any 
negotiation with railway managers whom the government had delegated to 
talk with the TRLU on these matters. For this reason, the idea that the 
Taiwan Railway should be corporatised in order to survive in the 
increasingly competitive transport market was again challenged and progress 
was further delayed. From this perspective, the power of the TRLU still 
prevailed, irrespective of the tacit alliance in which railway managers 
provided it with support, when negotiating with the government on the issue 
of privatisation.
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Part IV 
Conclusion
Chapter 10 
Assessment 
-  arguments, implications and conclusions
10.1 Introduction
The aims of this chapter are, first, to review and elaborate on the main 
arguments identified in the empirical chapters and, second, to address the 
implications of the findings for Taiwanese trade unionism and possibly trade 
unionism beyond Taiwan. This will involve assessing and analysing 
arguments with respect to: (1) privatisation and the state; (2) privatisation 
and capital; and (3) privatisation and trade unions. Accordingly, this chapter 
draws the threads of the analysis together.
The TRLU, the core of this research, is a very specific case in Taiwan. It was 
developed by an authoritarian state mainly for the control of labour and was, 
therefore, known for its dependency on the party-state apparatus. However, 
its transformation from a dependent to an independent union demonstrates a 
most valuable and noteworthy experience in the trade union movement. The 
discussion of their transformation process has been based upon an 
examination of the role of the state, capital and trade unions in the context of 
privatisation. This chapter will argue that in order to understand the different 
positions taken by organised labour in relation to privatisation it is necessary 
to consider both structural factors (market structure and financial status) and 
organisational capacity.
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10.2 Privatisation and the state
When the global economy encountered unprecedented stagflation due to two 
oil crises and the failure of public sector management in the 1970s, the 
mainstream macroeconomic policy based on Keynesianism (emphasising the 
importance of government interventionism) faced severe criticism. The 
failure of Keynesian economics stimulated a shift to neo-liberal policies, with 
their focus on privatisation and related policies. Advocates of neo-liberalism 
were convinced that government interventions implied ineffective 
management of public enterprises (Moore, 1986). From the 1980s onwards, 
under the leadership of British Thatcherism and American Reaganism, neo­
liberalism (represented by privatisation initiatives) became a prominent 
global trend (Famham and Horton, 1996). Neo-liberal policies were not only 
adopted in the 1980s by developing countries under the structural adjustment 
programmes of the IMF and World Bank, but also implemented in the 1990s 
in post-socialist transition economies where Western liberal democratic 
countries had specific strategic interests.
In the face of macroeconomic deficiencies, developing countries, generally 
speaking, were forced to adopt and implement privatisation under pressure of 
the IMF and World Bank. The provision of loans, investments and aid for 
developing countries was conditional upon the adoption and implementation 
of privatisation. In contrast to developing countries, in post-socialist 
transition economies like the former Soviet Union and those in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the role of the West was much more crucial, although 
privatisation was also the result of intervention from supranational financial 
agencies. I argued in Chapter 2 that to maintain national defence and geo­
strategic interests, Western developed governments endeavoured to help 
these transition economies by providing economic assistance and promoting 
democratisation, both conditional upon the adoption of certain reform 
strategies, including privatisation. In both developing countries and transition 
economies, the general origins and motives of adopting and implementing 
privatisation were seen as central to economic transformation, via financial
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help from the IMF, the World Bank, and support and advocacy from key 
Western developed governments. However, the role of the state in the 
privatisation process in Taiwan was different both economically and 
politically, and, therefore, presented itself as an interesting and important 
case. Research Question One (Given that Taiwan was a Leninist party-state, 
was the process and issue o f privatisation in Taiwan similar to that in post­
socialist countries, developing countries or advanced capitalist countries?), 
formulated to address the role of the state in Taiwan is answered below.
In answer to Research Question One, it can be argued that Taiwan is a 
distinctive case, drawing on elements of both the developed and transition 
countries. The most apparent differences were as follows. First, economically, 
in contrast to developing and transition economies, Taiwan did not face 
serious economic recession during or even after the oil crises, but continued 
to grow soundly and robustly with a relatively high economic growth rate 
and low unemployment and inflation (see Chapters 1 and 3). Politically, the 
KMT’s Leninist type of political control began to change from the late 1980s 
onwards, but did not collapse as in the former Soviet Union. This implies that 
although Taiwan was in transition from a party-state system to a liberal 
democracy, the changes took place in a relatively orderly way. Therefore, 
when compared with other developing countries and transition economies, 
Taiwan did not experience pressure from the IMF and World Bank, partly 
because Taiwan was not a member of the aforementioned organisations, but 
also because Taiwan did not encounter political and macroeconomic chaos 
during the transition process. Unlike other transition economies, which 
desperately required external resources to help stabilise politics and the 
economy, Taiwan was free from such considerations. Although from the 
1980s onwards, budget deficits in Taiwan began to accumulate because of 
increases in public investments and social welfare expenditure, it is still 
argued that this was not sufficient for the KMT to consider privatisation 
(Chang, 2002). Therefore, in Taiwan, the decision to adopt privatisation was 
not driven by the political and economic uncertainty associated with 
transition countries.
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Second, as I discussed in Chapter 2, one of the main political considerations 
for the British Conservative government, when implementing privatisation, 
was to diminish trade union power. However, this was never at the forefront 
of the KMT government, when considering privatisation (see Chapters 3 and 
5). Close and orderly industrial relations and dependent trade unions were the 
norm during the party-state period. Further, in line with political 
democratisation and the emergence of a working class consciousness, the 
KMT’s power over the trade unions gradually weakened. While the 
development of an independent union movement, associated with an increase 
in the number of labour disputes, to some extent disturbed the ruling party, 
such disputes tended to be limited in their overall political impact. At the 
time when the Taiwanese state was considering privatisation, to control 
deteriorated industrial relations was not its main rationale. It had little 
intention or pressure to control the unions. Finally, in contrast to the British 
government in the 1980s, privatisation was not considered by the ruling 
KMT as an electoral policy to win votes from constituencies (see Chapter 3). 
In other words, privatisation in Taiwan was not initiated entirely for fiscal 
considerations, nor to reduce the strength of trade unions, or for short-term 
deliberations in relation to political elections.
Taiwanese politics, the economy and society had been dominated by the 
authoritarian party-state system through martial law for 38 years (1949-1987). 
The Taiwanese state led by the only party -  the KMT -  effectively deployed 
its supreme power, supported by the military. However, unlike other 
countries which also adopted the party-state type of political control, the 
Taiwanese state strategically and ideologically allowed the development of 
capitalism, regulated by the state, to eliminate any source of opposition. This 
two-way development strategy characterised the Taiwanese state between the 
late 1940s and 1980s. The significance of this particular state development 
strategy not only effectively consolidated the KMT regime in Taiwan 
through political repression and exclusion, but also successfully built Taiwan 
through state corporatism and state regulated capitalism into a country where 
economic prosperity and orderly industrial relations were both embedded.
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However, this state development strategy was challenged and became 
difficult to sustain when external and internal pressures built up after the late 
1970s. These pressures accelerated in the 1980s. In terms of external pressure, 
international trade was the most important factor driving Taiwan to adopt 
neo-liberalism strategies, including privatisation. In contrast to other 
developing countries and transition economies, the Taiwanese economy was 
a success, which was built on international trade, and in particular on the US 
economy. The problems of this kind of economic development became clear 
when the US exerted trade sanctions demanding that Taiwan cut subsidies 
and liberalise and deregulate the market. In line with economic deregulation 
and liberalisation, America, as it did to other transition countries, also 
demanded that Taiwan embrace democratisation.
Within Taiwan, the problems associated with public enterprises also became 
a more immediate reason for the public to become more sympathetic to 
privatisation. On the one hand, the KMT government faced severe criticism 
from political dissidents (who criticised the fact that the KMT unfairly and 
financially benefited from becoming involved in and controlling public 
enterprises). On the other hand, the monopolistic status of public enterprises 
was widely condemned by the public for its corruption, inefficiency, lack of 
consumer choice, and lack of an environmental protection procedure (Chang, 
2002: 75). Against this background, the idea of privatisation was seen by 
some as the solution to problems (e.g. Van de Walle, 1989). Public 
enterprises had become an economic as well as a political burden so that the 
KMT government decided to adopt the privatisation strategy as an 
appropriate approach to resolve these problems.
There were, of course, less obvious reasons for the KMT government to 
promote privatisation policies. These policies were linked to internal 
conflicts within the KMT, including a power struggle between the 
mainstream and non-mainstream faction during the post-Chiang period (Ni,
th1996). When the incumbent President, Ching-kuo Chiang, died on 13 
January 1988, the mainstream faction, led by the successor President Teng- 
hui Lee, was challenged by the non-mainstream (conservative) faction.
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President Lee needed more support from other sources, including local 
capitalists and the opposition party, to strengthen and stabilise his political 
situation during the post-Chiang period. One of the strategies adopted by 
President Lee was cooperation with the opposition party and local capitalists 
on the privatisation issue to counter the old guard. The DPP strongly urged 
the government to implement privatisation as a way of breaking the link 
between public enterprises and the KMT (Chang, 2002: 70-75).
For the above reasons stated, therefore, the rationale for implementing 
privatisation in Taiwan was, at first, more for political considerations than 
economic ones. However, the idea of improving efficiency through a change 
in ownership (the economic perspective of privatisation mentioned by the 
KMT government) was still ideologically embedded in the rationale for 
privatisation (see Chapter 5). Although the political rationale changed over 
time (to a focus centred more on the economic perspective than the political 
one) in order to justify privatisation and accelerate its progress, basically, the 
Taiwanese government has never ignored the ideas of efficiency, ownership, 
market competition, cost and public choices (detailed in Chapter 5). In short, 
against this complex background, the Taiwanese state played a predominant 
and leading role in the privatisation process.
10.2.1 The case of the Taiwan Railway
Generally speaking, the majority of Taiwanese privatisations were 
undertaken both for political and economic considerations. Nevertheless, 
among privatisation cases, the Taiwan Railway stood out as unusual. In 
comparison with other privatisations in the country, not only did the state’s 
role change over time in the railway industry, but also the underlying 
rationale for privatising the Taiwan Railway was primarily to resolve 
financial problems. Although the emphasis on solving financial problems 
through privatisation was common (see Chapter 2), the Taiwan Railway case
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remains noteworthy for the chief focus on deficits’ resolution (see Chapter 6). 
One senior railway manager indicated unequivocally:
The rationale for the privatisation proposal for the Taiwan Railway 
was to solve the Railway’s deteriorating financial problems. That 
was the main motivation (interview, 29/03/2006).
There are two possible explanations for this rationale. First, the debate as to 
who owned the Taiwan Railway was a point of political controversy between 
the Provincial and the Central Government up to the time when the former 
ceased to function in 1999 (see Chapter 6). As the Taiwan Railway had 
actually been owned by the local government prior to 1999, the Provincial 
Government, in order to prevent itself from being politically and 
economically marginalised, had always refused to hand over ownership of 
this strategic industry to the Central Government. A number of reform 
initiatives, including employment and organisation rationalisation, and an 
increase in the purchase of locomotives, were introduced by the Provincial 
Government seeking to improve the Taiwan Railway’s productivity and 
income. For this reason, the idea of a change in ownership, whether from 
local to central or from public to private hands to revive the Railway, was 
intentionally avoided and not properly discussed.
Second, the state strategically emphasised the issue of financial deficits 
rather than ownership in the context of privatisation (see Chapter 6). In this 
respect, the state sought to generate strong public consensus in favour of the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway and to justify privatisation initiatives. 
The intention was to marginalise and weaken railway resistance to 
privatisation, particularly when the role of the TRLU became significant. In 
short, the way in which the state discussed railway financial problems may 
be viewed as a strategic discourse justifying its intention to privatise the 
Taiwan Railway. The state may have thought that, by highlighting the issue 
of finance, privatisation of the Taiwan Railway could be done quickly and 
smoothly. However, this discourse actually backfired. It has been seen that 
the way in which the state illustrated railway problems actually created two
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unexpected results: withdrawal of the role of private capital (Chapter 6), and 
an alliance between the TRLU and railway management (Chapter 9).
The excessive emphasis on the financial problems gave both the TRLU and 
railway managers a negative impression that the state actually wanted to get 
rid of this financial burden to cut public expenditure to the minimum. This 
was confirmed by respondents within, as well as outside the railway. As one 
railway correspondent emphasised:
The main reason why the government insisted on privatising the 
Taiwan Railway was because the government intended to abandon 
this loss-maker by means of privatisation (interview, 15/06/2006).
His comments were echoed by a legislator from the opposition party:
The proposal to privatise the Taiwan Railway was simply a matter 
of numerical calculation. The government simply wanted to give up 
this financial burden by privatising it (interview, 21/06/2006).
A TRLU official also made a similar comment:
The government did not clarify that the main reasons why the 
Taiwan Railway ran into the red were be cause of the [flawed] 
transport policy and providing unprofitable public services. On the 
contrary, the government publicly claimed that the Taiwan Railway 
was a loss-maker, and for this reason, it should be corporatised and 
privatised (interview, 17/06/2004).
According to various respondents, the government in view of the financial 
plight of the Taiwan Railway was reluctant to take full responsibility for 
operating railway services. And for many, in particular railway workers, 
privatisation came to be regarded as the way in which the state would wash 
its hands of the Railway. This triggered a sense of crisis and anger among 
workers and some managers, with the outcome that they privately worked 
together to resist the policy (detailed in Chapter 9). As a consequence, the 
planned privatisation of the Taiwan Railway through the “separation” 
scheme (suggested and supported by private capital) was withdrawn and 
replaced by the notion of “integration” (welcomed by railway managers and
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the TRLU). For this reason, private capital has withdrawn its interest in the 
Railway privatisation. Along with this development, the state began to pull 
back from its promotion of the privatisation of the Railway.
In summary, Taiwan adopted a particular state development strategy in 
which the Leninist-type party-state control system and the capitalist pattern 
of economic expansion were both embedded. From the economic perspective 
of privatisation, the Taiwanese state emphasised the issues of ownership, 
competition and efficiency. However, it was not the case at the time the state 
proposed privatising the Taiwan Railway that the state was doing anything 
other than solving its financial deficits. Nonetheless, while the state had the 
strong intention of privatising the Taiwan Railway, its strategic discourse 
towards its privatisation actually backfired and became a barrier to carrying 
on this process. This situation not only resulted in the withdrawal of private 
capital but also led to the TRLU forming a tacit alliance with railway 
managers, which, in turn, enabled it to reinforce its bargaining capacity to 
play a role shaping the privatisation policy (for details, see Chapter 9).
10.3 Privatisation and capital
Capital played a very particular role in the privatisation process in Taiwan (in 
answer to Research Question Two: What role did private capital play in 
Taiwan in the privatisation process?). This role was distinct from that in 
either advanced capitalist economies (such as the UK) or transition 
economies (such as Russia). In Taiwan, the government attempted to focus 
privatisation policies in ways that would attract local capitalists’ interests 
(Chapters 5 and 6). However, in my railway case, the role of capital in the 
privatisation process changed over time, from initially an influential role to 
one of non-involvement.
The British experience revealed that private capital had played a decisive role 
in the privatisation process (see Chapter 2). It could be argued that the
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success of privatisation to a large extent rested with the interest of private 
capital, including banks, in purchasing public enterprises put up for sale. 
Research has shown that the British government intentionally attracted 
private capital to privatisation through underpricing shares and assets in 
order to achieve the goal of broadening share ownership (Bishop and Kay, 
1989; Yarrow, 1986). In this regard, the role of private capital was influential 
in the privatisation process, particularly since the government ideologically 
favoured privatisation.
Although the rationale for privatisation was different in Taiwan, there was 
evidence of a limited influence of private capital on the government’s policy­
making (see Chapters 5 and 6). The Taiwanese government, particularly the 
KMT government, consciously formulated the privatisation policy in favour 
of private capital in order to attract capitalists’ investment to fulfil its 
privatisation goals (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999; see also Chapter 5 of this 
thesis). In this context, Taiwanese private capital had the capacity to become 
involved or even intervene in the privatisation policy-making process 
(Taiwan Labour Front, 1999: 29). For instance, private capital expressed a 
great interest in the privatisation of three public enterprises (China 
Petrochemical Development Co., BES Engineering Co., and Taiwan 
Machinery Co.), which were proposed for privatisation through the sale of 
shares and assets (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999). Through underpricing, the 
government successfully attracted private capital in these three cases. Private 
capital thus gained financial benefits from the sale of shares or the disposal 
of assets (Taiwan Labour Front, 1999; Economic Daily News, 27/07/1994: 2; 
Economic Daily News, 31/07/1994: 17).
However, it has also been observed that private capital was hesitant about the 
privatisation policies. They were concerned about the financial deficits of 
public enterprises. The Taiwan Railway was the most prominent case. 
Private capital showed an interest in being involved with the railway business 
conditional upon the government promoting the scheme of separating the 
railway infrastructure and train operations. I argued in Chapter 6 that the 
adoption of the “separation” scheme was primarily driven in part by the
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British Rail experience and in part by private capital’s reluctance to take on 
responsibility for infrastructure maintenance costs. Privatisation through the 
“separation” scheme meant that private capital could make money through 
operating train services without shouldering extra and heavy infrastructure 
maintenance costs. The government therefore proposed the concept of 
“separation”, hoping to complete privatisation of the Taiwan Railway by 
attracting private capital interests. However, when the government shifted the 
notion of “separation” to that of “integration”, private capital withdrew its 
interest in the Taiwan Railway (Chapters 6 and 9).
While the government was keen to privatise the Taiwan Railway, the way in 
which it was endeavouring to privatise the Railway made private capital 
hesitant about further involvement in the process. This reluctance was partly 
because of the state’s strategic discourse of financial problems and the 
Taiwan Railway’s bleak prospects in light of the competitive transport 
market. Besides, the government, while proposing the “separation” scheme, 
did not clearly provide financial incentives to attract private capital to 
become involved in the railway business, as it had done in three other public 
enterprises previously mentioned. For these reasons, the participation of 
private capital in the privatisation of the Taiwan Railway did not materialise, 
even though, in the beginning, Taiwanese capitalists had lobbied and 
encouraged the government to privatise the Taiwan Railway by way of the 
“separation” scheme. The government therefore was forced to delay 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway in line with the withdrawal of private 
capital’s interest.
In summary, a successful privatisation depends not only on the determination 
of the state but also on the interests of private capital. This has been 
demonstrated by many Taiwanese privatisation cases, where private capital 
“cooperated and coordinated” with the government to complete privatisation. 
Both parties need each other to complete privatisation. However, if private 
capital loses interest in the privatisation of a public enterprise because of lack 
of financial incentives, the completion of privatisation becomes difficult, 
particularly when labour is hostile to the policy. In my case study, in view of
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a change of private capital’s interest, the government’s attitudes became 
passive towards the privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. The government 
thus delegated railway managers with the responsibility of formulating an 
optimal reform proposal acceptable to the railway union. Under this double 
effect that both removed the “separation” scheme preferred by private capital, 
and left room for the TRLU to intervene in the reform process, private capital 
withdrew and no longer showed an interest in the railway business in Taiwan 
(see Chapters 6 and 9).
10.4 Privatisation and the trade union
In contrast to the withdrawal of capital, which merely delayed privatisation 
of the Taiwan Railway, the TRLU played a role that shaped that policy. The 
fact that the TRLU successfully shaped the privatisation policy is a process 
that is not often addressed in the contemporary literature. Accordingly, in this 
section, I will assess the extent to which the unions shaped public policy, 
particularly privatisation.
Trade unions were repressed and controlled by the Taiwanese government 
during the party-state period. Trade unions had no autonomy and capacity to 
protect and represent members’ interests. They existed simply to advance 
labour control for the political and economic interests of the party-state. This 
was particularly the case with the public sector trade unions. Since they 
played a role as an arm of government administration and a transmission belt 
between the party and the masses, trade unions could not and would not 
challenge public policies (see Chapter 3). However, with the end of this 
political process, civil society was freed from the martial law restriction and 
so were labour and union movements. Workers gained the confidence and 
the capacity to undertake independent labour actions. This brought about 
qualitative changes in trade unions; they shifted from dependent to 
independent unions. The trend towards union independence first emerged in
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the late 1980s but accelerated in the 1990s when the Taiwanese government 
began to implement privatisation programmes.
For public sector workers, privatisation was a policy that would 
unambiguously influence and shape their terms and conditions of 
employment. For this reason, public sector unions were expected to play an 
active role in the privatisation process, hoping to minimise workers’ loss in 
terms of benefits and to maximise employees’ interests. However, the 
Taiwanese experience shows that not all public sector unions opposed the 
privatisation policy. While some public sector unions did organise opposition 
to the policy, others did not. In Chapter 5 ,1 argued that the economic context 
(market and finance) of public enterprises in which the unions operated could 
affect attitudes towards privatisation and the policy of trade unions to oppose 
or not to oppose it. It also affected unions’ bargaining capacity during the 
privatisation process. Thus, in this way, in addressing Research Question 
Three {How did Taiwanese public sector trade unions play their roles in the 
privatisation process?), I have shown how Taiwanese public sector unions 
responded to privatisation.
In retrospect, many Taiwanese public sector trade unions were unable to 
resist this globalisation trend and/or to oppose privatisation. In these cases, 
public sector unions were more or less demobilised and/or played an 
irrelevant role in privatisation. These unions would not and could not 
challenge and shape the public policy for members’ interests. However, this 
study has shown that, under certain circumstances, trade unions actually had 
the capacity to influence and shape public policy. This unusual situation, 
which has not been discussed in the mainstream literature, was observed in 
the case of the TRLU as union members reorganised themselves to oppose 
and later shape the privatisation policy (see Chapters 6 to 9 for more details). 
This finding clearly addresses Research Question Four {Do Taiwanese public 
sector trade unions have the capacity to shape public policy?).
Although the economic context of the Taiwan Railway played a part, TRLU 
activism and leadership and railway workers’ solidarity perhaps played the
243
most important and direct role in the TRLU’s success in shaping public 
policy. Although industrial trade unions cannot exclude themselves from the 
economic context of the firm in which they operate, an account of union 
agency seems to provide an additional and perhaps decisive element in the 
explanation of why the TRLU operated so differently to other unions in 
Taiwan. The TRLU experience is significant as a bridge between the past and 
present of the Taiwanese labour movement and the history of trade unionism 
in Taiwan.
In Chapter 7 ,1 analysed the source of the TRLU’s power and activism, which 
was developed in a particular way under an extraordinary environment and 
situation. It began at the shop-floor level and then spread to the regional and 
national level. In retrospect, the development of the rebellion process was 
surprisingly logical, and in one sense, effective and one event led to another. 
However, when we put this experience into the Taiwanese political context, 
it is not immediately clear why these railway workers could organise these 
actions in such a well-structured and well-maintained way. My research 
suggests two elements as a possible explanation. First, the railway industry as 
a relatively structured and cohesive industry provided fertile ground for local 
leaders and activists to emerge. These personnel acted in the context of 
specific issues and problems faced by workers (pay and meals) (see Chapter 
7). This process was facilitated by the mutual experiences of workers (as 
apprentice intakes or as ex-military personnel).
Second, this group of people actually organised these actions with direct 
support from political elites and dissidents. Of course, this support was 
pervasive in Taiwan at that time and was not limited to railway workers. To 
push the KMT government to move towards democratisation by awakening 
working-class consciousness within the public sector would have been the 
main rationale for this support. While the evidence provided in this research 
for this is persuasive, a further exploration of the relationship between 
independent labour movements, political dissidents and such organisations as 
the American labour attache programme warrants further research.
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One feature that must be taken into account when considering the 
organisational capacity of the union is the role of the TDF, a craft-based 
group within the TRLU. This group and the actions they pursued, point to 
potential conflict among railway workers, as well as the fragility of union 
organisation (see Chapter 8). Nonetheless, to-date the TRLU leadership has 
been successful in addressing the potential crisis of a breakaway from the 
TRLU.
In the face of an increasingly challenging environment, after 1997, the 
independent TRLU began to take a militant attitude towards the government, 
particularly in relation to the privatisation policy (detailed in Chapters 7 to 9). 
The scale and impact that these union actions have had on Taiwanese union 
history have been marked. They have also had a number of important 
implications not only for the railway industry but also for the development of 
Taiwanese trade unionism.
First, the TRLU demonstrated its members’ determination to respond to 
privatisation through a general membership meeting on 11th September 2003 
that had never happened before in Taiwanese union history. It implied the 
emergence of a new approach towards government and management policies. 
The success of the 9/11 event also inspired other union counterparts in 
Taiwan to follow suit to reinforce union bargaining capacity under the public 
endorsement of members. Second, the success of the 9/11 event represented a 
watershed in that the role of the TRLU became even more crucial in railway 
reform. Third, the 9/11 event successfully built up a barrier to the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. Aware that the threat of general strike 
action could cause political damage to the incumbent DPP government, this 
government thus made concessions in response to the 9/11 event (see 
Chapter 9 for more details). In many senses, the TRLU won a historic victory, 
not only in terms of its bargaining capacity and representativeness, but also 
in terms of delaying the process of planning and implementing the 
privatisation of the Taiwan Railway. In this regard, the achievement of the 
TRLU was highly extraordinary. The TRLU’s experience suggests that under
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certain circumstances, trade unions are not without the possibility and 
capacity to shape and direct the development of public policy.
10.5 Implications
Overall, close scrutiny of the success of the TRLU reveals a number of 
noteworthy sociological implications. First, the food dispute in the 1970s was, 
at first glance, “coincidental” and generated “unintended” consequences. 
Nevertheless, the food issue not only became a point of unification within 
and even across classes, but also came to have apparent “symbolic” as well 
as moral connotations. The food issue had apparent symbolic importance for 
two reasons. First, workers in the factory, who, under martial law, were 
unable to overtly declare their independence, utilised the food issue to 
demonstrate their autonomy. During the party-state period, focusing on the 
food had a number of advantages. On the one hand, the food issue was easily 
recognised and supported by the majority of workers in the factory. On the 
other hand, the food issue was viewed by Factory management as non­
threatening to their authority, which perhaps explains why the organisers of 
the unlawful workers’ alliance were not punished under martial law.
The food issue also came to have apparent symbolic importance because it 
typified the “right” to eat a proper meal. In many senses, to eat a proper meal 
is a very basic human right. Sometimes, the importance of eating a proper 
meal for the working-class may even transcend economic concerns. For 
instance, the employer may have the right to cut wages but does not have the 
right to dehumanise employees by removing or denying their right to eat. 
While employees may be able to tolerate a cut in wages, the denial of food 
could have long-term consequences for their health and job performance. 
Thus, the basic right to food is an issue that would draw together not only the 
working-class but all classes, because food is essential to life. The Factory 
management recognised the workers’ basic human right to food and thus
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morally supported their grievances and did not oppose their organised 
behaviour.
While the issue of food had been of symbolic significance in the railway 
industry in Taiwan, about ten years later, in the former Soviet Union, soap 
became of similar symbolic importance. The main reason for a national coal 
miners’ strike was the government’s failure to implement reform. Soviet 
miners’ inability to tolerate the shortage of soap, detergent, washing powder, 
tooth paste and other daily consumer goods also contributed to the national 
miners’ strike (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1993d; Safire, 1989; Gumbel, 1989). 
The right to be clean is another fundamental human right. To deprive a 
person of the right to be clean is unacceptable and dehumanise that 
individual. Soviet miners could not tolerate such dehumanisation. While the 
strike in the Soviet Union was on a national scale, that in Taiwan was 
confined to the shop-floor. Nevertheless, both incidents were of historical 
importance. While the food issue had a successful outcome in that railway 
workers gained the opportunity to organise their own food provision which, 
in turn, led to workers’ autonomy in the railway industry, the soap issue in 
the former Soviet Union served as one of the reasons for a general strike and 
became a driver leading to the disintegration of the Soviet party-state system 
and subsequently of the Soviet union itself (Borisov and Clarke, 1996; 
Anderson and Bogert, 1989).
In addition to its symbolic importance, the food issue was also a “moral” 
issue transferable across classes. The Factory canteen problem not only 
inspired the participation of the majority of Factory workers but also led 
Factory management to morally support the workers’ alliance, since it 
recognised that the workers were acting in the best interests of the Factory as 
a whole. This outcome seems to suggest that workers and management are 
more likely to collaborate if both are offended by some coincidental incidents. 
In the Railway case, both managers and workers were offended by the way in 
which the government continually emphasised the Taiwan Railway’s 
financial deficits and attempted to wash its hands of the Railway. From this 
perspective, the moral issue of the right to food at the Factory appeared to
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pave the way for the formation of the tacit alliance between management and 
the TRLU to promote the interests of the railway industry as a whole, since 
both faced external challenges from the privatisation policy and the private 
high speed rail company.
The second sociological implication of this case study was that TRLU’s 
activism was developed and entrenched in particular ways. First, the 
solidarity and activism that were developed during the Factory period later 
became an important feature of the TRLU. Second, union activism enabled 
the TRLU to transcend the limitations of the existing economic context 
(market structure and financial status) of the Taiwan Railway. Organised 
labour in the factory in the 1970s clearly indicated that, in fact, workers 
privately recognised the importance of solidarity and labour representation. 
Accordingly, an unlawful workers’ alliance was formed as a result of the 
food issue at the Factory. Core members of this unlawful alliance worked to 
manage and operate the canteen on employees’ behalf. This was the origin of 
today’s TRLU activism. The idea of agency was then enlarged and extended 
beyond the Factory boundary. Core members of the alliance pursued an 
independent railway union on behalf of all railway workers. The 
entrenchment of the agency of the union later served as a force calli ng 
railway workers to collectively support and trust the independent TRLU to 
represent their interests. It could therefore be argued that today’s railway 
union activism is the legacy of the emergence of the independent workers’ 
movement, developed in a particular environment and in an exceptional way 
in the 1970s.
The success of the TRLU’s rebellion against privatisation was indeed 
impressive. However, in this case study, it was evident that railway managers 
also played an important role, that was not publicly known and which should 
not be overlooked. In view of their status as state management in which they 
lacked the ability to express their opinion against privatisation, railway 
managers showed sympathy towards what the TRLU was doing and provided 
it with adequate support.
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Railway managers encouraged the TRLU to speak on their behalf to the 
government about their attitudes towards privatisation, particularly their 
opposition to the “separation” scheme. As for the TRLU, the support from 
railway managers, including de facto tolerance of the union’s actions against 
the government, was also a key to its success (see Chapter 9). As a result, 
based on the idea that both managers and the TRLU had a commitment to 
secure a better future for the Taiwan Railway, a tacit alliance was formed and 
generated an extraordinary outcome for both actors (see Chapter 9). Railway 
managers’ interventions through the tacit alliance effectively became a 
potential barrier to the government’s intention to smoothly implement 
privatisation. Therefore, in one sense, railway managers’ attitudes towards 
the state-drive privatisation policy as well as their sense of identification with 
the TRLU reinforced union capacity and increased the possibility of the 
TRLU shaping the privatisation policy. This implied that a cooperative class 
consciousness developed not only within the working class, but also amongst 
the management class. This also parallels earlier suggestions that moral 
issues are transferable across classes.
The presentation of the source of TRLU activism extends the debate about 
trade union capacity and the shaping of public policy. The Taiwanese railway 
experience suggests that under certain circumstances, such as the economic 
context of the firm, the way in which union activism is developed, strong and 
militant union leadership, and a complex and interrelated union-management 
relationship, a trade union can develop the capacity to influence or even 
shape government policy-making processes and outcomes. However, the 
analysis of the process leading to the success of the TRLU suggests there 
have been more profound sociological implications behind its success. 
Members of the unlawful alliance at the Factory, chose the issue of the food 
on the one hand as a symbolic issue to demonstrate their autonomy and 
independence from the rest of the Factory workers in order to strengthen 
their identity and, on the other hand, as a political issue to draw the working 
class and management class together for the interests of the factory as a 
whole. These developments provided the basis for the eventual success of the 
TRLU as an independent and autonomous trade union.
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10.6 Future Research
From this research, two critical themes have emerged. The first theme is the 
specific focus on privatisation and the place of labour within the privatisation 
programme. The second theme is, that under some circumstances, trade 
unions may develop organisational capacity and activism so as to shape 
public policy as the way in which they defend members’ interests.
My research and its findings point to three possible future research projects.
(1) A systematic and extensive study of public sector trade unionism in 
Taiwan;
My doctoral research has already laid the foundation for such a future 
research project, which may help to contextualise the distinctiveness of the 
railway case.
(2) A study on the way in which Taiwanese independent trade unions 
developed organisational capacity and activism;
While my doctoral research project began with a specific focus on 
privatisation and trade unions with particularly reference to the Taiwan 
Railway case, it would be worth of extensively exploring more cases.
(3) A third project would be to explore more details about the 
relationship between union leaders and activists and labour lawyers 
and political dissidents. An exploration of possible assistance from 
the American labour attache programme in the labour rebellion 
process in Taiwan is worth doing.
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Appendix
Appendix A 
Number of Interviews conducted between 
May 2005 and November 2007
Interviewees* Number of interviews
Government officials:
MOTC Officials 1
Former DOT Officials (Provincial Government) 2
Former labour attache to America 1
Legislator (2005-2007):
The ruling party -  the DPP 1
The opposition party -  the KMT 3
Railway managers:
Incumbent and former 
Taiwan Railway director-generals 4
Taiwan Railway senior managers 5
Taiwan Railway Labour Union:
Incumbent and former Union Chairmen 3
Union Officials
(including Head Office, and local branches) 7
Railway employees:
Full-time Employees
(including employees of different places, train 
drivers and maintenance workers)
5
Others:
Telecom union chairman and official 2
Former union chairman of Taiwan Motor Transport 1
Academic 1
Former executive secretary of Taiwan Labour Front 1
ALSTOM senior manager in Taiwan 1
Railway correspondence
(United Daily News and China Times) 2
Executive secretary of Consumers’ Foundation 1
Total 41
*: The identity of interviewees is correct at the time when I interviewed them.
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Appendix B 
Interview Schedules for interviewees 
related to railway affairs 
(translated from Mandarin)
Interview schedules for railway interviewees (managers, employees, and 
TRLU officials), government officials (the DOT, MOTC, and IOT), 
legislators, and railway correspondents
Section A: Personal background
• Age
• Post
• Length of service in relation to the railway affairs
• If applicable, length of service in relation to the railway union
Section B: Political-economic perspective
1. What were reasons and objectives for the Taiwanese Government 
nationalising industries after the Second World War? Were there 
particular considerations in terms of politics, economy and labour 
market?
- As far as the union movement is concerned, what was it like 
during that period of time?
2. As part of the global trend, during the 1980s, the government began 
to consider privatisation. As far as you know, why the privatisation 
policy emerged in Taiwan? (background reasons, political and 
economic considerations)
- What were extrinsic/intrinsic factors?
- What was the role of the state in terms of promoting 
privatisation of industries during that time?
- As far as you know, in the process of formulating the policy, 
what was the role of private capital? Did capitalists lobby the 
government to open the market so as to have fair competition?
- In the process of formulating the policy, did the unions ever 
formally or informally express their opinion towards it?
- What was the role of trade unions during that time?
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Section C: Privatisation of the Taiwan Railway
1. When did the idea of privatising Taiwan Railway emerge? Who 
proposed it and why?
- What railway problems did the government concern most?
- What were objectives of privatising Taiwan Railway?
In the policy decision-making process, what were perceptions 
and attitudes of the following actors towards the issue:
- The government
- Taiwan Railway managers
- Private capital
- The TRLU
2. As far as you know, did government officials ever consult with 
consultants about the way in which how to privatise the Taiwan 
Railway?
- Who were consultants?
- What was the conclusion of such consultation?
3. What privatisation options for the Taiwan Railway did the 
government consider to implement?
- What were difficulties in terms of implementing privatisation of 
the Taiwan Railway?
- How did the following roles respond to that?
- The government
- Taiwan Railway managers
- Private capital
- The TRLU
- What would you describe the major problems faced by unions 
in the process of formulation of the policy?
4. Did private capital have ever formally or informally express their 
concerns about their expectations of privatising Taiwan Railway?
- Under what circumstances do you think that private capital 
would be more likely to operate the Railway?
- Do you think such expectations would in part (or largely) 
influence the decision-making process?
What privatisation options do you think that the government 
proposed to attract private capital?
Section D: The formation of the idea of “separation” and the 
corporatisation policy
1. When did the idea of “separation” of infrastructure and train
253
operations emerge? Who proposed it and why?
- What were original ideas of this option?
- What were expectations of the government towards this notion?
- How did the private capital reckon?
- How did the union perceive it?
- What problems did the government encounter when the scheme
was in process?
- When did the scheme shift from separation to integration, and 
why? Who proposed it? And why?
2. When was the corporatisation policy of the TR proposed? Who 
proposed it and why?
- Did the government reckon that if the union accept 
corporatisation then privatisation of TR would be easily 
obtainable?
Section £: The development of the private high speed rail company
1. When did the government start to think of establishing a parallel 
railway company? Why was it established?
Did the government consult with Taiwan Railway managers and 
private consultants for this decision? What were their opinion 
and conclusion?
- Did private capital play a role in terms of this development?
- How did the union respond to the establishment of the other 
new railway company?
- What was the position of TR managers towards this?
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Appendix C 
Interview Schedules for other unions 
(translated from Mandarin)
(Chair of the CTWU and the TMT)
Section A: Personal background
• Age
• Post
• Length of service in relation to union affairs 
Section B: Privatisation of the two companies
1. When did you notice that the government wanted to privatise the 
company?
2. How did the union respond to the privatisation policy?
3. How did members of the union respond to the union’s decision­
making in relation to privatisation?
4. As far as you know, what roles did the following actors play in the 
privatisation process of your company?
- The government 
Management
- Private capital
- Trade union
5. How do you compare the relationship between the union and 
management before and after privatisation?
Section C: Privatisation of the Taiwan Railway and your company
1. By comparing the Taiwan Railway and your company, what factors 
resulted in the different outcome?
- The economic context of the company
- The role of the state
- The role of private capital in the privatisation process
- The role of the union
- The role of union members
Section D: Union bargaining capacity
1. What factors you think would shape union bargaining capacity?
- The role of the state
- The role of private capital
- The role of trade unions
- The role of employees
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Appendix D 
Interview Schedules for members of the 
TRWF and TDF 
(translated from Mandarin)
Section A: Personal background
• Age
• Post
• Length of participation in relation to the TRWF or TDF 
Section B: The origins of the TRWF and TDF
1. When were the fellowships established? Why?
2. How were they developed? Who got involved in the process?
3. What happened prior to and on the date of the establishment of the 
two fellowships?
4. What was the relationship between the two fellowships?
5. How did railway management perceive the role of the two 
fellowships?
Section C: The 9/11 event
1. How did the TDF play its role in the 9/11 event?
2. What happened between the TDF, the TRLU and railway 
management in the run up to the 9/11 event?
Section D: The future of the TDF
1. How do you define the role of the TDF in the Taiwan Railway?
2. How do you identify the relationship between the TDF and the TRLU?
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